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INTRODUCTION 
The United Nations (U.N.) Security Council’s paralysis, caused by the 
Russian and Chinese veto of resolutions addressing the Syrian crisis, calls 
into question the international community’s commitment to act collectively 
“in a timely and decisive manner” through the Security Council to protect 
  
 * Ved P. Nanda [John Evans Distinguished University Professor, University of 
Denver; Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director of the International & 
Comparative Legal Studies Program, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. This is an 
adapted version of the keynote address given at the “Modern Global Revolution” symposium 
presented by the Michigan State International Law Review on February 16-17, 2012. I would 
like to gratefully acknowledge the invaluable assistance of Joan Policastri, Foreign, 
International, and Comparative Law Librarian, Sturm College of Law, and Katharine Nanda, 
Esq., and to thank Dean Marty Katz and the College of Law for the summer research grant 
that supported this work. 
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the populations from mass atrocity crimes, including crimes against 
humanity.1 
Several reports, including one each in the latter half of 2011 by the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,2 the U.N. Human 
Rights Council (HRC),3 and the U.N. Committee Against Torture,4 and one 
each by the HRC (February 22, 2012)5 and Amnesty International (AI) 
(August 2012),6 affirmed allegations that government forces and militias 
have committed gross human rights violations that are widespread and 
systematic, amounting to crimes against humanity with the apparent 
knowledge and consent of those at the highest level of the Syrian 
government.7 
To illustrate, the fact-finding mission established by the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights analyzed first-hand 
information obtained through interviews conducted with victims and 
witnesses of murder and disappearances, torture, and persecution, and found 
patterns of human rights violations that may amount to crimes against 
humanity.8 The first report of the Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry, submitted in November 2011, stated: 
  
    1.  This was the commitment undertaken by the heads of state and government 
gathered at the U.N. World Summit in New York in September 2005. 2005 World Summit 
Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) [hereinafter World 
Summit Outcome] (the atrocity crimes to which R2P applies include genocide, war crimes, 
and ethnic cleansing, along with crimes against humanity and their incitement). 
 2. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republic, 
A/HRC/18/53 (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter A/HRC/18/53].  
 3. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1 (Nov. 23, 2011) 
[hereinafter A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1]. 
 4. U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria: 
UN Committee Against Torture Concerned About Gross and Widespread Rights Violations 
(Nov. 25, 2011) (reporting that the U.N. Committee Against Torture expressed alarm on 
November 25, 2011, that “prompt, thorough, and impartial investigations ha[d] not been 
undertaken” despite reports of massive human rights violations. It “requested the 
Government of Syria to provide it with a special report by 9 March 2012 . . . .”). 
 5. U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Independent International 
Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/19/69 (Feb. 22, 2012) 
[hereinafter Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, 2012]. 
 6. ALL-OUT REPRESSION: PURGING DISSENT IN ALEPPO, SYRIA, AMNESTY INT’L 
(2012), available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/research/reports/all-out-repression-purging-
dissent-in-aleppo-syria [hereinafter ALL-OUT REPRESSION]. 
 7. Appalled at the “indiscriminate and possibly deliberate . . . killing . . . in the area 
of Homs in Syria” in late May 2012, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights said 
that these acts “may amount to crimes against humanity or other forms of international 
crime.” U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Syria: 
Pillay Says El Houleh Killings May Amount to International Crimes (May 27, 2012) 
(quoting Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
 8. A/HRC/18/53, supra note 2, at 3-4, 20.  
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The substantial body of evidence gathered by the commission indicates 
that these gross violations of human rights have been committed by Syrian 
military and security force since the beginning of the protests in March 
2011. The commission is gravely concerned that crimes against humanity 
have been committed in different locations in the Syrian Arab Republic 
during the period under review.9 
The second Commission report stated that the government had 
“manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect its people. Since November 
2011, its forces have committed more widespread, systematic and gross 
human rights violations.”10 
The AI report of August 2012 detailed a wide range of state-directed, 
systematic violations of human rights, including the deliberate targeting of 
peaceful protesters, hunting-down of injured protesters, torture, targeting of 
medics providing emergency treatment to the wounded, arbitrary arrests, 
and disappearances in Syria’s largest and most populous city, Aleppo.11 The 
report, which was based on AI’s field research in and around Aleppo in late 
May 2012, concluded that the Syrian government was responsible for 
systematic violations in Aleppo amounting to crimes against humanity: 
The cases and patterns of abuses investigated in this report, together with 
the gross and widespread human rights abuses documented by Amnesty 
International over the past 18 months in other parts of the country, 
constitute a body of evidence that Syrian government forces and state-
armed militias have been responsible for crimes against humanity and war 
crimes.12 
Because the commitment to protect the populations from serious human 
rights violations, including crimes against humanity and war crimes, 
constitutes the core of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle adopted 
by the world’s leaders at the September 2005 U.N. World Summit, 13 the 
obvious question arises: what is the future of R2P? This inquiry is 
especially pertinent because after the invocation and application of R2P in 
Libya, which resulted in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) 
intervention in 2011 leading to the overthrow of Muammar Gadhafi, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated on January 18, 2012: 
  
 9. A/HRC/S-17/2/Add.1, supra note 3, at 1. 
 10. A/HRC/19/69, supra note 5. 
 11. ALL-OUT REPRESSION, supra note 6, at 10-12, 18-20, 24-26. 
 12. Id. at 8. See also Written Statement, Amnesty Int’l, No More Impunity for 
Crimes Against Humanity in Syria (Dec. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE24/083/2011/en/5ca30b30-247e-41c6-ba8c-
4ec4a2b9d8fd/mde240832011en.pdf. 
 13. See Ved P. Nanda, From Paralysis in Rwanda to Bold Moves in Libya: 
Emergence of the “Responsibility to Protect” Norm Under International Law—Is the 
International Community Ready for It?, 34 HOUS. J. INT’L. L. 1, 39-45 (2011) [hereinafter 
Paralysis in Rwanda]. 
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Today we mark the first decade in the life of the responsibility to protect. 
There will be many more, for we can now say with confidence that this 
fundamental principle of human protection is here to stay. . . .  
In 2011, history took a turn for the better. The responsibility to protect 
came of age; The principle was tested as never before. The results were 
uneven, but at the end of the day, tens of thousands of lives were saved. 
We gave hope to people long oppressed. In Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, South 
Sudan, Yemen and Syria, by our words and actions, we demonstrated that 
human protection is a defining purpose of the United Nations in the 
twenty-first century.  
We also learned important lessons. For one, we have learned that this 
Organization cannot stand on the sidelines when challenged to take 
preventive action.14 
When the Secretary-General spoke, the U.N. was already facing a test in 
Syria. Since then, more than nine months have passed and Syria continues 
to burn, with the spiral of violence still on the rise. Day after day we hear 
reports of the carnage as innocent men, women, and children are tortured 
and killed. According to media reports, as of the beginning of September 
2012, the death toll in Syria had reportedly already surpassed 18,000.15 
After Libya, the R2P glow quickly faded. Silence at the U.N. has been 
accompanied by lack of an effective response by the international 
community. Hence, this question is valid: “Will R2P rhetoric suffer the 
same fate as the ‘never again’ slogan in the aftermath of the Holocaust?” 
This article is a response to that inquiry. Part II provides an historical 
context leading to the birth of R2P. This is followed in Part III by a review 
of the NATO action in Libya, and in Part IV, the Syrian crisis. Part V 
examines Brazil’s proposal to supplement R2P with RWP (responsibility 
while protecting) and explores the means to implement and operationalize 
R2P. Part VI is the concluding section. 
  
 14. U.N. Secretary General, ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Came of Age in 2011, 
Secretary-General Tells Conference, Stressing Need to Prevent Conflict Before it Breaks 
Out, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/14068 (Jan. 18, 2012). 
 15. Timely and Decisive Response Vital to Uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect’-UN 
Officials, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42806&Cr= 
responsibility+to+protect&Cr1=#.UFPmdU8kWaI (“The Secretary-General pointed to the 
immense human cost of failing to protect the population of Syria, where more than 18,000 
people, mostly civilians, have died since the uprising against President Bashar al-Assad 
began 18 months ago.”); See also Syria Crisis: Death Toll Tops 17,000, Says Opposition 
Group, HUFFINGTON POST WORLD (July 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/ 
07/09/syria-crisis-death-toll-17000_n_1658708.html.  
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I. THE GENESIS OF THE “RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT” PRINCIPLE AND 
ITS EVOLUTION 
As the Secretary-General marked “the first decade in the life of the 
responsibility to protect,” he was implicitly referring to the December 2001 
report of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), entitled The Responsibility to Protect,16 which was 
most influential in giving the concept its final shape. It is worth noting that 
the Commission’s initiative was in response to the call of then—U.N. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his Millennium Report to the General 
Assembly in April 2000, for member states to “unite in the pursuit of more 
effective policies, to stop organized mass murder and egregious violations 
of human rights.”17 
The tragedies of Rwanda and Srebrenica, which had happened on Kofi 
Annan’s watch, were the precursors to his call. Humanitarian intervention 
as a possible response to such tragedies had come under severe criticism for 
its potential abuse.18 Annan acknowledged the criticism as he stated: “[I]f 
humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on 
sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross 
and systematic violations of human rights that affect every precept of our 
common humanity?”19 
The ICISS’s response to this challenge was to shift the debate from the 
“right of humanitarian intervention” or “right to intervene,” to the 
  
 16. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT (2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
[hereinafter ICISS Report]. 
 17. The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report, We the Peoples: The Role of the 
United Nations in the 21st Century, 47, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (April 3, 2000), 
www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.pdf. See also Press Release, Secretary General, ‘We 
the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century,’ to General Assembly, U.N. 
Press Release GA/9704 (Apr. 3, 2000). See generally Paralysis in Rwanda, supra note 13 
(discussing the development of the R2P concept and its invocations in Libya). 
 18. For discussion of humanitarian intervention, see generally 21 SEAN D. MURPHY, 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: THE UNITED NATIONS IN AN EVOLVING WORLD ORDER (Burns 
H. Weston et al. eds., 1996); FERNANDO R. TESÓN, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN 
INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (2d ed. 1997); Matthew C. Cooper, A Note to States 
Defending Humanitarian Intervention: Examining Viable Arguments Before the 
International Court of Justice, 40 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 167 (2011); James A.R. 
Nafziger, Humanitarian Intervention in a Community of Power Part II, 22 DENV. J. INT’L L. 
& POL’Y 219 (1994); Ved P. Nanda et. al., Tragedies in Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, Rwanda 
and Liberia-Revisiting the Validity of Humanitarian Intervention under International Law-
Part II, 26 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 827 (1998); Jide Nzelibe, Courting Genocide: The 
Unintended Effects of Humanitarian Intervention, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1171 (2009); W. 
Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World Constitutive 
Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 3 (2000); 
Thomas G. Weiss, The Sunset of Humanitarian Intervention? Responsibility to Protect in a 
Unipolar Era, 35 SECURITY DIALOGUE 135 (2004). 
 19. ICISS Report, supra note 16, at 2. 
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“responsibility to protect,” which meant a focus on the point of view of 
those seeking or needing support instead of those who may be considering 
intervention.20 It must, however, be acknowledged that in the mid-1990s 
Francis Deng, then Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons 
and later the Special Adviser for the Prevention of Genocide, and his 
colleagues at the Brookings Institution had already defined sovereignty not 
simply as a right but as a responsibility.21 And as several international legal 
instruments have mandated, sovereignty is not without obligations.22 
The ICISS’s “responsibility to protect” concept comprises three distinct 
responsibilities: the responsibility to prevent,23 the responsibility to react 
(which in extreme cases may include military intervention),24 and the 
responsibility to rebuild after military intervention.25 The responsibility to 
prevent focuses on the importance of early warning mechanisms and 
conflict prevention, and on the use of diplomatic, economic, and military 
means to contain a conflict before it escalates. The responsibility to react 
applies when a state is either unable or unwilling to protect its citizens from 
massive human rights violations occurring in the state. The Commission 
proposed a “just cause” threshold for such intervention to be “serious and 
irreparable harm” to human beings, such as large scale “loss of life,” or 
large scale ethnic cleansing.26 It also proposed four precautionary principles 
to guide the use of force once this threshold has been reached: 1) right 
intention to “halt or avert human suffering”;27 2) last resort after all 
diplomatic means have been explored; 3) proportional means;28 and 4) 
reasonable prospect of success in ending the suffering so that “the 
  
 20. Id. ¶ 2.29. 
 21. FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT 
MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (1996); See also Francis M. Deng, Frontiers of Sovereignty: A 
Framework of Protection, Assistance, and Development for the Internally Displaced, 8 
LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 249 (1995). 
 22. See, e.g., Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. 1, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (obligating states to “prevent 
and punish” the crime of genocide). See also Declaration on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/8082 (Oct. 24, 
1970) (listing, along with the principle of sovereign equality of States, the duty of States to 
fulfill in good faith their international obligations); International Law Commission, 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res 56/83, 53rd Sess., Jan. 
28, 2002, arts. 40, 41, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) (calling for a positive duty of 
a State to cooperate to bring to an end any serious breaches of a peremptory norm of general 
international law).  
 23. ICISS Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 3.1.43. 
 24. Id. ¶¶ 4.1-.43. 
 25. Id. ¶¶ 5.1-.31. 
 26. Id. ¶¶ 4.18-.19, 4.32-.33. 
 27. Id. ¶ 4.33. 
 28. Id. ¶ 4.39 
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consequences of action [are] not likely to be worse than the consequences of 
inaction.”29 
The ICISS report identified the U.N. Security Council as the right 
authority under the U.N. Charter to authorize military intervention.30 
Addressing the veto issue, the Commission said that the five permanent 
members of the Security Council should agree not to use the veto where 
their vital state interests are not at stake, assuming there is majority support 
for such action.31 
The report offered alternative options if the Security Council is unable to 
act: an emergency special session of the General Assembly under the 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution,32 or action of regional organizations “subject 
to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.”33 The 
report cautions the Security Council that if the Council fails to live up to its 
responsibility, single states or coalitions might take action.34 
The next stage in the evolutionary process was the December 2004 
Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 
established by Secretary-General Kofi Annan.35 The Panel endorsed a 
“collective international responsibility to protect,” which it said was an 
“emerging norm,” while supporting the ICISS report’s recommendation that 
the Security Council is the proper U.N. body to authorize military 
intervention as a last resort “in the event of genocide and other large-scale 
killing, ethnic cleansing or serious violations of international humanitarian 
law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling to 
prevent.”36 The Panel, however, did not discuss any alternative to the 
Security Council taking action, although it did urge the permanent members 
to refrain from “use of the veto in cases of genocide and large-scale human 
rights abuses.”37 
The Panel also endorsed the ICISS report’s “just cause” threshold as well 
as its precautionary principles, while renaming the basic criteria of 
legitimacy—seriousness of threat, proper purpose, last resort, proper means, 
  
 29. ICISS Report, supra note 16. at XII, ¶ 4.41. 
 30. Id. ¶¶, 6.13-6.15. 
 31. Id. ¶¶ 8.28-8.30. 
 32. Id. ¶¶ 6.29-6.30; Uniting for Peace, G.A. Res. 377 (V), U.N. Doc. A/1775 (Nov. 
3, 1950).  
 33. ICISS Report, supra note 16, ¶¶ 6.31-6.35. 
 34. Id. ¶ 6.39. 
 35. See generally High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change: A 
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004).  
 36. Id. ¶ 203. 
 37. Id. ¶ 256. 
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and balance of consequences.38 Kofi Annan accepted the Panel’s 
recommendation in his March 2005 report.39 
Finally, in September 2005, the U.N. World Summit of Heads of State 
and Government considered the Secretary-General’s report and, while 
endorsing each state’s “responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” added 
that: “[t]his responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes.”40 The 
Summit further resolved: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this context, we 
are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, 
through the Security Council, . . . on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should 
peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly 
failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.41 
A comparison of the commitments undertaken by the 2005 World 
Summit with the recommendations in the ICISS report shows several 
differences between the two documents. The World Summit commitments 
are restrictive. First, the scope of the responsibility to protect is limited in 
the Outcome Document to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity, while the ICISS report encompassed “large scale 
loss of life” or “large scale ethnic cleansing.” Second, the scope of possible 
collective action is limited in light of the Outcome Document’s rather vague 
wording regarding the states’ obligation when genocide and other atrocity 
crimes are committed—they are “prepared to act” in a timely manner “on a 
case-by-case basis.” Third, there is no reference in the Outcome Document 
to the role of the General Assembly or the possibility of action without the 
Security Council’s authorization. And fourth, the Outcome Document drops 
the ICISS’s suggested guidelines on the use of force—the “just cause” 
threshold and the precautionary principles. 
  
 38. Id. ¶ 207. 
 39. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards 
Development, Security and Human Rights for All, U.N. Doc. A/59/2005, (Mar. 21, 2005).  
 40. World Summit Outcome, supra note 1, ¶¶ 138-39. 
 41. Id. ¶ 139. For the commitments compared here between the World Summit 
Outcome Document principles and the ICISS report, see id. ¶¶ 139 and supra note 16, 
¶¶4.18-.19, 4.32-.33, respectively. See also U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) 
(articulating R2P’s three-pillar framework) [hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect].  
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II. THE APPLICATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT IN LIBYA 
The uprisings that toppled Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Zine el-Abidine 
ben Ali in Tunisia did not spare Libya. In response to protests and 
demonstrations, which began in February 2011, the Muammar Qaddafi 
regime used force to suppress dissent.42 The U.N. Secretary-General was 
outraged at reports that government troops had fired at demonstrators from 
aircraft, and called for an immediate end to the violence on February 21, 
2011.43 The following day, the Security Council issued a statement on the 
Libyan situation in which the members “expressed grave concern, 
condemned the violence” and repression against the civilians and 
demonstrators, and called upon the Libyan Government to “meet its 
responsibility to protect its population.”44 Four days later, in response to the 
reports about the regime’s use of foreign mercenaries, detention and torture 
of the opposition, shooting of peaceful demonstrators, and indiscriminate 
killing, the Secretary-General called upon the Security Council to take 
concrete action.45 
Expressing grave concern at the Libyan situation, the U.N. Security 
Council condemned the violence and use of force against civilians in 
Resolution 1970, which it adopted on February 26, 2011.46 Prior to the 
adoption of this resolution, several U.N. officials had also condemned the 
serious violations of human rights in Libya. These included the U.N. High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, who denounced “the use of 
live ammunition . . . against peaceful protesters in Libya”47 and called for an 
  
 42. See generally Int’l Coal. for the Responsibility to Protect, The Crisis in Libya, 
RESPONSIBILITYTOPROTECT.ORG, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited Sept. 
2012).  
 43. Press Release, Secretary-General, Outraged Secretary-General Calls for 
Immediate End to Violence in Libya, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13408 AFR/2119 (Feb. 22, 
2011). 
 44. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Libya, 
U.N. Press Release SC/10180 AFR/2120 (Feb. 22, 2011). 
 45. Press Release, Security Council, Fundamental Issues of Peace, Security at Stake, 
Secretary-General Warns as He Briefs Security Council on Situation in Libya, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10185 (Feb. 25, 2011); Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General 
Tells Security Council Time to Consider Concrete Action in Libya, as Loss of Time Means 
More Loss of Lives, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/13418-SC/10186-AFR/2124 (Feb. 25, 
2011). 
 46. See S.C. Res. 1970 (2011), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1970 (Feb. 26, 2011) [hereinafter 
U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1970]. 
 47. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Pillay Denounces Violence 
by Security Forces in Libya, Bahrain and Other Countries in Middle East and North Africa 
(Feb. 18, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10738&LangID=
E. 
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international inquiry into the violence,48 and a group of U.N. Human Rights 
experts “who warned . . . that the gross violations of human rights 
committed by the government of Libya could amount to ‘crimes against 
humanity.’”49 
The U.N. Human Rights Council adopted a resolution on February 25, 
2011, strongly condemning “the gross and systematic human rights 
violations committed in Libya, including indiscriminate armed attacks 
against civilians, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrests, detention and 
torture of peaceful demonstrators, some of which may also amount to 
crimes against humanity.”50 Under the resolution the Council established an 
independent international commission of inquiry to investigate the alleged 
human rights violations, and requested the Commission “to establish the 
facts and circumstances of such violations and of the crimes perpetrated 
and, where possible to identify those responsible . . . [so that] those 
individuals responsible are held accountable.”51 The Council also 
recommended to the General Assembly to suspend Libya’s membership in 
the Human Rights Council,52 which the General Assembly did on March 1, 
2011.53 
The Arab League, the African Union, and the Secretary General of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference also condemned the violations of 
human rights and international human rights law being committed in Libya, 
which the Security Council welcomed in the preamble of Resolution 1970.54 
  
 48. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Pillay Calls for International 
Inquiry into Libyan Violence and Justice for Victims (Feb. 22, 2011), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10743&LangID=E 
 49. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Libya: “Stop the 
Massacre”—UN Experts (Feb. 22, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10747&LangID=E 
 50. Human Rights Council Resolution 15/1, Situation of Human Rights in the Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, 15th Spec. Sess., U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1 (Feb. 25, 2011) 
[hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1]. 
 51. Id. ¶ 11. See also U.N. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Council 
Holds Interactive Dialogue with Commission of Inquiry on Alleged Human Rights 
Violations in Libya (June 9, 2011), http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/ 
DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11131&LANGID=E (finding by the Commission on behalf of 
the Commission’s chair, Professor Cherif Bassiouni, that the government forces and their 
supporters had committed serious violations of international law, including murder, torture, 
persecution, and enforced disappearance, and presented it to the Human Rights Council 
meeting, and that these violations constituted “crimes against humanity” under customary 
international law, and as defined in the International Criminal Court’s statute, as well as 
committing serious violations of international humanitarian law, amounting to war crimes); 
See also Human Rights Council, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry to 
Investigate all Alleged Violations of International Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/17/44, 17th Sess. (June 1, 2011).  
 52. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/S-15/1, supra note 50, ¶ 14. 
 53. Suspension of the Rights of Membership of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya in the 
Human Rights Council, G.A. Res. 65/265, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/265 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
 54. U.N. Doc S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 46, at pmbl.  
2013] The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect 11 
It welcomed the Human Rights Council’s decision regarding the 
establishment of an independent international commission of inquiry,55 and 
specifically invoked “the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its 
population.”56 
The Security Council deplored “the gross and systematic violation of 
human rights,” expressed “deep concern at the death of civilians,” rejected 
“unequivocally the incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian 
population made from the highest level of the Libyan government,”57 
demanded an immediate end to the violence, and urged the Libyan 
authorities to act “with the utmost restraint, respect human rights and 
international humanitarian law.”58 It also decided to refer the Libyan 
situation to the International Criminal Court59 and imposed sanctions 
against Libya, including an arms embargo,60 travel ban against named 
government officials,61 and an asset freeze.62 The Security Council 
established a new sanctions committee63 and decided to remain actively 
seized of the matter.64 
The Libyan government remained defiant, violence was on the rise, and 
there were calls for a no-fly zone and international action to protect 
civilians. To illustrate, in his statement to the General Assembly on March 
1, the U.N. Secretary-General commented on the “reports that Government 
forces have fired indiscriminately on peaceful protesters,” and reminded the 
General Assembly that “[o]ur collective challenge will be to provide real 
protection for the people of Libya.”65  
On the same day, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights called on “the responsibility of the African Union, the Peace and 
Security Council of the African Union, and the International Community to 
take all the necessary political and legal measures for the protection of the 
  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. ¶ 2(a).  
 59. Id. ¶¶ 4-8. See also Press Release, International Criminal Court, Pre-Trial 
Chamber I Issues Three Warrants of Arrest for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, 
and Abdullah al-Senussi (June 27, 2011), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/exeres/D07229DE-
4E3D-45BC-8CB1-F5DAF8370218.htm. (reporting that the International Criminal Court 
issued warrants of arrest for Gaddafi, one of his sons, and Libya’s Intelligence Chief on 
murder and persecution charges through the state apparatus and Security Forces which 
constituted crimes against humanity).  
 60. U.N. Doc. S.C. Res. 1970, supra note 46, ¶¶ 9-14. 
 61. Id. ¶15, Annex I.  
 62. Id. ¶¶ 17-22, Annex II.  
 63. Id. ¶ 24.  
 64. Id. ¶ 28. 
 65. Press Release, Secretary-General, United Nations Response To Violence Against 
Civilians in Libya Sends Strong Message; There is ‘No Impunity’ For Crimes Against 
Humanity, Secretary-General Says, U.N. Press Release, para. 11, SG/SM/13425, GA/11051, 
AFR/2130 (Mar. 1, 2011). Id. at para. 26.  
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Libyan population.”66 The Secretary General of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC), Professor Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, announced (on 
March 8) that the OIC “aligned with those calling for a no-fly zone over 
Libya with a view to protecting civilians from air strikes [, and] called on 
the Security Council to assume its responsibility in this regard.”67 On March 
10 the European Parliament adopted a resolution stressing “that the EU and 
its Member States must honour their Responsibility to Protect, in order to 
save Libyan civilians from large-scale armed attacks,” and calling on  
“the High Representative and the Member States to stand ready for a UNSC 
decision on further measures, including the possibility of a no-fly  
zone aimed at preventing the regime from targeting the civilian population 
 . . . .”
68
 
On March 12, “[t]he Arab League called on the UN Security Council [ ] 
to immediately impose a no-fly zone over Libya and announced its 
recognition of the rebel movement as that country’s legitimate 
government.”69 Two days later, the Permanent Observer of the League of 
Arab States to the United Nations addressed a letter to the President of the 
U.N. Security Council informing him about the Council of the League’s 
decision “[t]o call upon the Security Council, in view of the deterioration in 
the situation in Libya, to shoulder its responsibility and take the measures 
necessary to immediately impose a no-fly zone on Libyan military aircraft . 
. . .”
70
 The six Arab Gulf Countries also supported the imposition of a no-fly 
zone over Libya to protect civilians from attacks by the Libyan regime.71 
On March 17, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1973,72 which 
authorized member states “to take all necessary measures . . . to protect 
  
 66. African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Human 
Rights Situation in the Great Socialist Peoples’ Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Res. 181 (Mar. 1, 
2011), http://www.achpr.org/sessions/9th-eo/resolutions/181/. 
 67. Ihsanoglu Support No-Fly Decision at Oic Meeting on Libya, Calls for an 
Islamic Humanitarian Programme in and Outside Libya, ORG. OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION 
(Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.oic/oci.org/topic_print.asp?t_id=5031.  
 68. Resolution of 10 March 2011 on the Southern Neighbourhood, and Libya in 
particular, EUR. PARL. DOC. PV P7_TA(2011)0095 (Mar. 10, 2011), ¶10, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2011-
0095+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN.  
 69. Richard Leiby & Muhammad Mansour, Arab League Asks U.N. for No-Fly Zone 
Over Libya, WASH. POST, Mar. 12, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-
league-asks-un-for-no-fly-zone-over-libya/2011/03/12/ABoie0R_print.html.  
 70. U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Mar. 14, 2011 from the Permanent Observer 
of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, para. 1, U.N. Doc. S/2011/137 (Mar. 15, 2011). 
 71. GCC Supports No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Call for Urgent Arab Summit, GOING 
GLOBAL EAST MEETS WEST—ARCHIVES (Mar. 8, 2011), http://articlesofinterest-
kelley.blogspot.com/2011/03/gcc-supports-no-fly-zone-over-libya.html. 
 72. S.C. Res. 1973, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973, (Mar. 17, 2011) 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution [hereinafter U.N. 
Doc. S.C. Res. 1973]. 
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civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in [Libya], 
including Benghazi, while excluding a foreign occupation force of any form 
on any part of Libyan territory.”73 At that time, Paul Williams and Colleen 
Popkin observed that “the world witnessed a brief moment of legal and 
moral clarity.”74  
The Security Council did indeed take a bold step by reiterating the 
Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect the Libyan population, 
reaffirming the primary responsibility of the parties to armed conflicts “to 
take all feasible steps to ensure the protection of civilians,”75 and, as noted 
earlier, “[a]uthoriz[ing] Member States . . . to take all necessary measures . . 
. to protect civilians . . . .”76 The Libyan situation called for such measures, 
for Gaddafi had earlier called the protesters “cockroaches” and promised to 
track them down and kill them, “house by house”—reminiscent of the 
language used by those perpetrating the Rwandan massacre—and had 
pledged “no mercy” to those who did not surrender as his forces were on the 
outskirts of Benghazi on March 17.77 The Security Council established a no-
fly zone78 and further strengthened the sanctions imposed by Resolution 
1970.79 
Pursuant to the Security Council’s authorization, a coalition of western 
states intervened militarily in Libya with the U.S. undertaking an air 
campaign against Gaddafi’s forces and NATO assuming responsibility for 
enforcing the arms embargo and no-fly zone. Commencing in March and 
continuing until October 2011, NATO carried out military attacks in Libya. 
President Barack Obama offered the rationale for NATO’s intervention on 
March 28:  
Qaddafi declared he would show “no mercy” to his own people. He 
compared them to rats, and threatened to go door to door to inflict 
punishment. We knew that if we . . . waited one more day, Benghazi, a city 
  
 73. Id. ¶ 4.  
 74. Paul R. Williams & Colleen (Betsy) Popken, North Africa and the Mideast: To 
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the Revolution: Can a Ragtag Civilian Army Defeat a Dictator? NEW YORKER (May 9, 
2011), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/09/110509fa_fact_anderson. 
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nearly the size of Charlotte, could suffer a massacre that would have 
reverberated across the region and stained the conscience of the world.80 
After seven months of military operations by NATO, the Gaddafi regime 
fell and his 42-year rule came to an end; eventually he was captured and 
died at the hands of rebels on October 20, 2011.81 A week later the U.N. 
ended its Libya military mandate,82 and NATO announced it was ending its 
military operations on October 31.83 
As the Syrian government continued killing civilians and the Security 
Council took no action, Williams and Popkin, who applauded a “moment of 
legal and moral clarity” when the Security Council passed Resolution 1973 
concerning Libya, later acknowledged that “[t]his moment of legal and 
moral clarity may have already passed.”84 As I study the Syrian crisis, I will 
discuss this quandary. 
III. THE CRISIS IN SYRIA 
A. Human Rights Violations in Syria Amounted to Crimes 
Against Humanity and War Crimes 
On the heels of the R2P triumph in Libya, protests and nonviolent 
demonstrations in Syria, which began in mid-March 2011, were met with 
extreme violence and brutal repression by government forces to crush the 
opposition.85 This repression led to defections from the army, acquisition of 
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weapons from other countries by the opposition, and the start of an armed 
uprising aimed at toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad. This eventually 
turned into a civil war. The protracted conflict between a regime under siege 
and a fractured opposition—with Iran and Russia supporting Assad and 
Saudi Arabia and Qatar, among others, supplying arms to the rebels—
galvanized the sectarian divide between Alawites and Sunnis, with both 
sides receiving support from abroad; created unease among the Syrian 
Christian community; and stirred regional unrest and fear of instability.  
Although the international community was outraged at reports of 
civilians being massacred in several places, the use of children as human 
shields by the army and militia, and the humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, 
the U.N.’s inaction was palpable. Russia and China repeatedly blocked 
efforts to get U.N. authority for tougher sanctions and stronger measures 
against the Syrian regime to stop the ongoing slaughter and humanitarian 
catastrophe.  
The Assad regime’s atrocities continued unabated. To illustrate, on July 
27, 2012, the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights expressed deep 
alarm at the increased threat to civilians in Syria and noted a discernible 
pattern of actions by government forces as they tried to clear areas they 
claimed were occupied by opposition forces: 
Typically, during the initial stages, after a village or urban district has been 
surrounded, water, electricity and food supplies are cut. This is followed 
by intense shelling and bombardment by a variety of weaponry, 
increasingly with air support from attack helicopters and now reportedly 
even jet aircraft. Then tanks move in, followed by ground forces who 
proceed door-to-door and reportedly often summarily execute people they 
suspect of being opposition fighters, although sometimes they detain them 
. . . . The bodies of those executed or otherwise killed are then sometimes 
burned or taken away.86 
She added: “While such conclusions can only ultimately be reached in a 
court of law, it is my belief, on the basis of evidence gathered from various 
credible sources, that crimes against humanity and war crimes have been, 
and continue to be, committed in Syria.”87 She “was also concerned by 
reports of killings of unarmed prisoners and use of excessive force by 
authorities reacting to unrest in two prisons.”88 
  
GLOBALR2P.ORG (July 15, 2012), http://globalr2p.org/media/pdf/R2P_Monitor_July2012.pdf 
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 86. U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Pillay Warns of 
Consequences Under International Law as Syria Conflict Escalates (July 27, 2012), 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12393&LangID=E 
(quoting Navi Pillay, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
 87. Id.  
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In July 2012, Human Rights Watch reported a pattern of torture in 
detention centers run by Syrian intelligence agencies, indicating the 
regime’s policy of torture and ill-treatment.89 Based on 200 interviews with 
former detainees from twenty-seven detention centers, the report states: 
“Since the beginning of anti-government protests in March 2011, Syrian 
authorities have subjected tens of thousands of people to arbitrary arrests, 
unlawful detentions, and forced disappearances, ill-treatment, and torture, 
using an extensive network of detention facilities, an archipelago of torture 
centers, scattered throughout Syria.”90  
In response to the events in Syria, the UN Human Rights Council called 
upon the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to appoint a 
fact-finding mission to investigate all alleged violations of international 
human rights law in Syria since March 2011.91 On August 22, 2011, the 
Council considered the report of the fact-finding mission at its 17th Special 
Session and, having expressed “profound concern about its finding, 
including that there were patterns of human rights violations that may 
amount to crimes against humanity,” it “decide[d] to dispatch urgently an 
independent international commission of inquiry . . . to investigate all 
alleged violations of international human rights law [in Syria] since March 
2011.”92 
The Commission submitted its first report on November 23, 2011,93 its 
second report on February 22, 2012,94 and an oral update on June 26, 
2012.95 In another report on August 16, 2012, the Commission asserted that 
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both the Syrian government and the opposition had used “brutal tactics.” 96 
However, it charged that government forces had been responsible for war 
crimes including murder, extrajudicial killings and torture, and gross 
violations of international human rights including unlawful killing, attacks 
against civilians, and acts of sexual violence. These crimes were committed 
in line with State policy, with indications of the involvement at the highest 
levels of the Government, as well as security and armed forces.97 
The Commission faced a major challenge in its inability to visit Syria, 
despite repeated requests.98 This lack of physical access to the country 
significantly hampered its investigation and its ability to fulfill its mandate. 
Although its chairperson did visit Damascus, the Commission had to collect 
firsthand accounts from people who had left the country. It also met with 
regional organizations, NGOs, and many individuals. The Commission’s 
methodology consisted of interviews in the field and electronically, via 
Skype or telephone, with witnesses and victims located inside the country; it 
conducted a total of 1,062 interviews from the time of its establishment in 
September 2011 through August 2012.  
As its standard of proof, the Commission sought to obtain a reliable body 
of evidence that was consistent with other information, and thus the 
incidents reported were based on two or more consistent and reliable 
witness accounts, often further supported by additional corroborating 
evidence.99 According to the Commission, a total of 7,928 people had been 
killed as of July 9, 2012; NGO reports ranged from 17,000 to 22,000, but 
the Commission was unable to confirm these figures.100 
Based upon the substantial body of evidence the Commission gathered, it 
concluded in the first (November 2011) report that the Syrian military and 
security forces had committed gross violations of human rights. It expressed 
grave concern that 
[c]rimes against humanity of murder, torture, rape or other forms of sexual 
violence of comparable gravity, imprisonment or other severe deprivation 
of liberty, enforced disappearances of persons and other inhumane acts of 
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a similar character have occurred in different locations in the country since 
March 2011 . . . .101 
Using a similar methodology as in the first report, the Commission 
concluded in its second report in February 2012:  
The Government has manifestly failed in its responsibility to protect the 
population; its forces have committed widespread, systematic and gross 
human rights violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, with the 
apparent knowledge and consent of the highest levels of the State. Anti-
Government armed groups have also committed abuses, although not 
comparable in scale and organization with those carried out by the State.102 
The Commission added that the crimes against humanity and other gross 
human rights violations it had documented had been committed within a 
system of impunity.103 
On June 14, Francis Deng and Edward Luck, then Special Advisers to 
the U.N. Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide and the 
responsibility to protect, respectively, issued a statement highlighting “the 
Syrian government’s manifest failure to protect its population.”104 They 
urged “the U.N. Security Council to consider the request of the High 
Commissioner on Human Rights to refer the Syrian situation to the 
International Criminal Court.”105 
In its oral update of June 26, the Commission reported on its special 
inquiry into the alleged killings at Al-Houla. As it was unable to visit the 
site of the killing, its report was based on interviews with witnesses either in 
person or, if they had fled the country, via telephone/Skype. The 
Commission found the perpetrators to be “Shabbiha or other local [pro-
Government] militia from neighbouring villages,” and concluded that it had 
[r]easonable grounds to believe that Government forces and Shabbiha 
have perpetrated unlawful killings, arbitrary arrests and detention and 
torture and other forms of ill-treatment . . . . Particularly affected are 
children . . . . interviews conducted by the Commission indicated that 
Government forces and Shabbiha have committed acts of sexual violence 
against men, women and children during the reporting period.106 
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In its report dated, August 15, 2012, the Commission found that armed 
violence had increased in intensity and spread to new areas and, based upon 
“the intensity and duration of the conflict, combined with the increased 
organization capabilities of anti-government armed groups, “the Syrian 
conflict had met the legal threshold for a non-international armed 
conflict.107 Thus, in its assessment of the actions of the parties to the 
hostilities, the Commission applied both international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law.108 
The Commission found “reasonable grounds to believe that Government 
forces and the Shabbiha committed crimes against humanity, war crimes 
and violations of international human rights law and international 
humanitarian law.”109 It also found reasonable grounds to believe that anti-
Government armed groups had also violated human rights law and 
committed war crimes. The Commission underscored that it  
[b]elieves that the large-scale operations during which the most serious 
violations were committed were conducted with the knowledge, or at the 
behest, of the highest levels of Government. Responsibility therefore rests 
with those who either ordered or planned the acts or, in the case of those in 
effective command and control, those who failed to prevent or punish the 
perpetrators. The consistent identification of the Shabbiha perpetrators of 
many of the crimes does not relieve the Government of its responsibility, 
as international law recognizes the responsibility of States that commit 
violations through proxies.110 
Among NGOs, the Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect 
(Global R2P) reported on January 10, 2012, that “State violence against 
civilians in Syria constitutes ongoing crimes against humanity by the Syrian 
Arab Republic.”111 It stated that since the beginning of the March 12 mass 
protest movement in Syria,  
Syrian security forces have used tanks, warships and heavy weapons 
against centers of protest. The security forces have also indiscriminately 
fired live ammunition to disperse and terrorize civilian protesters. Since 
March massacres have been perpetrated against civilians in Damascus [and 
six more cities, including Homs]. 
. . . . 
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Crimes against humanity perpetrated by the Syrian government continue to 
pose a grave threat to civilians.112 
Subsequently, in its July 2012 report, Global R2P asserted that “security 
forces and allied ‘shabiha’ militias have been intensifying their attacks 
[massacring civilians, using] helicopter gunships and tanks.”113 
B. The Response at the United Nations 
At the United Nations the grave concern with the Syrian situation was 
accompanied by exploring all possible means to bring the conflict to an end 
and to ensure the protection of the population. Hence, in addition to the 
active engagement of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the 
Human Rights Council, there were ongoing deliberations by members of 
both the Security Council and the General Assembly. As mentioned earlier, 
Russia and China stubbornly resisted any attempt by the Security Council to 
take strong measures against the Syrian government.  
To briefly recapitulate, on August 3, 2011, a Security Council 
Presidential Statement condemned “the widespread violations of human 
rights and the use of force against civilians by the Syrian authorities.”114 
The Council adopted this Statement by consensus, with only Lebanon 
“disassociat[ing] itself from the statement.”115 On October 4, 2011, after 
months of negotiations, a European-sponsored Security Council draft 
resolution116 containing sanctions against Syria including travel bans and an 
arms embargo, was defeated after receiving nine affirmative votes but with 
China and Russia vetoing, while South Africa, India, Brazil, and Lebanon 
abstained.117 The U.S. Representative to the U.N., Susan Rice, walked out 
after the vote, saying that “opposition to the resolution was a ‘cheap ruse by 
those who would rather sell arms to the Syrian regime than stand with the 
Syrian people.’”118 
Then, as discussed earlier, on August 22, the U.N. Human Rights 
Council resolved to dispatch its Independent International Commission of 
Inquiry to Syria to investigate all alleged human rights violations since 
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March 2011, in the Syrian Arab Republic, “to establish the facts and 
circumstances that may amount to such violations and of the crimes 
perpetrated and, where possible, to identify those responsible with a view of 
ensuring that perpetrators of violations, including those that may constitute 
crimes against humanity, are held accountable . . . .” 119 On November 2, 
there was a bit of hope when the Syrian government agreed to an Arab 
League peace plan to end the fighting,120 but the hope was short-lived.121 
On December 19, the General Assembly agreed to a resolution urging 
Syria to implement the Arab League plan of action “in its entirety,” 
including cooperating with the HRC’s commission of inquiry.122 Resolution 
66/176 “[s]trongly condemn[ed] the continued grave and systematic human 
rights violations by the Syrian authorities, such as arbitrary executions, 
excessive use of force and the persecution and killing of protesters and 
human rights defenders, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, 
torture and ill-treatment of detainees, including children . . . .”123 
The next attempt to take action in the Security Council came on February 
4, 2012, following the bloody siege of the city of Homs in which some 217 
to 260 people were killed. The strongly worded draft resolution called for 
President Assad to step down and for stringent sanctions against the Assad 
regime. The resolution condemned the ongoing violence and called upon the 
Syrian government to uphold its commitments under an Arab League plan 
that it had signed in November. On this occasion, none of the members 
abstained, but China and Russia again cast vetoes.124 
Subsequently, on February 16, the General Assembly overwhelmingly 
adopted another resolution, again  
[s]trongly condemn[ing] the continued widespread and systematic 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms by the Syrian 
authorities, such as the use of force against civilians, arbitrary executions, 
the killing and persecution of protestors, human rights defenders and 
journalists, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearances, interference with 
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access to medical treatment, torture, sexual violence, and ill-treatment, 
including against children.125 
A week later, on February 23, the Secretary General and the League of 
Arab States announced their appointment of Kofi Annan as a Joint Special 
Envoy on Syria.126 This move was enthusiastically endorsed by the Security 
Council,127which  
 
expressed its full support for [his] efforts . . . to bring an immediate end to 
all violence and human rights violations, secure humanitarian access, and 
facilitate a Syrian-led political transition to a democratic, plural political 
system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations or 
ethnicities or beliefs . . . .128 
  
On March 26, the Syrian government accepted Kofi Annan’s six-point 
proposal.129 However, implementation again seemed unattainable. On April 
4, 2012, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2042,130 
authorizing a team of up to thirty unarmed military observers “to liaise with 
the parties and to begin reporting on the implementation of a full cessation 
of armed violence in all its forms by all parties.” The resolution noted the 
Syrian government’s commitment to implement a ceasefire as of April 10, 
which the parties at that time apparently intended to observe, and underlined 
the urgency of full implementation of Kofi Annan’s Annan’s proposed six-
point plan.131 
The Syrian government, through its representative, pledged to support 
Mr. Annan’s mission as long as it respected Syria’s sovereignty, saying, 
“The time for violence is gone . . . . the time for stewardship over us is gone 
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as well.”132 The Council stated that once the cessation of violence was 
sustained it would immediately establish a U.N. supervision mission in 
Syria to monitor all relevant aspects of the Annan plan. The parties to the 
six-point proposal, set forth in an annex to the resolution, agreed to  
· work in an “inclusive Syrian-led political process to address the 
legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people”; 
· stop the fighting through a U.N. supervised cessation of armed 
violence to protect civilians and stabilize the country, in which the 
government would stop moving troops into population centers and 
begin a pullback of military concentrations in those areas , and also 
work to cease armed violence, with U.N. supervision; the 
opposition would similarly stop fighting and work toward cessation 
of armed violence, with U.N. supervision; 
· ensure access for provision of humanitarian assistance, including a 
daily two-hour pause for humanitarian access; 
· “intensify the pace and scale of release of arbitrarily detained 
persons”; 
· allow freedom of movement for journalists in the country; and 
· “respect freedom of association and the right to demonstrate 
peacefully as legally guaranteed.”133 
But the fighting did not cease.134 Instead, it very soon escalated, and, as it 
was apparent that the called-for cessation of armed violence was “clearly 
incomplete,”135 the Security Council’s action again became urgent. On April 
21, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2043, establishing a 
ninety-day U.N. Supervision Mission to monitor the ceasefire and 
implementation of Resolution 2042 and deploying 300 unarmed military 
observers.136 
  
 132. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Unanimously Adopts 
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 133. S.C. Res. 2042, supra note 130, Annex, Six Point Proposal of the Joint Special 
Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States. 
 134. See, e.g., U.N. News Centre, UN-Arab League envoy presses for ceasefire in 
Syria, April 10, 2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=41735&Cr=syria 
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 135. S.C. Res. 2043, at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2043 (Apr. 21, 2012). 
 136. Id. 
24 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1  
However, all efforts were unavailing. On July 19, yet another Security 
Council resolution calling for sanctions on Damascus was vetoed by China 
and Russia.137 The Council’s inaction was widely criticized.138 In an August 
3 resolution, the General Assembly expressed its “deep concern at the lack 
of progress towards implementation of the six-point plan, and deplor[ed] the 
failure of the Security Council to agree on measures to ensure the 
compliance of Syrian authorities with its decisions.”139 The resolution, 
which was passed by 133 in favor, twelve against, and thirty-one 
abstentions,140 encouraged the Security Council to consider appropriate 
measures to hold accountable those responsible for human rights violations, 
including those that may amount to crimes against humanity.141 The 
resolution reiterated the General Assembly’s call for “an inclusive Syrian-
led political transition to a democratic, pluralistic political system”142 
In the face of what must have appeared a hopeless situation, Kofi Annan 
resigned as Joint Envoy on August 2, 2012, with very critical words for the 
Security Council’s inability to exercise its authority to save the lives of 
innocent victims in Syria.143 The Secretary-General announced that he and 
the Arab League had agreed upon Lakhdar Brahimi for Annan’s 
replacement as Joint Envoy on August 17.144 
  
 137. See U.N. Secretary-General, Security Council fails to adopt resolution on Syria 
(Jul. 19, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42513&Cr=Syria& 
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2013] The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect 25 
C. Regional Response 
Arab inter-governmental organizations have been at the forefront of the 
effort to address the conflict in Syria. The Arab Parliament, an eighty-eight-
member advisory committee of lawmakers from the forty-four-member 
nations of the Arab League, called for monitors to leave Syria as their 
presence provided an imprimatur for the actions of the Syrian government. 
The Speaker of the Parliament called this a “clear violation of the Arab 
League protocol which is to protect the Syrian people.” He added, “We are 
seeing an increase in violence, more people are being killed including 
children . . . and all this in the presence of Arab League monitors, which has 
angered the Arab people.”145 
The Arab League suspended Syria and imposed tough economic 
sanctions to isolate Syria from the rest of the membership in November 
2011 after the Assad government accepted a peace plan,146 but then 
blatantly ignored the plan and invaded Homs.147 On August 15, the 
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) suspended Syria from 
membership in the organization, which represents 1.5 billion Muslims, 
because of “strong concern over the massacres and the inhumane acts that 
are being committed against the Syrian people.”148 
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D. Sanctions against Syria149 
Numerous states and regional organizations imposed diplomatic and 
economic sanctions on Syria during the course of its deadly war against its 
people. A number of states closed their embassies in Damascus and/or 
expelled the representatives of Syria. Also, many states and regional 
organizations imposed economic sanctions. 
E. Nongovernmental Organizations’ (NGOs) Response 
NGOs have been equally frustrated in their efforts to make any 
meaningful inroads in protecting the Syrian population, but their work has 
been critical, nonetheless, in raising awareness of the ongoing Syrian crisis, 
as well as in monitoring the violations and providing humanitarian aid. The 
contributions of a selected few organizations are noted here. 
After all of the efforts on the intergovernmental scale had clearly failed 
to halt the violence in Syria, and as the Syrian government’s bloody 
repression drew ever greater and more organized resistance, on August 4, 
2012, the International Committee for the Red Cross, which is responsible 
for the Geneva Conventions and their application in conflicts, characterized 
the situation as a “non-international armed conflict,” or civil war.150 Thus, it 
announced that henceforth all parties were subject to international 
humanitarian law: 
Under international humanitarian law, the parties to the conflict must at all 
times distinguish between civilians and persons directly participating in 
hostilities. Attacks may be directed only against military objectives—
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never against civilians, or against civilian structures such as homes, 
schools or places of worship.151 
This development is important in establishing the threshold for findings 
of international crimes committed in the course of the repression. 
Within Syria, the Syrian Arab Red Crescent has had a major role in 
providing relief, but has been greatly hampered by the logistics of the war 
and competing political pressures.152 On the international level, 
organizations concerned with human rights in Syria include Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch (HRW), the International Coalition for 
Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P), and the Global Center for the 
Responsibility to Protect (GCR2P). 
Amnesty International has been extremely effective in bringing to light 
the egregious human rights violations occurring in the Syrian conflict, 
including issuing major reports such as Deadly Reprisals153 and All-Out 
Repression.154 Similarly, Human Rights Watch, ICR2P, and GCR2P have 
been actively monitoring the situation and issuing comprehensive reports 
and recommendations.155 
IV. SUPPLEMENTING RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT WITH RESPONSIBILITY 
WHILE PROTECTING 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 report, Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect,156 is a seminal document in which he elaborated 
on the concept and further clarified it, especially highlighting its three 
pillars.157 Pillar one states the primary responsibility of each state to protect 
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Needed in Syria, (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/14/un-human-rights-
monitors-still-needed-syria; Ole Solvang, Tracking Down Torture in Syria, CNN Opinion, 
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its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes 
against humanity.158 The second pillar states the international community’s 
commitment to provide assistance to states in capacity building so that they 
can protect their populations from these crimes.159 And pillar three 
articulates the international community’s responsibility to take “timely and 
decisive” action to prevent and halt these crimes when a state is “manifestly 
failing” to protect the population.160 A range of options for such action, both 
non-coercive and coercive, is available under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII of 
the U.N. Charter.161 The document also provides for the General Assembly 
to be proactive, as provided under Charter Articles 10-14 and under the 
“Uniting for Peace” resolution.162 
The Secretary-General emphasized the narrow scope of the 
Responsibility to Protect as limited to the four specified crimes. He 
recounted the impressive developments in Africa in redefining sovereignty, 
noting the Constitutive Act of the African Union, under which the Union 
has the right “to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect to grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide, 
and crimes against humanity.”163 
The General Assembly considered the Secretary-General’s report, 
deliberating over a period of three days164 — informal interactive dialogue 
on July 23165 and two days of debate on July 24166 and 28167 — and adopted 
the resolution The Responsibility to Protect on September 14, 2009.168 The 
resolution recalled the 2005 World Summit Outcome and took note of the 
report of the Secretary-General and of the “timely and productive” 
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deliberation in the General Assembly on the subject.169 In its operative part, 
the General Assembly decided “to continue its consideration of the 
responsibility to protect.”170  
Pursuant to that decision, the General Assembly discussed R2P in an 
informal interactive dialogue in August 2010.171 Preceding the dialogue, the 
Secretary-General submitted a report, “Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect.”172 In this report, he noted the UN’s weakness in 
its insufficient focus on early warning and risk analysis and the lack of 
sufficient information sharing during the Rwanda and Srebrenica 
tragedies.173 He referred to several gaps in “providing the timely 
information and assessment needed to implement the Responsibility to 
Protect in a balanced, responsible, rigorous manner.”174 
The Secretary-General underscored the importance of early engagement 
for understanding a given situation, which is equally important to framing 
strategies for either prevention or response. The report emphasized the need 
for well-informed action. Thus, [g]etting the right assessment—both of the 
situation on the ground and of the policy options available to the United 
Nations and to its regional and subregional partners—is essential for the 
effective, credible and sustainable implementation of the responsibility to 
protect and for fulfilling the commitments made by the Heads of State and 
Government at the 2005 World Summit.175 
The Secretary-General suggested that the Assembly discuss in its next 
interactive dialogue in 2011 the role of regional organizations in 
implementing the responsibility to protect.176 
In the General Assembly’s informal dialogue there was overall support 
for the R2P, although a few states remained critical.177 The General 
Assembly also welcomed the Secretary-General’s suggestion that the next 
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interactive dialogue focus on the role of regional organizations in 
implementing R2P.178 
The next informal interactive dialogue took place on July 12, 2011.179 
The Secretary-General presented a report on June 27, 2011, entitled “The 
Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect.”180 In his report, the Secretary General 
highlighted the partnership and collaboration between the U.N. Secretariat, 
on the one hand, and the regional organizations on the other. He noted the 
ongoing contacts between his special advisers on the prevention of genocide 
and on the responsibility to protect, and regional groups on both thematic 
issues and specific country situations.181 Addressing the General Assembly 
on July 12, the Secretary-General acknowledged that the record on atrocity 
prevention is still mixed and anticipated that dialogue would “open a 
sustained cross-regional conversation on lessons learned and practical 
experiences.”182 
The next interactive dialogue took place on September 5, 2012, on the 
third pillar—collective, timely, and decisive response when a state is 
“manifestly unwilling to protect its population.”183 As in the past, prior to 
the Assembly meeting, the Secretary-General presented his report on July 
25, entitled “Responsibility to protect: timely and decisive response.”184 
The timing was critical for the discussion of the third pillar, as the 
complexity of the Syrian situation had presented a dilemma for invocation 
and application of R2P. Unquestionably, the Syrian government has the 
responsibility to protect its population, which, as the first pillar mandates, is 
an affirmation of each state’s duty under international law. As to the second 
pillar, the international community’s assistance to states to develop local 
capacities to protect populations from atrocity crimes, the rapid pace of 
events in Syria made such assistance impossible. Every initiative of the 
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international community was either ignored or rebuffed by the Assad 
government. And protests against the government were brutally repressed 
by the Assad regime, which led to the use of violence by the opposition, as 
well.  
As the preceding discussion has shown, state-directed crimes against 
humanity and war crimes were committed in Syria and continue as of the 
time of this writing. The national authorities have manifestly failed to 
protect their population from atrocities and intense violence, which has 
resulted in high casualties; they indeed have been the primary perpetrators 
of these crimes. Vetoes by China and Russia in the Security Council did not 
permit the invocation and application of R2P, so neither effective non-
coercive nor coercive measures could be taken by the international 
community. However, even if the Security Council could reach a consensus 
on taking effective non-coercive measures against the Assad regime in order 
to compel the security forces and militia to halt their excessive violence, 
assuming that the Syrian government did not halt its brutal repression, it is 
doubtful that there could be agreement on collective military intervention. 
Although there is a stronger case for the use of the third pillar of R2P in 
Syria than there was in Libya, and there is a moral imperative to react when 
such egregious violations of human rights occur the situation in Syria is 
complex. The army is strong and well trained, extremists have reportedly 
joined the ranks of the rebels, and the opposition lacks unity. Minorities are 
apprehensive about possible persecution under a new regime, and there is a 
likelihood that in light of the inflammatory regional setting, a military 
intervention might trigger regional instability. Furthermore, a nuanced 
approach under R2P is called for, because R2P may not be invoked unless 
there are reasonable prospects of success in protecting the lives and well-
being of people, so that the situation is made better for them rather than 
worse. Coupled with this complexity in Syria there were concerns about 
NATO having exceeded the Security Council’s mandate in its 
implementation of Resolution 1973 by focusing on regime change in Libya 
rather than on protection of the people.185 
This was the situation after the second Russian and Chinese veto in the 
Security Council on October 4, 2011,186 that the Permanent Representative 
of Brazil, Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, presented to the Secretary General a 
concept note, entitled Responsibility while protecting: Elements for the 
development and promotion of a concept,187 for circulation to member 
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states. The note stressed the “painful consequences” of past interventions—
aggravation of existing conflicts, increased incidence both of terrorism and 
vulnerability of civilian populations, and new cycles of violence— and a 
“growing perception” that R2P might be misused for purposes such as 
regime change.188 
RWP highlights prevention as “always the best policy”189 and the use of 
force as a measure of last resort,190 always to be authorized by the Security 
Council under Chapter VII, or “in exceptional circumstances, by the 
General Assembly, in line with” the Uniting for Peace Resolution.191 Force 
must meet the standard of proportionality and not exceed the mandate 
conferred by the Security Council or the General Assembly, nor “generate 
more harm than it was authorized to prevent.”192 
In addition the concept paper calls for the three pillars to strictly follow 
“political subordination and chronological sequencing.” The emphasis on 
sequencing is to distinguish between collective responsibility in the 
application of non-coercive measures and collective security, where there is 
a threat or situation of violence against civilians that is characterized as a 
threat to international peace and security.193 It also proposes the creation of 
a monitoring and assessment system to review the use of force as it 
evolves.194 
RWP, which is aimed at ensuring strict regulation of R2P, supplements 
R2P by adding new principles and procedures. It suggests specific criteria 
which the Security Council must consider before authorizing the use of 
force: force must be a measure of last resort, it must meet the test of 
proportionality, and it must not cause “more harm than it was authorized to 
prevent.”195 These criteria are similar to those recommended by the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
discussed earlier, which form the basis of R2P.196 RWP also calls for 
enhanced Security Council procedures for monitoring and assessing the 
interpretation and implementation of the Council’s resolution authorizing 
the use of force.  
RWP’s focus on prevention is a reaffirmation of R2P’s pillar one. And 
its suggested criteria on the use of force are helpful supplements to R2P. 
But the proposed chronological sequencing of R2P’s three-pillar framework 
  
General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701 (Nov. 11, 2011) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/66/551-
S/2011/701].  
 188. Id. ¶¶ 9-10. 
 189. Id. ¶11(a). 
 190. Id. ¶ 7. 
 191. Id. ¶11(c). 
 192. Id. ¶¶11(d)-(f).  
 193. U.N. Doc. A/66/551-S/2011/701, supra note 187, ¶ 6. 
 194. Id. ¶ 11(h).  
 195. A/66/551-S/2011/701, supra note 187, ¶¶ 7, 11.  
 196. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text.  
2013] The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect 33 
is a departure from the 2005 World Summit Outcome and from Secretary-
General Ban Ki-moon’s 2009 articulation of a three-pillar framework.197 At 
the U.N. Informal Discussion on RWP of February 21, 2012, the 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICR2P) 
emphatically made this point:  
The Secretary-General never called for the chronological sequencing of 
the pillars but rather established them together as representative of the full 
scope and range of measures necessary to protect. Every crisis situation is 
unique and requires a response according to the circumstances and needs 
of the population. All actors must have the full range of tools available 
when operating to prevent or halt crimes under RtoP. Restructuring the 
three-pillar framework would risk creating a system for prevention and 
reaction that fails to consider the particular elements of a crisis. 
Furthermore, the chronological sequencing of the three pillars would risk 
impeding timely and decisive action by limiting the array and flexibility of 
measures available and establishing required actions to be taken regardless 
of the needs of those under threat of mass atrocities. It is in this regard, 
that ICRtoP strongly believes that the conceptual foundation of the 
Responsibility to Protect must not be renegotiated.198 
The distinction between collective responsibility, which can be exercised 
through non-coercive measures, and collective security, requiring the 
Security Council’s characterization as a threat to international peace and 
security, also raises concerns as it goes beyond the language of paragraph 
139 of the Summit Outcome,199 which explicitly refers to Chapter VII for 
the the taking of collective action in the exercise of R2P. The ICR2P has 
again aptly stated that “genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and 
ethnic cleansing are by definition and under international law threats to 
international peace and security, thus requiring Member States and the UN 
to take preventive and reactive measures when faced with the threat of these 
crimes.”200 
It is in light of the Syrian crisis and Brazil’s RWP initiative that we 
should consider the Secretary-General’s July 2012 report and the General 
Assembly’s informal interactive dialogue of September 2012. In his report, 
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon provided an historical context for the 
genesis of the R2P concept and its development within the United Nations 
since its 2005 adoption. The report noted the three-pillar framework and 
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asserted that these pillars “are not sequential and are of equal importance; 
without all three the concept would be incomplete.”201 
The Secretary-General emphasized the broad range of measures 
available under the third pillar of R2P, which articulates the member states’ 
responsibility to respond collectively in a timely and decisive manner when 
a state is manifestly failing to protect its population.202 While R2P 
emphasizes prevention, the report suggests that one should not draw too 
sharp a distinction between prevention and response, for  
[p]revention and response must be seen as closely connected. Early 
prevention should address structural factors that affect a state’s capacity 
both to prevent and to respond to the four specified crimes and violations. 
The Office of my two Special Advisers has developed an “analysis 
framework” that identifies factors that can be used to assess the risk of 
these crimes and violations. Further work could be done to develop and 
sharpen response tools to address each risk factor.203 
In discussing the connections between prevention and response, the 
Secretary-General noted that the first two pillars of R2P are generally 
associated with prevention and the third pillar with response. But “[t]he 
dividing lines are . . . not so clear in practice, as action under either pillar 
one or two may include elements of both prevention and response.”204 
The report addressed the issue of sequence by stating that there is an 
interactive and mutually supportive relationship between the three pillars. It 
emphasized that: 
[p]illars are not sequenced. The question should therefore never be under 
what circumstances the responsibility to protect “applies”. This wrongly 
implies that there are situations where states do not have a responsibility to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity. It is clear that every state has an inherent 
responsibility to protect. The question we confront is one of how best to 
achieve the goals of RtoP in different circumstances.205 
The report stated that U.N. peacekeeping missions are implemented 
under pillar two and therefore should be distinguished from action under 
pillar three because, “[w]hile the work of peacekeepers may contribute to 
the achievement of R2P goals, the two concepts of the responsibility to 
protect and the protection of civilians have separate and distinct 
prerequisites and objectives.”206 
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The report reiterates that “[r]esponsibility is an ally of sovereignty, in 
that collective action by the international community is not called for where 
a State fully discharges its sovereign responsibility to protect.”207 The 
Secretary-General also set forth five lessons learned from experience to 
date: 1) R2P should be applied consistently and uniformly, but as each 
situation is distinct, the methods and tools used should differ according to 
each situation; 2) it is essential that principles are applied consistently both 
in utterances and implementation so that international responses do not lead 
to charges of double standards and selectivity; 3) experience has shown the 
need to understand how the three pillars relate to and reinforce each other; 
4) an effective and integrated strategy to protect populations is likely to 
include elements of both prevention and response; and 5) prevention and 
response measures are most effective when the United Nations works in 
tandem with its regional partners.208 
The report discusses at length both non-coercive and coercive tools 
available for implementation under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII209 of the 
U.N. Charter to help protect populations from the four specified crimes and 
violations. These include mediation and preventive diplomacy, public 
advocacy, fact-finding missions and commissions of inquiry, monitoring 
and observer missions, the International Criminal Court, and finally, when 
diplomatic and other peaceful means fail, “timely and decisive” collective 
action is called for under Chapter VII.210 In concluding this section, the 
report emphasized that  
[t]here is room for Member States to think and act more strategically. 
Measures, especially those under Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, 
should be applied as early as possible. While military enforcement must 
remain part of the toolbox, our primary aim should be to respond early and 
effectively in non-coercive ways and thereby reduce the need for force. . . . 
. Strengthening modes of collaboration between the national, the regional 
and the international levels in this regard continues to be necessary.211 
While reemphasizing that “[t]he integrity and credibility of the concept 
depends upon its full, faithful and consistent application,”212 the report 
referred to those at the international, regional, national, and local levels who 
have obligations to protect their populations and those who must respond 
under pillar three in implementing R2P.213 It specifically noted the role of 
the Human Rights Council, the ten U.N. treaty bodies of human rights 
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conventions, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the 
U.N. Children’s Fund, and the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Refugees, along with individual and regional and sub regional 
organizations. It also noted the role of humanitarian organizations, national 
and international civil society organizations, private companies and 
businesses, and individuals.  
The report concluded this section by stating that the international 
community’s response to these atrocity crimes “is most effective when 
actions are tailored to individual circumstances and calibrated 
appropriately.”214 It emphasized that in all situations, “we must not lose 
sight of our common goal—the protection of populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity—and we must 
focus on finding a common viable strategy for achieving it.”215 
The Secretary-General welcomed the Brazilian initiative on 
“responsibility while protecting,” stating that it had “received considerable 
attention from Member States as the international community has sought to 
refine and apply the concept” in light of the Libyan intervention.216 With the 
expanded use of the concept as it has been invoked in several situations, the 
report noted the need to understand how to operationalize the concept “in a 
manner that is responsible, sustainable and effective,”217 and also the 
importance of conducting early warning and assessment “fairly, prudently 
and professionally, without political interference or double standards.”218 
While observing that in essence the “responsibility while protecting” 
calls for “doing the right thing, in the right place, at the right time and for 
the right reasons,” the report focused on the need for assessment because 
“[a]n early and flexible response strategy requires dynamic assessment, 
focusing on trends and developments, not just the latest headlines.”219 
On the Libyan crisis the report observed that the Security Council action 
under Chapter VII was authorized after most member states had concluded 
that peaceful measures had proved inadequate. But it acknowledged that 
some member states are concerned that non-coercive measures were not 
given adequate time to take effect, and that the implementation of Security 
Council Resolution 1973 exceeded the Council’s mandate.220 Thus, going 
forward, these concerns must be taken into account and the Security 
Council must continue to respond flexibly, as it has a wide degree of 
latitude to decide on the appropriate course of action.221 
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Acknowledging that civilian lives were lost during the air campaign 
notwithstanding NATO’s focus on minimizing civilian casualties, the report 
emphasized the importance of military actors “taking all possible 
precautions to avoid situations that place civilians at risk.”222 It reiterated 
the Secretary-General’s preference for prevention in implementing R2P, 
which requires non-forcible measures. However, it emphasized that 
coercive measures should neither be left out of the protection strategy nor 
set aside for use only after all other measures have been applied and found 
to be inadequate. Thus, the report favored an early and flexible response, 
taking into consideration all the tools available under Chapters VI, VII, and 
VIII of the U.N. Charter, and tailoring each circumstance to each situation 
to ensure the protection of populations.223 
While observing that the application of the third pillar will sometimes 
entail difficult choices, the report cautioned:  
Disagreements about the past must not stand in the way of our 
determination to protect populations in the present. Nor should Heads of 
State and Government lose sight of the commitment made to act in 
accordance with the responsibility to protect. The initiative on 
“responsibility while protecting” provides a useful pathway for continuing 
dialogue about ways of bridging different perspectives and forging 
strategies for timely and decisive responses to crimes and violations 
relating to RtoP. Suggestions for improving decision-making in such 
circumstances and reviewing implementation are useful catalysts for 
further discussion.224 
In conclusion the report noted that, while the concept has been widely 
accepted and has been invoked by the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, controversy persists on aspects of implementation, especially on 
the use of coercive measures to protect populations.225 Thus it stressed the 
need to employ all the coercive and non-coercive measures at an early stage 
to ensure prevention and to reduce the need for more coercive action to 
protect populations, but it reiterated, “Inaction is not an option.”226 The 
Secretary-General called for continued dialogue on the responsibility to 
protect in the General Assembly.227 
In his remarks on September 5, 2012, to the General Assembly’s 
Informal Interactive Dialogue on the responsibility to protect,228 the 
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Secretary-General said, “‘Never again’ is the oft-heard cry. But I am 
haunted by the fear that we do not live up to this call.”229 Noting that the 
R2P is a concept whose time has come, he emphasized that it reaffirms 
“sovereignty as a positive responsibility” for governments to protect their 
populations.230 
Addressing the concerns related to selectivity in invoking the concept 
and the loss of innocent lives in military operations undertaken to protect 
populations, coupled with disagreements on both the oversight of 
implementation methods and the interpretation of Security Council 
resolutions, he said that “fears of its possible misuse should not inhibit its 
use in the face of incitement and grave violence”231 
The Secretary-General noted that the Security Council had explicitly 
referred to the concept of Responsibility to Protect in its resolutions on 
Libya and Yemen. Also, the General Assembly, the Human Rights 
Committee, and the High Commissioner for Human Rights, had referred to 
R2P in Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, South Sudan, Sudan, 
Syria, Yemen, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He stated that 
there have been successes with the Responsibility to Protect, but also that 
concerns have been expressed about missions exceeding the intent and 
mandate of the resolutions on which they were based. He stressed that, 
notwithstanding concerns and disagreements about the past, we must move 
forward, for “we cannot stand by while populations fall victim to these 
grave crimes and violations.”232 
Following the Secretary-General’s address, deliberations in the General 
Assembly found a general consensus on the primacy of the preventive 
aspects of R2P.233 The representative of Germany, however, emphasized the 
equality of all three pillars, which precludes an “either/or approach” 
regarding prevention and more coercive action, as well as a strict 
sequencing of measures under each pillar.234 He said that Germany had set 
up the structures to implement the second pillar by establishing an inter-
ministerial working group for civil crisis prevention and early warning, as 
well as an adjunct advisory council, and was in the process of appointing a 
national focal point for R2P.235 
The representative of the European Union to the United Nations 
emphasized that the three pillars are “parallel and finely balanced” and thus 
  
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id.  
 233. U.N. Press Release GA/11270, supra note 183.  
 234. The Permanent Mission of Germany to the U.N., New York, Statement by 
Ambassador Berger at the 4th Informal Interactive Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect 
(Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.new-york-un.diplo.de/Vertretung/newyorkvn/en/__pr/speeches-
statements/2012/20120906-berger-ga-r2p.html. 
 235. Id.  
2013] The Future Under International Law of the Responsibility to Protect 39 
there cannot be “a prioritization of action under one pillar over another or a 
chronological sequencing between them.”236 Among other participants, the 
representative of Brazil noted that its RWP initiative could make a 
contribution to the debate, as it provides 1) a set of guidelines for the 
Security Council to take into account before mandating any military force, 
and 2) an enhanced monitoring and review process that Council members 
could use to “discuss mandates during the implementation process.”237 
The South African representative expressed concern that “international 
intervention might be used” in order to “effect regime change by those with 
political agendas,” and warned that the Security Council mandate not be the 
“pretense for operating beyond international law.”238 The representative of 
Singapore called for moving beyond “the mantra that the three pillars were 
‘equally important’ . . . ‘mutually reinforcing,’ and ‘supportive,’” for, while 
member states would have no problem with supporting pillars one and two, 
it is pillar three which is a fundamental principle behind the R2P concept 
and on which attention must be focused.239 Reflecting on the intervention in 
Libya, he said that while the Security Council intervention was seen by 
many as a “vindication” of R2P, there remain “deep concerns” over the 
action.240 He added, “How R2P was invoked to justify Council action on 
Libya has cast a long shadow, resulting in the current impasse over Syria. 
Arguably, what happened to Libya has not only not helped the long-term 
development of R2P, but may have done it damage.”241 
The Singapore representative criticized the Permanent Members of the 
Security Council for not agreeing to the “recommendation that they 
consider refraining from using the veto to block Council action aimed at 
preventing or ending genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”242 
He echoed one of the “lessons learn[ed]” mentioned by the Secretary-
General in his report -- that R2P principles must be applied consistently in 
rhetoric and implementation so as to avoid the “accusations of double 
standards and selectivity.243 “The representative of Malaysia also 
emphasized that the biggest challenge continued to be “the selectivity and 
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double standards practiced” in implementing R2P.244 A few representatives, 
including those from India and Russia, challenged the Secretary-General’s 
statement that there should be no sequencing.245 
V. OPERATIONALIZING THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
The preceding discussion raises more questions than it answers. The 
deliberations in the General Assembly since 2009 have demonstrated 
consensus on what Secretary-General Ban calls “pillar one,” and which 
Heads of State and Government had accepted at the World Summit in 
paragraph 138 of the Summit Outcome Document, viz, that “[e]ach 
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity,” 
including their incitement, which “entails the prevention of such crime . . . 
through appropriate and necessary means.”246 Thus, there is no situation in 
which a state does not have the primary responsibility to protect its 
population.  
Similarly, no state questions in principle what Ban calls the second 
pillar: that the international community should “encourage and help States 
to exercise this responsibility,”247 and that there is a commitment “to 
helping States build capacity to protect their populations from [these 
atrocity crimes] and . . . . assisting those which are under stress before crises 
and conflicts break out.”248 The term “appropriate and necessary” must 
mean that the state itself is seeking help to exercise this responsibility and to 
build capacity to protect its population from these crimes. 
Also, the Summit Outcome calls on the U.N. to establish an early 
warning capability and for states to support the U.N. in accomplishing this 
goal.249 The Secretary-General has already focused his attention on early 
warning, which was the theme of his 2010 Report.250 Thus, what the 
appropriate measures are and how to reach agreement on them are important 
questions here. 
The underlying purpose of the second pillar is to prevent the perpetration 
of these crimes. For if preventive diplomacy and using all the measures 
listed in Article 33 of the U.N. Charter for peaceful settlement of disputes 
were to succeed, there would be no need for the use of force. 
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The critical question that remains unresolved relates to the 
implementation of what Secretary-General Ban calls “pillar three”: 
collective military action in a “timely and decisive manner” and on a “case 
by case basis” when peaceful means are inadequate and “national 
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations” from the 
specified crimes.251 A prerequisite is that Chapter VI and Chapter VIII 
measures either have been exhausted or are inapplicable. Currently, there 
are no guidelines and the action is, of course, left to the Security Council, 
where decision-making ends up in the hands of the fifteen members, 
uncontrolled by any guidelines or constraints. Consequently, we need 
criteria or guidelines to determine whether an armed response is 
appropriate, as a last resort. 
It follows that for the operationalization of R2P we need common 
standards and criteria to govern the use of force, that is, to decide whether, 
based upon the information received, the situation warrants the invocation 
and application of the third pillar. Thus the pertinent question is what 
standards and principles will help us measure and analyze the information to 
determine whether the third pillar is applicable.  
Following the tragedies in Northern Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti, 
Rwanda, and Liberia, I suggested in a 1992 article that for an intervention to 
be valid on humanitarian grounds it must meet the criteria of necessity, 
proportionality, purpose, and maximization of the best outcomes.252 On the 
criterion of necessity, the suggestion was “the existence of gross, persistent, 
and systematic violations of human rights which are likely to result in 
massive loss of life in any country.” Those criteria and the ICISS 
suggestions regarding the “just cause” threshold and precautionary 
principles253 also present a useful starting point for deliberations on the 
responsibility to protect at the UN, with active participation of the 
Secretary-General’s special adviser on the prevention of genocide and the 
civil society. The Brazilian initiative is indeed a useful tool in this context. 
CONCLUSION 
Syria has tested the responsibility to protect. The three pillars articulated 
by Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon offer a wide range of actions by the 
international community to prevent and halt mass atrocities. The main 
contention is on when and how to apply the third pillar. For that to be 
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operational the need for common standards and principles is evident. The 
U.N. General Assembly and Security Council must set standards for 
evaluating the risks, determining the urgency of the situation and 
concluding whether a state is actually “manifestly failing” to meet its 
responsibility to protect. The challenge is to find the common ground to set 
such standards, notwithstanding the reality that without political will and 
cooperation among the permanent members of the Security Council no 
action is possible at the United Nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “tugs and pulls” of the post-colonial state-building projects have 
resulted in conflicts in several African states. In some cases, these conflicts 
have degenerated into violence. As a result, an environment of anarchy has 
often provided the propitious conditions for the commission of vitriolic 
human rights violations by various antagonists, including governments. For 
example, during the Ugandan civil war (1986-2010), the two Liberian civil 
wars (1989-1997 and 1999-2003), the Sierra Leonean civil war (1991-
2002), and the Congolese civil wars (1997-1999, 1999-2003, 2003-2006), 
war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed, including heinous 
acts such as the terrorizing of civilians, mass killings, the violation of 
personal dignity, including sexual violence against women, cruel treatment 
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and looting.2 Similarly, during the Rwandan civil war (1990-1994), 
genocidaires3 operating under the banner of the government and various 
militias, especially the Interhamwe,4 committed various genocidal acts that 
resulted in the death of over 800,000 people.5 
Importantly, the commission of these atrocities and the resultant complex 
humanitarian crises in these various conflicts generated debates in Africa 
and throughout the international community regarding the appropriate 
responses. Accordingly, in some cases, the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU), sub-regional organizations such as the Economic Community of 
West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations responded with 
peacemaking and peacekeeping operations as remedial measures.6 However, 
in other cases, such as Rwanda, the OAU and the international community 
sat on the sidelines, amidst the commission of acts of genocide. In short, as 
Garth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun observe, “The international 
community . . . repeatedly made a mess of handling the many demands that 
were made for ‘humanitarian interventions:’ coercive action against a state 
to protect people within its borders from suffering grave harm.”7 
Clearly, state sovereignty has been a major impediment to the African 
regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as the U.N.’s robust 
military intervention in conflicts in which war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide were committed. Tom Kabau provides an excellent 
summation of the state sovereignty lacuna thus: “Forceful intervention for 
humanitarian purposes has been problematic due to the principles of state 
sovereignty and non-intervention. The traditional conceptualization of 
  
 2. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT (1989-2012) (providing a 
comprehensive discussion of various human rights violations that were committed during 
some of the violent conflicts in Africa).  
 3. The genocidaire is a French word that is used to generally describe those who 
commit genocide. The term gained currency during the Rwandan genocide in 1994 in which 
about one million people were killed. For the application of the term in the Rwandan case, 
see Elizabeth Barad, “Rwanda’s Mother and Son Genocidaires,” Pambazuka News, Issue 
547, September 15, 2011. 
 4. The Interhamwe (meaning “those who strike as one”) was the principal Hutu-
based militia that was accused of bearing the greatest responsibility for the 1994 Rwandan 
genocide. For a discussion of the roots of the genocide and the Interhamwe’s role in it, see 
Rwanda: A Brief History of the Country, UNITED NATIONS (Feb. 5, 2013, 2:15 p.m.), 
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/education/rwandagenocide.shtml.  
 5. See MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, 
NATIVISM, AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA, (2012) (for a discussion of the Rwandan 
genocide).  
 6. See DEALING WITH CONFLICTS IN AFRICA: THE UNITED NATIONS AND REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS (Jane Boulden ed. 2005) (for an examination of some of the peacemaking 
and peacekeeping efforts undertaken by African regional and sub-regional organizations and 
the United Nations).  
 7. Garth Evans & Mohamed Sahnoun, The Responsibility to Protect, 81 FOREIGN 
AFF. 99, 99 (2002). 
2013] The African Union 45 
sovereignty was an effective shield for a state in respect of its domestic 
affairs, despite its misconduct or atrocities towards its citizenrys.”8 
Interestingly, in 2002, the African Union (AU), the successor to the 
moribund OAU, initiated what amounted to a “sea change” in the 
conceptualization of state sovereignty in Africa by adding a “responsibility 
dimension.” That is, while retaining the conception of state sovereignty as a 
right, the AU also added the dimension that sovereignty imposes 
responsibility on states as well, especially the requirement that they protect 
their citizens from heinous acts such as war crimes, crimes against humanity 
and genocide.9 Moreover, the AU asserted its legal right to circumscribe the 
sovereignty of a member state, if the latter failed to perform its 
“responsibility to protect” function.10 
Against this background, the violent conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region, 
especially its attendant commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity provided a “litmus test” for the AU’s responsibility to 
protect framework.11 In this vein, the purpose of this article is two-fold. 
First, the article will assess the application of the African Union’s (AU) 
responsibility to protect norm to the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur Region. This 
entails an examination of the methods the AU has used and their resulting 
impact on the implementation of the organization’s responsibility to protect 
norm. Second, based on the assessment of the application of the AU’s 
responsibility to protect norm, the study will proffer some suggestions for 
strengthening the capacity of the AU to implement its responsibility to 
protect norm. In order to address the research problem, the article is divided 
into five major parts. The first section probes the origins and the major 
contours of the AU’s responsibility to protect regime. Next, the article 
examines the travails of the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region for the 
ostensible purpose of determining whether the atrocities committed are 
covered acts that would necessitate the application of the norm of the 
responsibility to protect. Third, the study deciphers the application of the 
AU’s responsibility to protect norm to the conflict in Sudan’s Darfur 
Region. Fourth, the study offers some suggestions for helping to strengthen 
the AU’s capacity to implement its responsibility to protect regime. Finally, 
in the concluding section, the article discusses the major findings regarding 
the failure of the AU to apply its responsibility to protect norm to the civil 
conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region. 
  
 8. Tom Kabau, The Responsibility to Protect and the Role of Regional 
Organizations: An Appraisal of the African Union’s Interventions, 4 GOETTINGEN J. INT’L L. 
49, 51-52 (2012). 
 9. See Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h) (July 11, 2002), OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/23.15, available at http://www.africa-union.org. 
 10. See Stephanie Hanson, The African Union, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/africa/african-union/p11616. 
 11. See Emma McClean, The Responsibility to Protect: The Role of International 
Human Rights Law, 13 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 123, 142 (2008). 
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I. THE EMERGING AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
REGIME: AN OVERVIEW 
A. Origins 
The emerging African Union’s responsibility to protect regime has its 
roots in the dismal failure of both the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
its predecessor, and the larger international community to undertake much 
needed robust military interventions in the continent’s worst humanitarian 
crises (such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, the Great Lakes region, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and the Mano River Basin 
Region of West Africa).12 Several major factors accounted for this. On the 
African side, the OAU was hamstrung by its absolutist conception of the 
state sovereignty doctrine. And this provided a “firewall” for governments 
that committed atrocities against their own citizens from being held 
accountable. The other major conundrums included: the prevalence of 
authoritarianism and its associated culture of impunity; the solidarity 
between and among the continent’s various ruling classes that led them to 
defend and protect one another; the lack of political will; and the myriad of 
institutional and operational weaknesses, including the lack of a security 
architecture.  
In terms of the broader international community, the primacy of national 
interests shaped and conditioned the attitudes of the dominant powers 
toward humanitarian crises in Africa. For example, during the Rwandan 
genocide, then American President Bill Clinton made it clear that the United 
States could neither support nor undertake either a robust multilateral or 
unilateral military intervention because it had no economic or strategic 
interest in Rwanda.13 
Against this backdrop, the AU determined that it had the primary 
responsibility (within the ambit of the U.N. Charter) to maintain regional 
peace and security. Accordingly, it became imperative to design the 
modalities for a security architecture that would facilitate the performance 
of this important responsibility. Moreover, the AU recognized that it could 
not rely on the dominant powers in the international system to deal with 
threats to peace and stability, since these global suzerains are driven 
primarily by the imperatives of their national interests, rather than 
humanitarianism. Said Djinnit, the then AU’s Commissioner for Peace and 
Security articulated the rationale for Africa’s new system of “self-help” 
thus: “No more, never again. Africans cannot . . . watch the tragedies 
  
 12. See Tim Murithi, The Responsibility to Protect, As Enshrined in Article 4 of the 
Constitutive Act of the African Union, 16 AFR. SEC. REV. 14, 16 (2008); Paul Williams, From 
Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union’s 
Security Culture, 106 AFR. AFFAIRS 253 (2007). 
 13. Rory Carroll, U.S. Chose to Ignore Rwandan Genocide, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 
31, 2004, 10:59 EST), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/mar/31/usa.rwanda. 
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developing in the continent and say it is the U.N.’s responsibility or 
somebody else’s responsibility. We have moved from the concept of non-
interference to non-indifference. We cannot as Africans remain indifferent 
to the tragedy of our people.”14  
B. The Contours 
During its formation, the AU incorporated the “responsibility to protect” 
as a legal norm in its Charter, thereby making the organization’s 
Constitutive Act the first international treaty to recognize the right on the 
part of an international organization to intervene for humanitarian protection 
purposes.15 The legal basis for the AU’s “responsibility to protect” regime is 
found in Article 4, Section h of the organization’s Charter: “[T]he right of 
the [African] Union to intervene in a [m]ember [s]tate pursuant to a decision 
of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes against humanity.”16 Implicit in these provisions is the 
understanding that sovereignty is conditional and defined in terms of a 
state’s capacity and willingness to protect its citizens.17 The Constitutive 
Act acknowledges that a state has the principal responsibility for protecting 
its citizens.18 
“Operationally, like the emergent U.N.-based global “responsibility to 
protect framework,” the AU’s regime is anchored on three major pillars: the 
member states’ responsibility to protect; continental and other international 
assistance; and timely and decisive response. The case of the responsibility 
to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of state responsibility, because 
prevention begins at home, and the protection of populations is a defining 
attribute of sovereignty and statehood.”19 Specifically, the state’s 
responsibilities include the protection of its population from genocide, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. The continental and international 
assistance, along with the capacity-building element, is based on the 
premise that member countries would be assisted and encouraged to fulfill 
their responsibility to protect. This would entail assistance with building the 
capacity to protect the populations of member states from genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity. In addition, assistance would be 
  
 14. KRISTINA POWELL, THE AFRICAN UNION’S EMERGING PEACE AND SECURITY 
REGIME: OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR DELIVERING ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT 4 (2005) (quoting Ambassador Said Djinnit, Statement on the African Union’s 
Responsibility to Protect Framework (June 24, 2004)). 
 15. See id. 
 16. See Constitutive Act of the African Union art. 4(h) (July 11, 2002), OAU Doc. 
CAB/LEG/23.15, available at http://www.africa-union.org.  
 17. POWELL, supra note 14, at 11. 
 18. Id. at 11-12.  
 19. U.N. Secretary General, Report on the Implementation of the Responsibility to 
Protect, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Implementation]. 
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provided to member states that are under stress before crises and conflicts 
arise.20 The timely and decisive response pillar is based on the AU’s 
“responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian, and other 
peaceful means in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the U.N. 
Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.”21 However, as Article 4, Section 1 of the AU Charter 
stipulates, the organization may use military force “should peaceful means 
be inadequate, and state authorities are manifestly failing to protect their 
populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity (plus 
ethnic cleansing, which is a part of the U.N.’s responsibility to protect 
norm).22 
II. THE CONFLICT IN SUDAN’S DARFUR REGION 
The civil war in Darfur commenced in February 2003, just as the larger 
Sudanese civil war that pitted the “north against the south” was winding 
down.23 The war was triggered by the armed attacks launched by the Sudan 
Liberation Movement Army (SLM/A) and the Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM) against Sudanese government offices, police, and military 
bases.24 In turn, the attacks “provoked an indiscriminately violent response 
from the Sudanese government, led by President Omar Hassan al-Bashir.”25  
Broadly, the war and its resulting genocide, crimes against humanity, 
and war crimes were caused by a confluence of factors. In spite of the huge 
revenues, which the Sudanese government earned from the sale of the 
country’s oil, the Darfur region remains one of the most underdeveloped 
sections of the country.26 This is evidenced by the prevalence of abject mass 
poverty, unemployment and malaise.27 Another factor is that the Darfur 
region is marginalized in the Sudanese political system. One of the major 
manifestations of this marginalization is the absence of effective channels 
through which Darfur is can participate in Sudanese politics. To make 
matters worse, the government’s authoritarian proclivities militate against 
such participation.28 This led to some of the non-Arab ethnic groups 
  
 20. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Implementation, supra note 19, at ¶ 49.  
 23. See UNMIS Background, UNITED STATES MISSION IN SUDAN, (Feb. 4, 2013), 
www.un.orglenlpeacekeepingmissions/unmis/background.shtml. 
 24. ADAM JONES, GENOCIDE: A COMPREHENSIVE INTRODUCTION 371 (2d ed. 2011). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Jennifer L. DeMaio, Is War Contagious? The Transnationalization of 
Conflict in Darfur? 11(4) AFRICAN STUDIES QUARTERLY 30, 31 (2010), 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v11/v11i4a2.htm. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
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challenging authoritarian rule in the Sudan.29 Furthermore, there are ethnic 
conflicts between the various Arab ethnic groups, on the one hand, and the 
non-Arab ethnic groups, on the other. These conflicts have found expression 
in disputes over land and land use. The supremacist ideology of the Arab 
ethnic groups has exacerbated the existing conflicts by, among other things, 
injecting the “superior-inferior myth,” and thus seeking to establish the 
hegemony of the Arab ethnic groups in the Sudanese polity.30 
Infuriated by the military insurgency initially mounted by the two 
Darfur-based armed groups, the Sudanese government launched massive 
counter-offenses that involved the military and the use of the Janjaweed or 
“devils on horseback,” an Arab militia that was organized and is supported 
by the Sudanese government.31 Significantly, the Sudanese government then 
made the determination that the conflict provided propitious conditions for 
its troops and the Janjaweed militia to commit genocidal acts, as well as war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. For example, there were, and continue 
to be, the genocidal massacres of adult male non-combatants from the 
various non-Arab ethnic groups, especially the Fur, Massalit, and 
Zaghawa.32 In addition, rapes are committed against women from the non-
Arab ethnic groups on a large scale. Similarly, the members of the non-Arab 
ethnic groups were subjected to forced migration and starvation.33 As the 
Public International Law and Policy Group laments, “Government and 
Janjaweed forces destroyed everything that made life possible. Food that 
could be carried away was; the rest was burned. Animals that could be taken 
away were; the rest were killed. The simple straw buildings that served as 
clinics and schools were destroyed . . . . “34 
In addition, the Sudanese military continues to perpetrate various 
heinous acts against the non-Arab ethnic groups in Darfur, including 
“bombings from airplanes; and along with the Janjaweed the use of 
automatic weapons fire, stabbings, the torching of people, the poisoning of 
wells, and chasing the victim population out into forbidding deserts without 
water or food.”35 By early 2012, about 300,000 people had died; 
approximately 1.9 million people were internally displaced in camps inside 
  
 29. Salih Booker & Ann-Louise Colgan, Genocide in Darfur, THE NATION (July 12, 
2004), http://www.thenation.com/article/genocide-darfur#. 
 30. See Joseph C. Ebegbulem, Nigeria and Conflict Resolution in Africa: The Darfur 
Experience, 3(2) TRANSCIENCE, 18, 19 (2012), available at http://www2.hu-
berlin.de/transcience/Vol3_Issue2_2012_17_23.pdf. 
 31. Genocide in Darfur, UNITED HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL (June 1, 2012), 
http://www.unitedhumanrights.org/genocide/genocide-in-sudan.htm. For a discussion of 
some of the genocidal acts that have been committed by the Janjaweed, see Sudan’s Shadowy 
Arab Militia, BBC NEWS, (April 10, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3613953.stm. 
 32. JONES, supra note 24, at 372. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. See Samuel Totten, The Darfur Genocide, in THE GENOCIDE STUDIES READER 
195 (Samuel Totten & Paul Bartrop eds., 2009). 
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Darfur; while more than 250,000 others are refugees in various neighboring 
countries.36 
Based on the evidence, the Sudanese government continues to perpetrate 
genocidal acts, war crimes, and crimes against humanity against the 
members of various non-Arab ethnic groups. Specifically, the actions of the 
Sudanese government meet the thresholds for genocide established under 
the International Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide. According to Article 2 of the Convention, “genocide means any 
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy in whole or in part, a 
national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such:37  
a) Killing members of the group; 
b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring 
about its physical destruction in whole or part; 
d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.38  
For example, there is evidence of genocidal intent. The case in point is 
that of Musa Hilal, one of the leaders of the Janjaweed militia, who “wrote 
in August 2004 to a regional commander, “citing orders from President 
Bashir himself’: ‘[y]ou are informed that directives have been issued . . . to 
change the demography of Darfur and empty its African tribes.’”39 Also, 
various non-Arab ethnic groups are the targets and victims of the Sudanese 
government perpetrated mass killings. The purpose of these mass killings is 
to destroy these non-Arab ethnic groups in whole.40 As for the commission 
of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the evidence was reflected in 
the fact that in 2008 the U.N. Security Council, through Resolution 1593, 
referred the mass killings and other atrocities being committed in Darfur to 
the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC).41 Subsequently, 
the prosecutor of the ICC requested that President Omar Hassan al-Bashir 
  
 36.  Darfur Conflict: Peace Elusive in War-Torn Region, ALERTNET (Feb. 16, 
2012), http: //www.trust.org/alertnet/crisis-centre/crisis/Darfur-conflict; Donald A. Ranard, 
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CENTER (June 2011), http://www.cal.org/co/pdffiles/backgrounder_darfuri.pdf. 
 37. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948. 
 38. Id. 
 39. JONES, supra note 24, at 371-72.  
 40. Id. 
 41. See S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). 
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be charged with genocide.42 But, the judges did not oblige.43 Instead, 
President Bashir was charged with the commission of war crimes and 
crimes against humanity.44  
III. THE APPLICATION OF THE AFRICAN UNION’S RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT NORM TO THE DARFUR CONFLICT 
By the time the AU intervened in the Darfur conflict in 2004, there was 
widespread commission of genocidal acts, as well as war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by the Sudanese government troops and the Janjaweed.45 
Thus, based on the phase of the conflict, and pursuant to the provisions of 
the AU’s responsibility to protect regime, the AU should have used military 
force to stop the commission of these heinous crimes. Instead, the AU 
decided to commence its intervention with peacemaking.46 This further 
suggested that the AU was mistakenly treating the conflict in Darfur as a 
traditional civil war involving the Sudanese government and armed 
resistance groups. 
The first major peace agreement the AU mediated was the Humanitarian 
Ceasefire Agreement, which was signed in Ndjamena, Chad, in April 2004, 
between the Sudanese government and the armed resistance groups.47 Two 
years later, in Abuja, Nigeria, the AU mediated the Darfur Peace Agreement 
between the Sudanese government and a faction of the Sudan Liberation 
Army (SLA) led by Minni Minnawi.48 Originally, the AU intended to 
mediate a broader and comprehensive peace agreement involving the 
Sudanese government and all of the armed resistance groups. But, all of the 
armed resistance groups, with the exception of Minnawi’s faction and the 
free wings factions of the SLA, refused to participate.49 The adverse effects 
of the lack of a broader peace accord became evident when shortly after the 
signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement, “the various . . . armed resistance 
groups [began] to fight each other., and the situation deteriorated into a 
military, political and diplomatic conundrum.”50 
  
 42. See Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquher, Court Issues Arrest Warrant for 
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 46. Tim Murithi, The African Union’s Foray into Peacekeeping: Lessons from the 
Hybrid Mission in Darfur, 14 J. PEACE, CONFLICT & DEVELOPMENT 1, 9 (2009). 
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In spite of the precarious security situation in Darfur, the AU took its 
second major misstep by deploying a peacekeeping force, rather than a 
military interventionist one, to stop the Sudanese government troops and the 
Janjaweed, from continuing to commit acts of genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity. Again, by making the decision to deploy a 
peacekeeping force, the AU once again re-affirmed its belief that the Darfur 
conflict was a traditional civil war. Thus, peacekeeping was seen as 
necessary to help create an enabling environment for continual peacemaking 
and the eventual end of the war. By employing the use of the classical 
peacekeeping method, the AU was constrained by several factors: 1) the 
imperative of getting the consent of the Sudanese government; 2) the 
requirement that the peacekeepers would be neutral; and 3) that the 
peacekeepers would only use force in self-defense.51 Thus, in 2005, the AU 
deployed the African Union Mission I (AMIS) in Darfur, which consisted of 
150 military observers. The mandate limited the peacekeeping force to the 
following: 
1) To monitor and verify ceasefire violations;52  
2) To protect civilians under imminent threat;53 
3) Undertake confidence-building measures among the parties to the 
conflict;54 
4) Facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance;55 
5) Assist internally displaced persons.56 
In essence, the primary mandate of AMIS I was to monitor a crumbling 
ceasefire that was being violated consistently by the Sudanese government 
and the various armed resistance groups. As John Prendergast observed, 
“The initial idea of operations for the AU force was deeply flawed from the 
outset . . . [B]y authorizing a mandate that only was focused on cease-fire 
observation rather than the protection of civilians, it minimized the 
objective of the force and rendered it largely irrelevant.”57 Thus, in effect, 
the peacekeeping force’s mandate left the primary responsibility for the 
  
 51. See generally LISA M. HOWARD, UN PEACEKEEPING IN CIVIL WARS (2008) 
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 53. Id. 
 54. Murithi, supra note 46. 
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“protection of civilians to the government that is accused of terrorizing 
them.”58 
Clearly, the peacekeeping operation, besides being an inappropriate 
response to halting genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, was 
a dismal failure. Several factors accounted for this. The size of the 
peacekeeping force was very small, especially against the background of the 
land mass: Darfur is about the size of France.59 Therefore, a peacekeeping 
force with 150 military observers was bound to not succeed from the 
onset.60 Another factor was that the mandate of the peacekeeping force did 
not include the overarching issue of protecting civilians. Further, the 
peacekeeping force lacked the requisite equipment, logistical, and 
intelligence gathering capabilities.61 
With the failures of AMIS I, which were quite glaring, a Technical 
Assessment Mission comprising of representatives from the United Nations, 
the European Union, and the United States recommended that the AU 
undertake another peacekeeping mission with an enhanced mandate. In this 
vein, the AU continued to use an inappropriate method—peacekeeping—to 
deal with a conflict-ridden environment in which genocide, war crimes, and 
crimes against humanity were being committed by the Sudanese 
government troops and the Janjaweed. As a result, in late 2005, AMIS II 
was established.62 Some changes were made to the mandate and the size of 
the peacekeeping force: the mandate was extended to include the protection 
of refugee camps, and the size of the force was initially a little over 3,000.63 
Later, the size of the peacekeeping force was increased to 7,000.64 In spite 
of the changes, AMIS II faced similar challenges as its predecessor. With 
regard to the size of the peacekeeping force, even the size of 7,000, at its 
peak, was still woefully inadequate to cover a region as large as Darfur. The 
continuing limited size issue adversely affected the peacekeeping force’s 
capacity to protect the refugee camps. Furthermore, AMIS II, like its 
predecessor, was constrained by the inadequacy of weapons, equipment, 
logistical, and intelligence gathering capabilities.65 To make matters worse, 
the operational deficiencies of the peacekeeping force emboldened the 
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Janjaweed to attack its troops, which led to the death of some 
peacekeepers.66 
Although the peacekeeping method was inappropriate for addressing the 
commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, coupled 
with the fact that the two operations failed miserably, the AU continued to 
violate the contours of its responsibility to protect regime.67 This was 
reflected in the AU’s violation of a key provision that requires the 
organization to use military intervention to protect the citizens of a member 
state who are victims of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
as a result of their government’s unwillingness to protect them. It could also 
be used in a case where the government is the perpetrator of any of the 
above mentioned crimes. Instead of identifying the Sudanese government as 
the chief culprit in the commission of genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity against its own citizens, the AU continued to use the 
peacekeeping method inappropriately. However, since it was clearly 
established that the AU did not even have the operational capacity to 
undertake a peacekeeping mission, the AU and the U.N. agreed to establish 
a hybrid force as the successor to AMIS II.68 Interestingly, the U.N.-AU 
decision was shaped by the Sudanese government’s strenuous objection to 
having a solely U.N. peacekeeping force. In other words, the decision to 
establish a hybrid force consisting of troops from the AU and U.N. was a 
clear act of capitulation to the Sudanese government. The Bashir regime had 
insisted that it would not accept a U.N. peacekeeping force. However, it was 
willing to accept an expansion of the size of the AU’s peacekeeping force. 
But later, the Bashir regime indicated that it would allow a hybrid U.N.-AU 
force. In short, based on the Bashir regime’s distrust of the U.N., it was thus 
apprehensive about allowing a peacekeeping force that was exclusively 
under the control of the organization. However, in the case of the AU, the 
Bashir regime has confidence in the organization, because it has defended 
him against the backdrop of his indictment for war crimes and crimes 
against humanity by the ICC. Even then, the deployment of the hybrid force 
was delayed by continuing objections from the Sudanese government with 
the support of China, which has economic (oil) and strategic interests (the 
sale of weapons) in the Sudan.69 Finally, in 2008, the hybrid force was 
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deployed in Darfur.70 Nonetheless, the expanded peacekeeping force, like its 
predecessors, has proven incapable of halting the commission of genocidal 
acts, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the Sudanese government 
troops and their allies, the Janjaweed. 
Why has the AU continuously failed to use robust military intervention 
when the Sudanese government has been identified as the perpetrator of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity against its own people? 
Several factors account for this. Despite the so-called “third wave of 
democratization” that began sweeping across Africa in the early 1990s, the 
authoritarian African state and its political culture have remained intact.71 
That is, although the “third wave” has led to the liberalization of the 
political space in several African states, the democratic reconstitution of the 
African state has not occurred.72 In other words, democracy has not been 
institutionalized in most African states.73 Accordingly, the “culture of 
impunity,” has been a major bedrock of the post-colonial African state, and 
its political culture remains a pervasive feature of the political economy of 
the overwhelming majority of the African states.74 Hence, there is a poverty 
of moral leadership among the continent’s ruling elites. This being the case, 
it is difficult for the AU to lecture the Sudanese government about respect 
for political rights and civil liberties, when many of the African states are 
also engaged in the violation of the human rights of their own citizens; 
although, such actions, in contradistinction to the Sudanese situation, have 
not degenerated into the commission of atrocities that rise to the level of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. 
Another factor is the primacy of solidarity between and among the 
various regimes on the continent. As Dan Kwali aptly notes, “The AU 
member states appear to operate according to the norm that the mutual 
protection of ruling elites is of greater priority than the protection of 
civilians.”75 For example, all of the regimes on the continent, with the 
exception of the new government of Malawi under the leadership of 
President Joyce Banda, have supported the Bashir regime by, among other 
things, collectively imploring the ICC to drop the charges against President 
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Bashir, as well as revoke the writ of arrest issued against him.76 However, 
the Banda regime in Malawi, which came to power in 2012, has refused to 
support the Bashir regime.77 It refused to host the 2012 Summit Meeting of 
the Assembly of the AU, if President Bashir attended.78 As such, the AU 
moved the meeting to its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.79 The 
prevailing practice among the majority of the regimes on the continent is to 
defend heinous acts that are committed by their colleagues. This is because 
if a regime commits similar acts against its citizens, it would expect to be 
shielded by the other regimes—a sort of quid pro quo. Therefore, 
supporting the Bashir regime in Sudan is analogous to the securing of an 
“insurance policy” by the other regimes should they be in similar 
circumstances in the future. This has led Emmanuel Kwesi-Aning and 
Samuel Atuobi to observe: “[T]he AU’s response to current security 
challenges in Darfur in Sudan, . . . and especially the ICC’s application for 
the issuance of arrest warrant for President Al Bashir of Sudan, does not 
reflect a clear commitment to the responsibility to protect.”80 
Also, the continuing centrality of state sovereignty served as an obstacle 
for the AU, in spite of the AU’s professed commitment to making 
“sovereignty a responsibility.”81 For example, the AU sought the Bashir 
regime’s approval for the various peacemaking and peacekeeping activities 
it has undertaken in the Darfur conflict. And in the cases where the Bashir 
regime objected to certain actions contemplated by the AU, the latter 
capitulated to the former.82 As Christine Gray argues, “The AU was not 
willing to intervene in the absence of consent by the government of the 
Sudan.”83 In essence, the AU has, and continues to treat the conflict in 
Darfur as a domestic matter over which the Sudanese government has 
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primary responsibility. Thus, the AU sees its primary role, and those of 
other external actors as mediatory. That is, the Bashir regime should be 
encouraged rather than coerced to end the conflict in Darfur. Unfortunately, 
the AU’s view is contradicted by the fact that the conflict in Darfur is 
genocidal rather than simply traditional (a classical civil war involving a 
government and insurgent domestic faction or factions). Accordingly, since 
the Bashir regime is the principal source for perpetrating the genocide, 
military force should be used against it as is required by the AU’s 
responsibility to protect norm. 
Similarly, the AU continues to demonstrate the lack of political will to 
invoke the use of the military force, given the circumstances in Darfur. In 
spite of the hoopla and fanfare about the dawning of a “new era” on the 
African Continent in which governments would be held accountable for 
committing atrocities against their citizens, the AU has failed to match its 
rhetoric with praxis in the Darfur case. As Kithure Kindiki argues,  
[D]arfur presents a splendid example of a government that is “unable or 
willing” to protect its citizens, but also tragically, an international 
community that is equally unable or unwilling to take on the default 
sovereign responsibility that the Responsibility to Protect envisages. More 
importantly, the Responsibility to Protect essentially endorses the legality 
and legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, a doctrine whose normative 
status has remained fraught with uncertainties over the years.84  
 
Christine Gray puts the case this way:  
[The] failure to prevent a major humanitarian crisis demonstrates that the 
universal acceptance in principle of a “responsibility to protect” in the 
World Summit Outcome Document cannot guarantee action. . . . It may be 
that the World Summit’s acceptance of the ‘responsibility to protect’ has 
created expectations which will not be fulfilled in practice.85  
In short, the AU’s failure to match its rhetoric with practice in Darfur is 
symptomatic of the continuation of the legacy of African states that revolves 
around the habit of formulating documents with lofty objectives, but failing 
to implement them.  
In addition, the AU has several institutional and operational weaknesses 
that would have adversely affected its use of robust military intervention in 
the Darfur conflict, even if it chooses to pursue this option. Institutionally, 
there are two major interrelated problems. The AU has not established the 
units that would design the modalities for the application of its 
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responsibility to protect norm. In other words, the absence of the requisite 
institutions has resulted in the AU’s lack of operational doctrines, including 
strategies for enforcing the norm of the responsibility to protect. Another 
major limitation is that there is the lack of the requisite coordination 
between and among the existing institutions of the AU regarding matters 
concerning the processes and procedures for implementing the 
“responsibility to protect” norm. For example, there are no modalities for 
ensuring collaboration between and among the various institutions under the 
AU’s security architecture. For instance, there are no procedures and 
processes in place for the African Commission on Human and People’s 
Rights, which has the responsibility for monitoring human rights violations 
on the continent (including the violations that are covered under the 
organization’s “responsibility to protect” regime), and the Peace and 
Security Council, which is the AU’s security policy implementation organ.86 
The AU also lacks adequate preventative mechanisms that could be used to 
tackle crises and conflicts before they degenerate into the commission of 
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. In addition, there are 
very weak links between the organization’s “early warning system” and its 
preventive actions.87 That is, the required steps have not been taken to 
develop the appropriate mechanisms that would link early warning with 
preventive actions that would need to be taken by the AU to prevent the 
escalation of a conflict. 
At the operational level, there are several major problems as well. At the 
vortex is the absence of a strategic doctrine for implementing the 
“responsibility to protect” norm. This is coupled with the lack of adequate 
equipment for carrying out military operations, the lack of troop mobility as 
a result of the former, and the lack of an effective intelligence gathering 
mechanism replete with the required elements. Additionally, there is the 
perennial problem of inadequate funding. In fact, it is a common practice 
for the AU to rely on the United States and European states to provide 
substantial portions of the funds for various regional military operations.88 
This means that the AU member states have failed to demonstrate a real 
commitment to the security of the continent, as evidenced by their lack of 
financial support for the AU’s security architecture. Clearly, the AU cannot 
effectively meet its charter obligations concerning the implementation of the 
  
 86. See Jeremy Levitt, The Peace and Security of the African Union: The Known 
Unknowns, 13 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 124 (Spring 2003) (for a discussion 
of the lack of coordination between and among the various institutions of the African Union 
that have responsibilities related to the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” 
norm).  
 87. See Kwali, supra note 75. 
 88. See Eric Berman and Katie E. Sams, Keeping Peace in Africa, DISARMAMENT 
FORUM (2000), available at http://www.unidir.ch/bdd/fiche-periodique.php?ref_periodique= 
1020-7287-2000-3-en#contents. 
2013] The African Union 59 
“responsibility to protect” norm, if it is dependent upon external actors for 
funding, equipment, and logistics.  
IV. TOWARD STRENGTHENING THE AU’S RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
REGIME 
So what are some of the major steps that need to be taken to help 
strengthen the AU’s “responsibility to protect” regime, especially the 
organization’s capacity to implement the robust military intervention option, 
when the situation warrants pursuant to the criteria outlined in Article 4 of 
the AU’s Charter? First, the democratic reconstitution of the African state is 
imperative, especially the replacement of the “culture of impunity” with one 
based on accountability.89 Regimes would think twice before engaging in 
the commission of genocidal acts, war crimes and crimes against humanity. 
This is because the regimes would know that they would be held 
responsible. Undoubtedly, the democratic state reconstitution project on the 
continent can only succeed, if the larger society and civil society 
organizations work together to shepherd the process. This is because with 
very few exceptions the regimes on the continent prefer the maintenance of 
the “culture of impunity,” so they can have carte blanche to abuse the 
human rights of their own citizens.90 Also, the support and cooperation of 
the international community would be important. Some of the major actors 
in the international system such as the United States have the record of 
supporting some of the most authoritarian regimes on the continent, while it 
claims to support democracy. Without external support, authoritarian 
regimes on the continent such as Bashir’s in the Sudan would have two 
major options: democratize or face the people’s power. 
Second, the rhetoric of making “sovereignty responsibility” needs to be 
translated into action by the African Union. One of the major requirements 
for doing so is the emergence of leaders on the continent, who have the 
moral leadership to stand up to fellow leaders, who are autocrats. The 
decision taken by President Banda of Malawi to have arrested President 
Bashir of Sudan and hand him over to the ICC, if he had attended the 2012 
Summit Meeting of the Heads of State and Government of the AU in 
Malawi, is a major step forward.91 
Third, both the AU and its member states consistently need to 
demonstrate political will, especially when it comes to the enforcement of 
the “responsibility to protect” norm. This would require, for example, 
African leaders, who have the moral authority, to refuse to play the 
insidious game of elite solidarity. As has been discussed, President Banda of 
Malawi has become a trail blazer in this vein. 
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The AU also needs to address its various institutional and operational 
weaknesses. At the institutional level, the AU need to establish new units 
within its Peace and Security Department that would focus on the 
development of the modalities for the operation of the ‘“responsibility to 
protect” regime. Essentially, these new units would develop the blueprint 
for the operation of the “responsibility to protect regime.” Also, the various 
entities that have responsibilities bearing on the operation of the 
“responsibility to protect” regime need to coordinate their activities. This 
would entail the development of a framework that would serve as the 
roadmap for the promotion of inter-agency coordination. In terms of the 
operational weaknesses, the issues of linking “early warning” to preventive 
action, the provision of funding for various military operations, the 
development of a strategic doctrine that would serve as a guide for military 
actions, troop mobility, equipment and intelligence gathering need to be 
addressed. In addition, the AU needs to establish a cooperative relationship 
with the U.N. in the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” norm. 
This is because the U.N. has greater amount of resources—spanning from 
money to expertise— than the AU.  
CONCLUSION 
The AU has failed to meet its Charter obligations regarding the 
implementation of its “responsibility to protect” norm in the case of the 
conflict in Sudan’s Darfur region. Given the gravity of genocide, crimes 
against humanity and war crimes, peacekeeping is not an appropriate 
method for implementing the “responsibility to protect” norm. This is 
because the use of military force to enforce the norm under the stipulated 
prevailing conditions would have required the identification of the Sudanese 
government as the culprit, thereby requiring steps to be taken to end the 
commission of atrocities. Certainly, the AU’s failure to use military force 
has, and continues to contribute to the Sudanese government’s continuous 
engagement in committing genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. 
Finally, the AU’s performance in the case of Darfur does not portend 
well for the implementation of the “responsibility to protect norm” at the 
regional level. This is because the AU’s capitulation to the Bashir regime 
will embolden other autocrats on the continent to engage in a similar pattern 
of behavior like the Bashir regime under similar circumstances. The 
establishment of such a bad precedent would return the continent to the era 
when “sovereignty was only a right for states without a concomitant 
“responsibility.” In order to forestall the reversion to the past, several steps 
would need to be taken, including the imperative of democratically 
reconstituting the state in Africa, particularly ending the culture of 
impunity, the urgency of moral leadership on the continent, the need to 
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develop political will, and addressing the battery of institutional and 
operational pathologies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The “it” of the foregoing quote was the transatlantic telegraph, being 
described by the mayor of New York City in 1858. Yet the same words 
could equally be applied to the significance of social media platforms and 
their transformative impact on the world. From its humble beginnings in 
2004 as a way for Harvard students to stay connected with one another, 
Facebook’s inexorable spread has resulted in the most-visited website in the 
world and nearly 1 billion users worldwide. Twitter, which processed 
roughly 5,000 “tweets” per day in 2007, now handles over 340 million 
tweets each day. The rise of social media represents a paradigm shift in how 
people communicate and share information, and it is only natural that social 
media play an ever-increasing role in stimulating political debate and 
galvanizing support for or opposition to governmental policies and the 
figures identified with them. 
Nowhere has this impact been more evident than in what has become 
known as the “Arab Spring,” a term applied to the social unrest and political 
upheaval that spilled across the Middle East in early 2011, beginning with 
Tunisia and continuing across Egypt and into Yemen, leaving authoritarian 
governments toppled in its wake. Rather than provide a recitation of events 
that have already been well-documented in the media, this article will first 
examine the debate over the role played by social media in bringing about 
the Arab Spring. A number of commenters have argued that this role has 
been grossly overstated—that, in essence, dictators are overthrown by 
people, not by social media platforms. But there is compelling empirical 
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evidence to suggest that, if anything, social media’s importance may have 
been understated. Next, this article will attempt to place social media’s 
contribution to the Arab Spring in perspective, by analyzing how emerging 
technologies are impacting not only political and social protest in other 
nations, but also affecting diplomatic efforts and governmental response as 
well. Even in a democratic nation like Great Britain, an event like the 
London riots illustrates the powerful temptation for governmental response 
to incorporate censorship and even cutting off access to the Internet. Finally, 
this article will examine the use of technology in government response, and 
how the “unplugging of democracy” as a state media strategy can result in 
the very same communications platforms that galvanize political protest 
movements being used to stifle such expression—often with the aid of 
Western technology companies. 
In the digital age, the power of social media to, nearly instantaneously, 
spread word of atrocities, inflame public opinion, and to embolden people to 
take action can no longer be underestimated, and neither can what that 
means for traditional diplomatic efforts. The acceleration of media has 
steadily meant changes to diplomatic channels. President Kennedy, for 
example, had plenty of time to formulate a response to the Soviet Union’s 
Berlin Wall crackdown. Yet by the latter stages of the Vietnam War, 
President Johnson was frustrated by the increasing technological 
capabilities of television news as it offered an alternate version of wartime 
events. And the diplomatic prominence of cable news was perhaps never 
more important than during the Gulf War, when Saddam Hussein let CNN 
stay in place as a diplomatic channel to Washington. However, despite this 
media acceleration, the Obama administration (that itself owed a measure of 
its campaign success to its mastery of social media) was little more than a 
sideline player, diplomatically speaking, during the Arab Spring. As Philip 
Seib has pointed out, “Policy makers cannot be mere spectators. Stunned 
surprise is an inadequate response to transformative events, and yet that is 
what we saw from the United States and other major powers as events in the 
Arab world unfolded.”1 
Both the use of social media platforms by citizens to organize protests 
and the governmental response of attempting to control, limit, or completely 
shut down such technologies will continue to pose important questions for 
international law scholars for years to come, even as democracies ponder 
limits on Internet access. For example, in an age in which social media can 
influence outcomes in mere days, how can nations effectively and 
meaningfully conduct diplomacy? How do the laws of war affect civilians’ 
use of social media to guide military air strikes, as in Libya? Even though 
revolutions were toppling governments long before Facebook and Twitter, 
and even though social media-coordinated political expression has not 
  
 1. PHILIP SEIB, REAL-TIME DIPLOMACY: POLITICS AND POWER IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA 
ERA 2 (2012).  
2013] Democracy Unplugged 65 
always led to regime change (witness the 2009 Iranian election protests), the 
Arab Spring has provided perhaps provided the clearest example of how the 
power of social media platforms can be harnessed as a tool for political 
organization and expression. 
I. THE ARAB SPRING IN PERSPECTIVE 
Few people could have predicted the role that a humble produce vendor, 
Mohamed Bouazizi, would play in unleashing a wave of protests seeking 
democracy across the Arab world. After being assessed an arbitrary fine, 
slapped by corrupt policemen, and humiliated in public, the young Tunisian 
stepped in front of a Tunisian government building on December 17, 2010, 
and set himself on fire. Video of the horrific event went viral in Tunisia, 
which enjoys one of the highest rates of Internet access in north Africa. 
Within a month, there were over 196,000 mentions on Twitter about the 
Tunisian revolution, and after increasing protests, the government of 
President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali was toppled. 
Civil war broke out in Libya. Protestors took to the streets in Yemen, 
Syria (where a civil war would also soon begin), Bahrain, Morocco, and 
elsewhere. In Egypt in 2010, Khaled Said was beaten and murdered by 
Egyptian police after he posted a video showing police corruption online. 
Photos of Said and his swollen, bruised face went viral on the Internet, 
contradicting police reports and an official autopsy report that had 
concluded that Said had choked to death on a bag of drugs. Wael Ghonim, 
and Egyptian Google executive and Internet activist, started a Facebook 
page entitled “We Are All Khaled Said.” It grew to over 800,000 members, 
as Egyptians increasingly used social networking platforms to produce and 
consume political content, organize protests, stay connected, and spread 
word to others about abuses of the Mubarak regime. 
While the success of the so-called “Facebook revolutions” or “Twitter 
revolutions” during the Arab Spring garnered worldwide attention- 
technology and, particularly social media, played significant roles in 
mobilizing and organizing political and social protests worldwide. On 
January 17, 2001, after Filipino President Joseph Estrada was acquitted of 
corruption charges, within minutes after the decision was announced, people 
took to their mobile phones to forward text messages. The messages called 
for people to converge on Epifanio de los Santos Avenue, a major 
crossroads in Manila. Over 1 million people eventually arrived, stopping 
traffic in downtown Manila. Nearly 7 million text messages were sent 
protesting the verdict. Legislators quickly reversed course and allowed key 
evidence that had been set aside to be introduced. By January 20, President 
Estrada was out, and he himself blamed “the text messaging generation” for 
his downfall. 
All over the world, the power of social networking as a tool for effecting 
political change has been played out on stages that may not be as prominent 
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as Tahrir Square during the Arab Spring, but which nonetheless command 
our attention. In India, the government has demanded that social media sites 
like Facebook censor user content to remove objectionable content before it 
goes online. Sites like Facebook and Google/Orkut are already being 
monitored by special units in cities like Mumbai for content deemed 
disparaging or obscene. In South Korea, prosecutors indicted a Socialist 
Party member for re-tweeting pro-North Korean messages from a North 
Korean government Twitter account. In China, which has waged its own 
war with social networking sites over its censorship demands, the 
government was upset with the fact that the U.S. Embassy posted air 
pollution reading in Beijing on Twitter. The readings, which rebuke the 
official and wildly optimistic assessments of the Chinese government, have 
been picked up and spread by Chinese bloggers as an indication of the 
government’s lack of transparency and willingness to lie to its own people. 
In October 2011, the office of U.S. Senator Richard Lugar released a report 
outlining a strategy to advance U.S. goals in Latin America by expanding 
social media use and by supporting software engineering training programs, 
IT literacy programs, and supporting local technology developers in 
creating language translation programs (only about 12% of Internet content 
is in Spanish or Portuguese). In addition, the U.S. State Department is 
already using social media to reach out and to explain U.S. foreign policy, 
through tools like Iniciacion Emprende, a Facebook page for online youth in 
Latin America who are interested in starting their own businesses. 
Ongoing developments in Russia have also illustrated the vital role 
played by social media in fomenting dissent. In December 2011, tens of 
thousands of Russians protested in cities like Moscow, organizing anti-Putin 
rallies using social networking sites. YouTube was flooded with videos 
alleging vote rigging by the countries’ ruling United Russia Party. Russia 
has over 1 million Twitter users, a five-fold increase from the previous year. 
40% of Russian adults are online, using sites like Vkontakte (Russia’s 
“Facebook”). 
Governmental response that uses technology or directly addresses the use 
of technology by protestors is a key factor in the success or failure of 
movements agitating for political or social change, as the experience of the 
Arab Spring amply demonstrates. However, social media is a double-edged 
sword. During the August 2011 London riots, social networking platforms 
received much of the blame for providing rioters with a vehicle to help 
organize and cause massive, violent looting. Rioting Londoners used social 
media not only to plan rendezvous locations, but also to warn others of 
areas where the police had gathered in force. At one point, the Metropolitan 
Police announced that they would bring charges against people who tried to 
initiate looting or violence through social media postings. Indeed, in the 
aftermath of the riots, individuals who had used social media to coordinate 
looting or to incite violence were criminally charged. Even Prime Minister 
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David Cameron raised the stakes during the unrest, when he publicly 
contemplated shutting down access to the Internet. 
Yet, even as social media became associated with the violence and 
lawlessness of the London riots, it was simultaneously a positive force. 
Social media aided the police in finding, apprehending, and prosecuting 
thousands of suspected rioters and looters in the wake of the unrest. In 
addition, social media helped facilitate a massive cleanup effort and helped 
a divided community to heal. Facebook pages and websites were created to 
help coordinate and centralize information about cleanup locations. In 
addition, @Riotcleanup, a popular Twitter feed with over 60,000 followers, 
was created and regularly updated to let people know where to meet to help 
clean up the city, donate supplies, and so forth. 
Social networking platforms are all about facilitating communication and 
the sharing of information. These new methods of communication allow 
widely-dispersed individuals to connect and work together in a coordinated 
fashion, while also broadcasting their views and activities at home and 
abroad. The Arab Spring experience was but one demonstration among 
many on the international landscape. It is a virtual certainty that it will not 
be the last. 
II. WAS THE REVOLUTION REALLY TWEETED? 
As the Arab Spring coalesced, media outlets worldwide clamored to 
credit the use of social networking platforms for the regime-changing 
successes. One account quoted on a tweeting Cairo activist who proclaimed 
“[w]e use Facebook to schedule the protests, Twitter to co-ordinate and 
YouTube to tell the world.”2 At times, the effusiveness of the protestors 
themselves veered into the extreme; in February 2011, Jamal Ibrahim of 
Egypt even named his newborn daughter “Facebook” because of the 
significant role of the social networking site in his country’s revolution.3 
Other observers similarly applauded the importance of social media. Amjad 
Baiazy of Amnesty International said that during Syria’s crackdown on 
dissidents, for example, there were “thousands of [pieces of] evidence 
thanks to social media, not only to show the world, but also Syrians, of the 
crimes.”4 Social media, Baiazy said, had “turned every citizen into a 
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journalist. Every citizen can use Twitter to broadcast.”5 The Atlantic Wire 
quoted Mohammed Janjoom of CNN on the vital role played by social 
media, with Janjoom pointing out: 
In the case of Egypt it really played a critical factor in getting out the word 
on how to organize . . . . There was one group in Egypt that was one of the 
key groups in getting people out on the street . . . . Last week in a matter of 
days they went from 20,000 fans to 80,000 fans . . . . We can see that these 
sites were used in order to get the word out about how to bypass 
checkpoints, how to get across bridges, how to get to places where people 
wanted to demonstrate. So it was a critical tool in getting people out into 
the streets.6 
Other observers pointed to the organizational value as well as the 
empowering, citizen journalism aspect of social media: 
Regardless of one’s personal opinion of YouTube, Twitter and Facebook, 
these social media platforms, along with sheer creativity, determination 
and innovation, became the technological weapons of this revolution. 
Their use confounded the Mubarak team at every turn as tech savvy people 
around the globe created the means with which to continue to get their 
messages out . . . . While many who were there in the Square argued 
Twitter and Facebook were not great organising tools for those physically 
there, they provided a tipping point of outrage that spread like wildfire 
throughout the region . . . . Yes, everyone knew to go to Tahrir Square . . . 
these social media tools were used to send out information quickly so 
evidence of regime atrocities were seen from places the media’s cameras 
were not able to show the violence.7 
Moreover, as Denis Campbell went on to observe, the use of social 
networking platforms lent an air of honesty and transparency to coverage of 
the revolution, highlighting the use of candid, unguarded moments from 
Tahrir Square “of children protesting and spontaneous groups singing, 
virally across the globe countering biased coverage that painted the 
revolution as not meaningful or only representative of a small group of 
protestors.”8 
Yet almost as quickly as the coverage and credit—misplaced or not—
being given to social media occurred, a backlash began against those media 
accounts that had, as one author described it, “glazed over what the real role 
of social media was, instead mischaracterizing social media and the Internet 
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as a new phenomenon that showed Egyptian youth just how wonderful 
democracy was.”9 A host of pundits sprang up to argue that social media 
was merely a means and not the end, and that Western journalists were 
engaging in considerable wishful thinking, exaggerating the influence of 
emerging media because of a sense of “techno-utopianism.” Pointing out the 
failure of Iran’s 2009 election protests amidst the media hype about the 
power of social media, for example, Evgeny Morozov wrote that “Iran’s 
Twitter Revolution revealed the intense Western longing for a world where 
information technology is the liberator rather than the oppressor.”10 Writing 
in the Washington Post, Anne Applebaum expressed her skepticism based 
on the continued Egyptian protests even after President Mubarak decided to 
cut off all Internet access: 
Note that the Egyptian government’s decision to shut down the country’s 
Internet access over the weekend—something it can do because Internet 
access is still so limited—had almost no impact on the demonstrators. For 
all the guff being spoken about Twitter and social media, the uprising in 
Cairo appears to be a very old-fashioned, almost 19th century revolution. 
People see other people going out on the streets and decide to join them.11 
Such critics were quick to point out that while social networking 
platforms may have dramatically altered the traditional relationship between 
popular will and political authority, ultimately there is no substitute for 
word of mouth and boots on the ground activism. Sites like Facebook or 
Twitter may be useful tools for rapid coordination, but don’t look to them 
for the narrative or resolve needed to sustain a movement. As Andrew 
Woods commented in one op-ed piece, “flash mobs do not a political 
organization make.”12 
Soon, almost as if to compensate for the pendulum swing of media 
commentary that had been hailing “the Twitter Revolution” in the Mideast 
and arguably magnifying social media’s role in the political upheaval, the 
pendulum swung back. Articles begin appearing with such titles as 
“Successful Revolution Takes More Than Social Media,” “Did Twitter, 
Facebook Really Build a Revolution?,” and “The Twitter Revolution 
Debate is Dead.”13 And new attention was focused on earlier cynics, like 
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Golnaz Esfandiari’s refutation of the role that social media had played in the 
2009 unrest in Iran. Writing in Foreign Policy, Esfandiari said “It is time to 
get Twitter’s role in the events in Iran right. Simply put: There was no 
Twitter Revolution inside Iran.” Instead, Esfandiari pointed out, it was 
Western journalists and bloggers who were scrolling through English-
language tweets with the hashtag “#iranelection,” rather than 
communicating with people on the ground in Iran, who were spreading 
word of the unrest. Nevertheless, despite the confusion over the sources of 
the news itself, Esfandiari acknowledged that social media played a pivotal 
role in publicizing the Iranian protests, albeit a role that had to be viewed in 
the context of the efforts at regime change that predated social media. 
Esfandiari noted: 
Twitter played an important role in getting word about the events in Iran 
out to the wider world. Together with YouTube, it helped focus the 
world’s attention on the Iranian people’s fight for democracy and human 
rights. New media over the last year created and sustained unprecedented 
international moral solidarity with the Iranian struggle—a struggle that 
was being bravely waged many years before Twitter was ever conceived.14 
Perhaps the most vocal member of the “Internet freedom does not equate 
with securing real freedom” school of thought is Malcolm Gladwell. 
Rejecting the idea that the “new tools of social media have reinvented social 
activism,” Gladwell pointed to the success of the early sit-ins during the 
U.S. civil rights movement to illustrate that meaningful social change could 
be accomplished with word of mouth instead of technology.15 As Gladwell 
put it, “These events in the early sixties became a civil-rights war that 
engulfed the South for the rest of the decade—and it happened without e-
mail, texting, Facebook, or Twitter.”16 Gladwell continued to sound this 
theme in the aftermath of the toppling of the Mubarak regime, writing 
“What evidence is there that social revolutions in the pre-Internet era 
suffered from a lack of cutting-edge communications and organizational 
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tools? In other words, did social media solve a problem that actually needed 
solving?17 
Certainly, political and social protests have gone on long before social 
media, and dictators were being toppled long before the first glimmers of 
Facebook or Twitter. And without a doubt, Western journalists in a rush to 
anoint social networking as the new “it” tool to effect social change may 
have been guilty, if not of overstating social media’s role in the Arab 
Spring, then of failing to properly place it in the context of other 
organizational and broadcast tools. Viewing it more pragmatically, one 
commentator has noted that Egyptians “knew the value of social media was 
that it was a good tool to organize masses but it was not a miracle object 
that would create a revolution on its own. With that understanding, they 
used both the Internet and clandestine meetings to shape the revolution.18 
However, cyber-pessimists like Gladwell and others, in their rush to 
assure and convince their respective audiences that “the revolution will not 
be tweeted,” have failed to take several significant factors into account. The 
first is that a failure to appreciate the significance of the role played by 
social media in organizing protests, broadcasting word of the dissenting 
voices, and promoting government transparency during the Arab Spring is 
at once dismissive as well of the social networking power that can be (and 
has been) harnessed by repressive regimes themselves for their own 
purposes—surveillance of the opposition, spreading disinformation, and 
even networking propaganda of their own. The second factor that cyber-
pessimists have ignored hearkens back to Marshall McCluhan’s prophetic 
words that “the medium is the message.” The medium carrying the message, 
whether it be Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, or any one of a number of social 
networking platforms, cannot help but define and shape the message itself. 
The utility of a site like Facebook is in providing a tool for enhancing the 
ability to engage in public speech, to undertake collective action, and to 
facilitate instantaneous access to information, communication, and 
organization. Social media didn’t bring about the protests in Tahrir Square; 
these were fueled by years of corruption, poverty, unemployment, and the 
abuses of an authoritarian regime. Yet just because social mobilization 
occurs via Facebook or Twitter as opposed to face to face communication 
doesn’t lessen its impact or make the ties it creates any weaker. Images of 
friends and neighbors being beaten by riot police are powerful, and clearly 
can draw people to the streets. The appeals for solidarity, the calls to action, 
are no less powerful because they are viewed in a hastily-recorded YouTube 
clip as opposed to being witnessed in person. The very immediacy of social 
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media and the technological infrastructure it provided for gathering and 
organizing support, together with the transparency it offered by providing a 
global audience with news is as much a part of the message as the content 
itself. 
The final factor overlooked by cyber-pessimists in the backlash seeking 
to diminish the importance of social media’s role during the Arab Spring is 
the growing body of empirical evidence that has emerged to document 
social media’s critical importance in enabling the historic region-wide 
uprising in early 2011. For example, a study by Ekaterina Stepanova of the 
Institute of World Economy and International Relations analyzed the 
penetration rate of modern information communication technologies and 
digital social media tools and networks throughout the Middle East in late 
2010 and early 2011.19 While that report chided media haste to emphasize 
the mobilization role of a site like Twitter, for example, as composed to the 
greater impact of satellite television, cell phones, and YouTube, it 
nevertheless concluded: 
No region, state, or form of government can remain immune to the impact 
of new information and communication technologies on social and 
political movements. While the political contexts of mass unrest in large 
parts of the Middle East have important country and macro-regional 
specifics, the impact of net-based technologies and social tools goes 
beyond that region and will continue to affect developing and developed 
countries alike.20 
The PONARS report highlights the conditions that made it possible for 
social media to play such an important role in Egypt, relying upon February 
2010 figures from the Egyptian Ministry of Communications and 
Information Technology that revealed that the country had over 17 million 
users—a 3,691 percent increase from the 450,000 users it had in December 
2000.21 According to the Ministry, Egypt also had 4 million Facebook users 
at the time, and over 160,000 bloggers (roughly a third of which were 
focused on politics).22 Nevertheless, this PONARS report points out the 
seeming contradiction between its conclusions and the fact that “states with 
some of the lowest levels of Internet exposure (like Yemen and Libya) both 
experienced mass protests.”23 
Ultimately, the PONARS study cautions against U.S. policy making an 
automatic connection between social media networks and a Western-style 
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democracy agenda while ignoring socioeconomic realities and social justice 
facets to the Arab Spring. As Stepanova aptly characterizes it, the events of 
the Arab Spring defied skeptics like Malcom Gladwell and Evgeny 
Morozov by proving social media’s value as an accelerator of social 
transformation, but while “net-based information and communication tools 
may serve as powerful accelerating factors of social protest, . . . they do not 
in and of themselves reflect or dictate the substantive natures (sociopolitical, 
value-based, and ideological) and contextual forms of such protests.”24  
Another empirical look at the Arab Spring was conducted by the Dubai 
School of Government’s Governance and Innovation Program in its second 
Arab Social Media Report.25 The report highlights and analyzes usage 
trends of online social networking across the Arab region based on data 
collected during the first quarter of 2011, looking at (among other factors) 
Twitter and Facebook usage. In particular, it notes that Facebook usage 
between January and April 2011, jumped by 30 percent (compared with 18 
percent growth for the same time period in 2010). In particular, Egypt’s 
growth was 29 percent, up from just 12 percent for the first quarter of 
2010.26 The report also details the swelling numbers for terms on Twitter 
associated with the Arab Spring, noting that the hash tag “Egypt” garnered 
1.4 million references during the first quarter of 2011, while “Jan25” had 
1.2 million mentions.27 While the mentions associated with the Arab Spring 
in Tunisia peaked right around the January 14, 2011, when protests 
commenced there, such mentions in Egypt did not peak until President 
Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011.28 Another interesting fact 
from the study is that, for the Egyptians and Tunisians who were surveyed, 
government attempts to block sites like Facebook apparently backfired, with 
more than half of those surveyed (56% in Egypt, 59% in Tunisia) reporting 
the attempts had a positive effect by motivating them to be more creative in 
communicating and organizing.29 The study also mapped calls for protests 
on Facebook with the actual demonstrations on given dates and found 
demonstrable correlations. While the study stopped short of calling social 
networking “the defining or only factor in people organizing themselves on 
these dates,” it does conclude that, “as the initial platform for those calls, it 
cannot be denied that they were a factor in mobilizing movements.”30 
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Yet another telling result from the Arab Social Media Report concerns 
the significance of social media as a source of news and information. A 
staggering 94.29% of Tunisians surveyed reported getting their news and 
information on events during the civil unrest in early 2011 from social 
media resources like Facebook, Twitter, blogs, etc., while 88.10% of 
Egyptians acknowledged doing so.31 This dwarfs the figure for state-
sponsored media (television, radio, newspapers), which 35.71% of 
Egyptians and 40% of Tunisians admitted consulting.32 
Overall, while the Arab Social Media Report cautions that “[i]t is still 
early to make a final assessment about the role of social media in the Arab 
civil movements or the role they will be playing in changing the ways in 
which governments interact with societies in the region,” it nevertheless 
provides compelling empirical evidence suggesting that, as the report itself 
puts it, “the growth of social media in the region and the shift in usage 
trends have played a critical role in mobilization, empowerment, shaping 
opinions, and influencing change.”33 
A final example of the empirical analysis that refutes the media backlash 
against the recognition of social media’s vital role during the Arab Spring is 
the study performed by a group of University of Washington researchers as 
part of 2011’s Project on Information Technology and Political Islam.34 This 
study, which focused primarily on Tunisia and Egypt, involved the creation 
and study of a database consisting of more than 3 million tweets, gigabytes 
of blogs, and countless hours of YouTube videos. In discussing social 
media’s importance in putting “a human face on political oppression,” the 
study found that in Egypt, the number of tweets mentioning “revolution” 
from Egypt and during the week before President Mubarak’s resignation 
skyrocketed from 2,300 a day to 230,000 a day.35 Because Twitter users can 
send updates from any mobile phone, Professor Howard and his colleagues 
devoted particular attention to that data, since the number of people with 
cellphones in Egypt and Tunisia greatly outnumber those with standard 
internet access. As a result, Howard says, “Twitter offers us the clearest 
evidence of where individuals engaging in democratic conversations were 
located during the revolutions.”36 
Among the observations made in the University of Washington study is 
not just the sheer numbers indicating that political discussion on blogs and 
social networking platforms often preceded mass protests, but also the 
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“who” and “how” behind the social media efforts. Howard and his fellow 
researchers found that a key demographic group—young, urban, relatively 
well-educated individuals (many of whom were women)—played a critical 
role in steering the political conversation, and often in inventive ways.37 In 
Tunisia, for example, dissidents streamed video of President Zine El 
Abidine Ben Ali’s wife using a government jet to make expensive shopping 
trips to Europe to highlight the regime’s excesses.38 In addition, as with the 
Dubai School of Government’s Arab Social Media Report, the University of 
Washington study demonstrated that a spike in online conversations about 
revolutionary subjects usually preceded major events, with Twitter traffic 
peaking with street protests. 
Another interesting aspect of this study is not just the increasing social 
media activity and content produced by political actors in Egypt as they 
reacted to events on the street, but the close affinity with Western media. 
From mapping the digital space in Egypt twice (once in November 2010 
and a second time in May 2011), the University of Washington found that, 
for Egyptians, Facebook and other social networking platforms are not 
simply used for entertainment, but instead, are where Egyptians go to 
engage in politics. Major political actors frequently linked to social 
networking platforms like Facebook or to Western media (like CNN) and, 
in fact, were more likely to link to these resources than to each other.39 Over 
20% of the 928 links going out of Egyptian party websites were to social 
media platforms like Facebook and YouTube and to major Western news 
websites.40 Interestingly, none of the outgoing links from the Egyptian 
websites went to Al-Jazeera in November 2010, and when the web crawl 
was performed again in May 2011, there were only 6 outgoing links to Al-
Jazeera.41 
The University of Washington study relied on this body of empirical 
evidence to reach several conclusions. One was that, “by using digital 
technologies, democracy advocates created a freedom meme that took on a 
life of its own and spread ideas about liberty and revolution to a surprisingly 
large number of people.”42 Another was that conversations about democracy 
and revolution on blogs and social networking platforms usually 
immediately preceded mass protests.43 Finally, the report concluded that 
social media helped spread democratic ideas transnationally, as democracy 
proponents used social media to connect with others outside their borders. 
The result, according to Howard and his fellow researchers, was that “social 
media brought a cascade of messages about freedom and democracy across 
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North Africa and the Middle East, and helped raise expectations for success 
of political uprising.”44 In other words, far from being merely an 
exaggeration by “cyber-utopian” Western media overly eager to anoint 
social media as a digital political savior, social networking platforms played 
a genuine, vital and, more importantly, quantifiable role in the Arab Spring. 
As Howard and his colleagues sagely point out: 
Democratization movements had existed long before technologies such as 
mobile phones and the Internet came to these countries. But technologies 
have helped people interested in democracy build extensive networks, 
create social capital, and organize political action. Technology may not 
have created the desire for political freedom, but it is a tool democracy 
advocates have used to their advantage.45 
III. GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSE 
As vital as appreciating the uses of social networking platforms by 
protesters themselves may be, no understanding of the significance of social 
media during the Arab Spring can be complete without appreciating the 
nature of the governmental response. In particular, the use of technology by 
repressive regimes—technology all too often developed and/or sold by 
Western nations—in attempting to stifle and combat dissent has been 
largely overlooked. Whether or not another Arab Spring might succeed 
could very well depend on how leaders in the West respond to attempts to 
“unplug democracy.” Legislative efforts such as the Global Online Freedom 
Act could impact the extent to which the very same technology credited 
with fomenting dissent can be used by an authoritarian regime to crush 
opposing voices. 
Looking at Egypt and Tunisia in particular, the conditions were certainly 
ripe for technology to serve as both a tool for marshaling and organizing 
protests and a means of exerting government control. Both countries have 
comparatively young populations comfortable with technology. In Tunisia, 
the median age is 30 years old, and approximately 23% of the country’s 
population of 10 million is under the age of 14.46 For every 100 people in 
Tunisia, there are 93 mobile phone subscribers.47 Twenty-five percent of the 
Tunisian population has used the Internet, and approximately 66% of the 
online population in Tunisia is 34 or younger.48 In Egypt, the median age is 
24, and out of the nation’s 83 million residents, a third is under the age of 
34.49 Out of 100 Egyptians, 67 have mobile phone subscriptions.50 Ten 
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percent of the Egyptian population has used the Internet, and 70% of the 
online population in Egypt is under the age of 34.51 And in both nations, 
there was a long history of government censorship of the media, giving 
people greater incentive to look to the Internet for sources of credible news 
and information. 
Prior to the Arab Spring itself, government crackdowns on Internet use, 
and particularly the use of social media, were not unknown. For example, in 
Tunisia in August 2007, video of the president’s plane arriving at and 
departing from prime shopping spots in Europe—with the president’s wife 
as the only passenger—was published on YouTube and other sites. The 
Tunisian government responded by blocking YouTube and another video 
site, Daily Motion, for an extended period of time.52 In 2008, the 
government blocked Facebook for a month.53 During both periods, it was 
widely speculated that the Tunisian administration of Ben Ali was 
concerned about the power of social media to nurture communication ties 
among its citizens. 
With the spark that ignited national protests in Tunisia—the self-
immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi on December 17, 2010—came more 
crackdowns. Although the state-sponsored media had not covered either 
Bouazizi’s act, the protests it engendered, or his eventual death in a hospital 
on January 14, 2011, the uploaded YouTube videos of the tragedy spread 
rapidly, initially among networks of family and friends. Critics of the Ben 
Ali regime, like 29 year-old fashion designer Shamseddine Abidi, posted 
videos and updates on Facebook that were picked up by news outlets like Al 
Jazeera. At the same time, there were online campaigns calling for 
particular groups (like lawyers and unions) to form committees to support 
the protests that had begun in the city of Sidi Bouzid. While the Tunisian 
government responded by trying to ban Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Daily Motion, organization using these social networking platforms had 
already spread thanks to the near-universal access to cell phones. In 
addition, outside Tunisia, hacker organizations like Anonymous targeted 
Tunisian government efforts with “Operation Tunisia” denial-of-service 
attacks and with software solutions that activists used to evade government 
firewalls.54 
The study by Professor Nolan and his colleagues show that Twitter 
traffic with hashtags associated with Tunisian protesters (such as 
#sidibouzid) ebbed and flowed along with government efforts to curb the 
effects of social media. Many of the tweets themselves gave glimpses into 
personal stories of suffering under the Ben Ali regime, while others 
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provided links to YouTube videos, news stories, or Facebook groups critical 
of the regime. Before Ben Ali fled Tunisia on January 14, 2011, the volume 
of Twitter traffic would periodically decline while mobile networks were 
under attack, but it would always surge again when service returned to 
normal.55 Similarly, the number of tweets coming from inside Tunisia 
increased over the same period, just as the number of tweets with no 
location information declined, an indication that as the winds of political 
change were blowing, more and more Tunisians were willing to publicly 
declare that they were tweeting from inside their own country.56 
As social media has become a key forum for the debate of political 
movements as well as an organizational tool for would-be reformers, 
governmental response has taken various forms, ranging from suppressing 
the use of such platforms, using them as an avenue for surveillance, or by 
blocking them altogether. In a study of thirty-seven countries conducted by 
Washington, D.C. based Freedom House, researchers identified a variety of 
different practices employed by governments, including increased website 
blocking and filtering; content manipulation; attacks upon and 
imprisonment of bloggers; punishment of ordinary users; and coercion of 
website owners to remove content.57 This study identified twelve nations, 
including Egypt and Tunisia, where social media sites have been at least 
temporarily shut down.58 Of the forms of governmental response to dissent 
being disseminated via social media, internet blocking is the most widely 
used. The aim of this response (essentially a form of censorship) is to 
prevent specific content from reaching a final user, using software or 
hardware that reviews communications and content and decides whether to 
block the information on the basis of some predetermined, pre-programmed 
criteria. 
Another widely used form of governmental response is coercion, or 
censorship by pressure. Here, governmental actors contact either the authors 
of particular information or the operators of an Internet site and apply 
pressure for the removal of particular content. This can take the form of 
threats of legal action, withdrawal of government contracts or licenses, or 
even outright bans of specific companies from operation within the country. 
One example of this is Google and China. In 2010, under immense pressure 
from the Chinese government to censor its content, Google China began 
redirecting all search queries from mainland-based Google.cn to 
Google.com.hk, based in Hong Kong. In this manner, Google could bypass 
Chinese regulatory authorities, allowing users access to uncensored search 
results as opposed to those that had been “simplified” by government filters. 
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As a unique entity acknowledged by international treaty, Hong Kong was 
not subject to Chinese laws requiring the restriction of the free flow of 
information. Governmental coercion can also take the form of encouraging 
users of social networking platforms like Facebook to complain directly to 
the site owners about user content. Content manipulation is another tactic in 
which government agents (portraying themselves as ordinary citizens) post 
pro-government messages or content on social media sites. 
The most direct forms of governmental response, however, are more 
aggressive. At the low end of this spectrum is the deliberate slowing down 
of connection speeds, particularly in newspaper offices, internet cafés, 
private residents, and hotels. At the other end of the spectrum is the 
complete shutdown of national networks. This tactic was employed by the 
Mubarak regime in Egypt. It was also used in Syria, where the Internet is 
almost exclusively controlled by state-owned Syrian Telecom 
Establishment. In June 2011, nearly all Internet networks in Syria were shut 
down, with the exception of a handful controlled by the Bashar Al-Assad 
regime.59 
In the middle of the spectrum of governmental response is Internet 
surveillance, legal action by the state (including arrest and formal 
prosecution), imprisonment and even torture. Internet surveillance often 
includes monitoring what information people are accessing, their online 
communications such as emails or tweets, and even using geo-location 
features on sites like Facebook to track the location of a given user. 
Organizing protests and mobilizing dissenting voices becomes increasingly 
difficult when the organizers are living in fear of spies, arrest, or physical 
attack. 
The Egyptian governmental response to social media activism during the 
Arab Spring is an example of escalating response, as the Mubarak regime 
first moved to attack and limit first the content and then the social 
networking platforms themselves before ultimately moving against the 
communications infrastructure itself. All the while, the Egyptian 
government simultaneously was employing social media platforms for its 
own purposes. As one scholar has noted, this strategy had the effect of 
throwing out the baby with the bathwater, because the full quarantine and 
shutdown of media infrastructures helped turn the tide of public opinion 
against the Mubarak regime. This quarantine strategy, notes Alexandra 
Dunn, “required a disproportionate attack on apolitical actors and was 
ultimately ineffective at fully impeding the communications networks of 
those that were the most politically engaged.”60 
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http://www.renesys.com/blog/2011/06/syrian-internet-shutdown.shtml.  
 60. Alexandra Dunn, Unplugging a Nation: State Media Strategy During Egypt’s 
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Beginning in October 2010, the Egyptian government’s response to the 
growing unrest with the ruling party was to focus its attack on content. This 
began with the shuttering of fourteen predominantly religious satellite 
television stations, the firing of four prominent critics of the Mubarak 
regime from their posts at newspapers and television talk shows, and the 
requirement that all live talk shows be broadcast from the headquarters of 
Egyptian State television.61 On the day of the parliamentary elections 
themselves, the regime blocked websites that hosted the newspapers of 
major opposition groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood.62 However, this 
blockage was both focused in nature and limited in time (the government 
lifted the blockage immediately after the elections). Clearly, at this point, 
the regime was seeking to keep specific information from reaching the 
population at a specific time. 
However, by January 2011, in the face of mounting unrest, the regime’s 
efforts shifted to blocking entire platforms such as Facebook (which boasted 
3.5 million users in Egypt) and Twitter (which had 12,000 users in Egypt). 
Another site, Bambuser, had 15,000 registered users in Egypt (most of 
which signed up just before the November election). A video-sharing site, 
Bambuser enabled live broadcasts from protests, and allowed people all 
around the country to follow protests and ensuing government crackdowns 
in real time.63 With the escalating signs of social media’s importance in 
coordinating protests (the phenomenal popularity of the “We are all Khaled 
Said” Facebook page, the use of Twitter to coordinate marches), the 
Egyptian government shut down Facebook, Twitter, and other social 
networking sites in their entirety on January 25, 2011. 
As previously noted, the ubiquity of cell phones in Egypt made such 
technology an important organizing tool for activists. Along with the 
disruption of service of Facebook and Twitter, the government also targeted 
specific activists by cutting off their mobile phone lines, such as the 
Frontline SMS hotline for the group Front to Defend Egyptian Protestors 
(FDEP). However, activists responded by simply purchasing new SIM cards 
for their phones, or, in the case of FDEP, replacing the phone numbers 
multiple times. Ultimately, however, the Mubarak regime realized that more 
extreme measures would be needed in order to slow the flow of information 
that was helping to fuel and coordinate the protests. On January 27, 2011, 
the government shut down text messaging and almost all Internet service 
(with the exception of one small internet service provider, Noor ISP, which 
was not shut down until January 30, 2011.64 Internet service would not be 
  
http://fletcher.tufts.edu/~/media/Fletcher/Microsites/Fletcher%20Forum/PDFs/2011summer/
Dunn_FA.ashx. 
 61.  Id. at 17. 
 62.  Id.  
 63.  Id. at 18.  
 64.  Id. at 19.  
2013] Democracy Unplugged 81 
restored until February 2, and text messaging services remained frozen until 
February 6, 2011. This amounted to the most drastic attack ever taken by a 
government against national-level media technologies.65 
The Internet and SMS shutdown, however, backfired. First, the 
consequences of the media blackout could still be circumvented. The 
blocking of Twitter prompted activist to use circumvention software to 
access it, and when the Internet was shut down entirely, people used 
landlines to call friends outside the country and have them tweet for them. 
Satellite television stations showed tweets on air, and even provided 
telephone numbers for access to Google’s newly-developed Speak2Tweet 
system. But most importantly, shutting down the Internet and text-
messaging had an immediate impact beyond politics, particularly among 
business people and the wealthiest, most highly-educated segments of 
Egyptian society. As Dunn described it: 
For the vast majority of Egyptians without Internet access or satellite 
television services, the SMS shutdown was their first experience with 
government-imposed limitations on their ability to communicate openly. 
For nonpolitical individuals, the shutdown of SMS services likely came as 
a surprise, and it increased people’s engagement in the uprising, if only 
due to curiosity about the unavailable services.66 
The Mubarak regime inadvertently brought people together by 
“unplugging” the Internet. By this unplugging, Egypt inflicted potentially 
catastrophic collateral damage on itself: it “unplugged” its own economy, 
lost credibility with the international community, and showed international 
corporations, who were doing business in Egypt, such as Vodaphone, that 
like Egyptian citizens they, too, were subject to the whims and the will of 
the regime. Ultimately, even this extreme demonstration of the lengths to 
which the Mubarak regime was willing to go in order to quell dissent was 
not enough to keep the regime in power. 
Along with orchestrated attacks on international journalists, the extreme 
measures taken by Egypt to attack media infrastructure and media freedoms 
also had the byproduct of increasing diplomatic pressures, particularly by 
the United States. With the United States’ long-standing interest in 
cherished media freedoms, it came as no surprise that the media blackout 
would bring political fallout from Egypt’s single largest source of foreign 
aid. Then-Assistant Secretary of State P.J. Crowley tweeted “we are 
concerned that communication services, including the Internet, social 
media, and even this #tweet, are being blocked in #Egypt.”67 
  
 65.  Id. 
 66. Dunn, supra note 60, at 19.  
 67. Matthew Weaver, et al., Protests in Egypt—As They Happened, GUARDIAN (Jan. 
28, 2011), http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/blog/2011/jan/28/egypt-protests-live-updates. 
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Yet one cannot ignore the fact that even as Western diplomats and media 
outlets condemned the extreme and often brutal efforts to curb expression 
and dissent during the Arab Spring, Western technology has been complicit 
in such crackdowns. Innovations from Western countries have enabled 
oppressive regimes in the Middle East to conduct surveillance and intercept 
the email, text messages, and cell phone calls of political dissidents. Even as 
protesters in the Middle East were using social media to organize and 
communicate, the very regimes they were battling were often equipped with 
highly-sophisticated technology, purchased from or produced by Western 
companies that they used to thwart such efforts. In a thought-provoking 
series of articles entitled “Wired for Repression,” Bloomberg News 
journalists shed light on these dealings. For example, an Iranian engineer 
who had become involved in the opposition movement in the wake of the 
2009 elections was arrested, beaten, and jailed for 52 days.68 During that 
time, he was repeatedly interrogated, with security agents confronting him 
with transcripts of text messages, geo-location records that showed where 
he had been at specific times, and even a diagram showing all of the people 
he had called, and the contacts that they in turn had called.69 The cruel irony 
was that this engineer, who had worked for telecommunications giant 
Ericsson in Tehran until 2010, had worked on some of the very technology 
that was now being used against him.70 
In addition to Ericsson technology being sold to Iran, Creativity 
Software of the United Kingdom sold systems to both Iran and Yemen 
designed to aid in customer location. The systems, which can record a 
person’s location every 15 seconds, generate reports of a person’s 
movements, and alert the user when two targets come in close proximity to 
each other, were intended for law enforcement use.71 Dublin-based Adaptive 
Mobile Security Ltd. also sold software intended for law enforcement 
purposes to Iran, technology, which would be used to monitor the text 
messaging of suspected dissidents. The system would analyze all messages 
in English, Persian, or Arabic for key words or phrases; store the messages; 
and flag ones that had been selected by a filter for review.72 Even more 
troubling than the capability for these features to be misused to quash 
dissenters is the fact that Iranian law enforcement officials requested other 
  
 68. Ben Elgin, Vernon Silver & Adam Katz, Iranian Police Seizing Dissidents Get 
Aid of Western Companies, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Oct. 30, 2011), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-10-31/iranian-police-seizing-dissidents-get-aid-of-
western-companies.html [hereinafter Iranian Police Seizing Dissidents Get Aid of Western 
Companies]. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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specific features, one of which was the ability to change the content of 
messages.73 
U.S. companies, of course, have long been banned from nearly all trade 
with Iran. Moreover, in July 2010, President Obama signed new U.S. 
sanctions into law, barring federal agencies from doing business with 
companies that export to Iran “any technology specifically used to disrupt, 
monitor or restrict the speech of Iranians.”74 Despite this, U.S. technology 
still winds up in the hands of authoritarian regimes. For example, Blue Coat 
Systems, and NetApp Inc., both from Sunnyvale, California, purportedly 
developed and sold filtering technology to Tunisia that the Ben Ali regime 
used to censor websites critical of the government.75 Tunisia also used 
Smartfilter, a product from Santa Clara, California-based McAfee Inc., for 
its internet surveillance and web-blocking efforts.76 Prior to the fall of the 
Ben Ali government, Tunisian bloggers and other activists lived in an 
Orwellian existence in which a “Big Brother” type of message —“Ammar 
404”—would appear instead of the blocked websites they were trying to 
access, just as words, random symbols, or threatening messages like “you 
can run but you can’t hide” would appear instead of the emails they were 
trying to exchange with friends.77 One opponent of the Ben Ali regime, 
Asma Hedi Nairi, described how the “Ammar 404” intrusions forced her to 
shut down multiple email accounts prior to the Arab Spring, and how the 
government interference would sometimes even harm reputations by 
inserting pornographic images in work emails and by routing embarrassing 
photos onto Facebook.78 Nairi says that “Ammar 404 was seeing everything. 
Ammar 404 is more dangerous than any police man in the street. It was a 
war of information.”79 
The digital surveillance industry is worth an estimated $3 billion to $5 
billion a year.80 Just as activists during the Arab Spring and throughout the 
Middle East have used emerging technologies and social networking 
platforms to organize protests, mobilize support, and communicate with 
others, repressive regimes have used technology to intrude into and disrupt 
these digital connections. Marietje Schaake, a member of the European 
Parliament who follows the abuses of communications technology, points 
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out that “[w]e have to acknowledge that certain software products now are 
actually as effective as weapons.”81 Regimes like the Bashar Al-Assad 
government in Syria have made widespread use of these digital weapons. 
Using Western technology from companies like Nokia Siemens and others, 
the Syrian regime monitors emails and online traffic. A storage and archival 
system copies the emails, scanning across a network and stores them in a 
searchable database where the authorities can perform searches at a later 
date. 
Efforts have been made to stop the sale of such surveillance technologies 
to repressive regimes. Last year, U.S. Representative Christopher Smith of 
New Jersey, introduced the Global Online Freedom Act, which would 
create a legally-enforceable obligation on the part of any U.S. business that 
“creates, provides, or offers to the public for commercial purposes an 
internet search engine, internet communications services, or internet content 
hosting services” to ensure that the foreign countries in which it operates or 
provides service are not violating the basic human rights of their citizens to 
freely express themselves.82 The Act’s stated purpose is threefold: (1) to 
prevent American businesses from cooperating with repressive governments 
in transforming the Internet into a tool of censorship and surveillance; (2) to 
fulfill the responsibility of the U.S. government to promote freedom of 
expression on the Internet; and (3) to restore public confidence in the 
integrity of U.S. businesses.83 As justification for its goals, the Act notes 
that U.S.-based technology companies have enabled or even assisted 
oppressive practices of governments by supplying them with necessary 
technology and/or training.84 It also decries the cooperation by U.S. 
businesses with repressive governments by providing these regimes with 
information about their users. The bill also proposes an in-depth study of the 
feasibility of devolving expert controls concerning items being exported to 
an Internet-restricting country “for the purpose, in whole or in part, of 
facilitating substantial restrictions on internet freedom.”85 Should the study 
indicate that such controls are viable, the Act could potentially be revised to 
include them, something that could significantly impact U.S. diplomatic 
relations with a country subjected to such controls. Finally, the bill would 
also establish an “Office of Global Internet Freedom,” as a suborganization 
within the State Department.86 
While the Global Online Freedom Act is to be applauded as a market-
based approach to what is, fundamentally, a human rights problem, it raises 
as many questions as it answers. How will U.S. companies, already dealing 
  
 81.  Id. 
 82. Global Online Freedom Act of 2011, H.R. 1389, 112th Cong. § 201 (2011). 
 83.  Id. § 2. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. § 301. 
 86.  Id. § 204. 
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with a patchwork quilt of data privacy issues at home and abroad, react to 
being pressed into service as a sort of global police force, providing 
intelligence on the practices of the “Internet restricting” countries where 
they operate? Moreover, if violating nations wind up subject to trade 
controls, will that prompt retaliation against the United States through trade 
restriction of their own? Finally, the Act is silent on the question of solving 
the very practical issue of circumventing the letter and spirit of the Act 
through the use of “middle man” companies. Certain foreign regimes that 
are already subject to scrutiny, like Iran, have a long history of acquiring 
technology through such roundabout means. 
CONCLUSION 
Have iPads and iPhones become the protest signs and placards of the 21st 
century? A glance at political upheaval worldwide during the digital age—
from anti-Putin demonstrators in Moscow holding their tablets and 
smartphones over their heads during protests to the demonstrations in Tahrir 
Square at the height of the Arab Spring—illustrates that, contrary to 
Malcolm Gladwell’s denials, the revolution will indeed be tweeted. In the 
modern age, no social or political protest is complete without the requisite 
electronic accessories: a fast-trending hashtag (#) on Twitter that concisely 
describes the movement itself and provides updates on escalating 
developments; a critical mass of Twitter users adding momentum with their 
masses of followers and re-tweeters; and a Facebook page with thousands of 
“friends” sharing and posting. While the critics who were quick to counter 
the social media narrative that enthralled many Western journalists correctly 
pointed out that revolutions were occurring long before the advent of 
Facebook and Twitter, the fact remains that social media platforms and 
technology in general enabled protests to spread more quickly and 
organization to occur more efficiently. Facebook, Twitter, and the Internet 
may not have ignited the upheavals of the Arab Spring, but they certainly 
served as an accelerant. These new technologies may not have made history 
happen—the simmering resentments formed by decades of tyranny did 
that—but they did make history happen faster. The empirical studies of the 
role of technology during the Arab Spring bear this out. 
At the same time, the flipside of technology cannot be ignored, as the 
governmental response of “unplugging democracy” makes use of the very 
same innovations to monitor and stifle expression. Governments like the 
Mubarak regime simultaneously feared the impact that electronic content 
could have on their entrenched positions and used technology to further 
their repressive aims, ultimately (and unsuccessfully) playing the ultimate 
trump card of cutting off internet access altogether. Moreover, such a state 
media strategy provides a cautionary tale, even to countries as justifiably 
proud of their commitment to free speech as the United Kingdom and the 
United States. During the London riots of 2011, Prime Minister David 
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Cameron contemplated cutting off access to the Internet. And in San 
Francisco in August 2011, city mass transit administrators worried about 
planned protests at a number of subway stations elected to shut down 
network access, ostensibly to ensure safety. Although measures like the 
Global Online Freedom Act represent an important recognition of the role 
that U.S. businesses can inadvertently play in supporting the cyber 
surveillance efforts of repressive regimes, threats to free expression can 
originate from the highest levels of government. For the Mubarak regime at 
least, the last-ditch governmental efforts to quell unrest by “unplugging” the 
Internet failed miserably. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Considerable controversy was generated in the United States by the 
introduction into the Senate in May 2011 of the Protect IP Act (PIPA)1 and 
by the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA)2 which was introduced into the 
House of Representatives in October 2011. Both pieces of legislation sought 
to facilitate the capacity of the IP enforcement authorities in the U.S. to 
combat the online trade in pirated copyright works and counterfeit 
trademarked goods. Provisions included court orders to take down websites 
which made infringing products available and payment facilities from 
conducting business with infringing websites, search engines from linking 
to the sites, and court orders requiring Internet service providers to block 
access to the sites. Existing criminal laws were to be extended to penalise 
the unauthorized streaming of copyrighted content.  
Characterizing SOPA and PIPA as attempts to introduce censorship of 
the Internet, notable companies such as “Tumblr, Mozilla, Techdirt, and the 
Center for Democracy and Technology were among many Internet 
companies who protested by participating in ‘American Censorship Day’ on 
November 16, 2011.”3 They displayed black banners over their site logos 
with the words “STOP CENSORSHIP.”4  
  
 1. Preventing Real Online Threats to Economic Creativity and Theft of Intellectual 
Property Act, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter PIPA] (referencing the Senate bill, 
which may also be cited as “Protect IP Act of 2011”). 
 2. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011) [hereinafter SOPA].  
 3. Protests Against SOPA and PIPA, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protests_against_SOPA_and_PIPA (last visited June 10, 2012) 
(providing a comprehensive account of the protests referenced). 
 4. Id.  
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On January 18, 2012, Wikipedia’s English language site and an 
estimated 7,000 other smaller websites coordinated a service blackout to 
raise awareness.5 Over 160 million people viewed Wikipedia’s banner.6 
“Other protests against SOPA and PIPA included petition drives, with 
Google stating that it had collected over seven million signatures, as well as 
boycotts of companies and organizations that supported the legislation.”7 
Paradoxically, in a protest about censorship, the web sites of organizations 
that were considered supporters of the legislation, such as the United States 
Justice Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Universal Music 
Group, the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and the 
Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) were slowed or shut down 
with denial of service attacks.8 
On January 18, 2012, Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid announced that 
a vote on PIPA would be postponed until the issues raised about the bill 
were resolved, and on January 20, 2012, House Judiciary Committee 
Chairman Lamar Smith announced that the Committee would postpone 
consideration of SOPA until there was wider agreement.9 Although lauded 
as a triumph for the Internet community, the apparent demise of SOPA and 
PIPA was paralleled by the covert triumph of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA), was described on Internet blogs as being “SOPA’s 
Pimp Daddy,”10 as “SOPA and PIPA on Steroids,”11 and as being “more 
dangerous than SOPA”12 and “worse than SOPA.”13  
ACTA was adopted by the negotiating parties, including the U.S., on 
April 15, 2011.14 On  October 1, 2011, a special signing ceremony was held 
in Tokyo, with the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Morocco, New 
  
 5. Stop Online Piracy Act, WIKIPEDIA: THE FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stop_Online_Piracy_Act (Last visited June 10, 2012). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Molly Wood, Anonymous Goes Nuclear; Everybody Loses?, CNET NEWS 
(Jan. 19, 2012, 5:40 PM PST), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31322_3-57362437-
256/anonymous-goes-nuclear-everybody-loses/. 
 9. Jonathan Weisman, After an Online Firestorm, Congress Shelves Antipiracy 
Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/ 
technology/senate-postpones-piracy-vote.html.  
 10. “Acta” is SOPA’s Pimp Daddy, THE POLITICAL FILM BLOG (Jun. 10, 2012), 
http://politicalfilm.wordpress.com/2012/01/24/acta-is-sopas-pimp-daddy/.  
 11. Anomaly, Meet ACTA; It’s SOPA and PIPA on Steroids, the Global Edition, 
FREAKOUTNATION (Jun. 10, 2012), http://freakoutnation.com/2012/01/22/meet-acta-its-sopa-
and-pipa-on-steroids-the-global-edition/.  
 12. Lance Ulanoff, ACTA ‘Is More Dangerous Than SOPA,’ MASHABLE SOCIAL 
MEDIA (Jun. 10, 2012), http://mashable.com/2012/01/26/acta-more-dangerous-than-sopa/.  
 13. Erik Kain, If You Thought SOPA Was Bad, Just Wait Until You Meet ACTA, 
FORBES (Jun. 10, 2012), available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkain/2012/01/23/if-
you-thought-sopa-was-bad-just-wait-until-you-meet-acta/.  
 14. Press Release, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) (Opening for Signature), (May 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2011/5/0501_01.html.  
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Zealand, Singapore, and South Korea all signing ACTA.15 This article 
explores how ACTA was negotiated without the scale of the protests which 
accompanied SOPA and PIPA. 
I. THE ROAD TO ACTA- FAILURE OF ENFORCEMENT NEGOTIATIONS IN 
OTHER FORA 
The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Trade Related 
aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) had originated 
as a response to the frustration which principally the U.S. and the European 
Union (EU) shared about the inadequacy of the international intellectual 
property rights IPR regime to deal with the growth of counterfeiting and 
piracy.16 The proposal made by the United States that IPR regulation be 
shifted to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), made at the 
launch of the Uruguay Round in 1987,17 was created because of its 
disillusionment with the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
as an effective custodian of the international IPR system.18 The creation of 
the World Trade Organization as the body responsible for the administration 
of the GATT and the TRIPS Agreement, suggested that IPR enforcement 
would be placed on sound footing.19 However, within ten years of the 
commencement of the TRIPS Agreement, a more than ten-fold increase in 
counterfeiting and piracy from $20 billion annually to at least $450 billion,20 
together with 
the difficulties that the [United States] had in raising the enforcement issue 
in the TRIPS Council, as well as the fairly poor result which it obtained in 
its complaint about the enforcement of China’s copyright law, meant that 
  
 15. See Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, available at http://www.ustr.gov/acta.  
 16. See generally MICHAEL BLAKENEY, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CONCISE GUIDE TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT (1996) (providing, within 
chapter 2, background regarding the origin of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 17. See generally Information: The Uruguay Round: Decisions of 28 January 1987 
(Feb. 5, 1987), GATT/1405 (1987). 
 18. See generally William N. Walker, A Program to Combat International 
Commercial Counterfeiting, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 117 (1980). 
 19. See generally THE GATT URUGUAY ROUND: A NEGOTIATING HISTORY (1986-
1992) (Terrence P. Stewart ed., 1993) (providing a comprehensive account of the negotiating 
history of the Uruguay Round). 
 20. It should be noted that there is a significant lack of agreement about the size of 
the annual trade in infringing products. See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Advisory Comm. 
on Enforcement, Dec. 1 – 2, 2010, The Economic Effects of Counterfeiting and Piracy: A 
Literature Review, 6th Sess., Dec. 1-2, 2010, ¶ 49, WIPO Doc. WIPO/ACE/6/7 (Sept. 3, 
2010); See World Intellectual Prop. Org., Advisory Comm. on Enforcement, Dec. 1 – 2, 
2010, Observations on Efforts to Quantify the Economic Effects of Counterfeit and Pirated 
Goods, 6th Sess., Dec. 1-2, 2010, ¶ 1, WIPO Doc.WIPO/ACE/6/4 (Sept. 3, 2010). 
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the WTO was not the effective forum which the [United States] had 
[sought].21  
In June 2005, the EU sought to initiate discussions on IPR enforcement.22 
At the TRIPS Council meeting in June 2006, it called for an “in-depth 
discussion” of enforcement issues.23 This proposal was met with strong 
opposition from leading developing countries such as Argentina, Brazil, 
China, and India, which considered the enforcement issue a diversion from 
the Doha Development Agenda.24 At the TRIPS Council meeting in October 
2006, the EU, with support from Japan, Switzerland, and the U.S., 
submitted a joint communication asserting that the TRIPS Council was “an 
appropriate forum to examine and assist Members in the implementation of 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement” and that the work of the 
TRIPS Council “should complement Members’ efforts to use other 
cooperative mechanisms to address IPR enforcement.” 25 The co-sponsors 
stated that they: 
-  Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of how to 
implement the enforcement provisions of TRIPS in a more effective 
manner.  
- Invite other Members to engage in a constructive discussion of 
accompanying measures which could enhance the effectiveness of national 
implementing legislation and enforcement efforts, such as for example 
promoting interagency co-operation, fostering a higher public awareness, 
and reinforcing institutional frameworks.  
- Ask the Secretariat to prepare a synopsis of Members’ contributions to 
the Checklist of Issues on Enforcement that would serve as a basis for the 
above-mentioned discussion.  
  
 21. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26 2009) (interpretation of Article 61 was 
raised in China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual 
Property Rights, which arose on a complaint by the U.S. about the enforcement of China’s 
copyright law).  
 22. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Communication from the European Communities, 
IP/C/W/448 (June 9, 2005). 
 23. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcing 
Intellectual Property Rights: Border Measures: Communication from the European 
Communities, IP/C/W/471 (June 9, 2006). 
 24. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, ‘EU Gets Little Support for Enforcement Proposal at 
WTO; CBD Issue Unresolved’, IP-WATCH (June 16, 2006, 2:52 PM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/2006/01/25/ustr-clarifies-demand-for-details-on-chinas-ipr-enforcement-
cases/. 
 25. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights: Joint Communication from the European Communities, 
Japan, Switzerland and the United States, ¶ 4, IP/C/W/485 (Nov. 2, 2006). 
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- Stand ready, in cooperation with recipients of technical assistance and 
with relevant international organizations, to better focus the technical 
assistance they provide in favour of developing countries in order to 
facilitate the implementation of enforcement provisions.26  
A number of Least Developed Countries (LDCs) objected to this 
proposal on procedural grounds and it was rejected.27 The LDCs apparently 
interpreted the joint communication as an “implied threat that countries 
failing to provide ‘adequate’ protection of intellectual property rights 
ultimately could be found not to be in compliance with TRIPS.”28 Taking a 
more capacity-building approach, the U.S., at the next TRIPS Council 
meeting in January 2007, circulated a paper sharing its experience on border 
enforcement of intellectual property rights, and called on the TRIPS Council 
to “make a positive contribution to addressing [IPR enforcement] problems 
through a constructive exchange of views and experiences.”29 Although the 
LDCs found this approach to be procedurally acceptable, they reiterated that 
the issue of enforcement did not belong in the TRIPS Council.30 China, with 
the support of Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, India, and South Africa, declared 
that “enforcement could not be a permanent agenda item in the council.”31 
In June 2007, Switzerland introduced a paper suggesting ways to implement 
the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and to improve the 
overall enforcement of IPRs, particularly in the area of border measures.32 
Finally, on October 11, 2007, Japan introduced a paper on border 
enforcement of IPRs that outlined the recent trend on IPR infringements.33 
Less than two weeks later, on October 23, 2007, each of these countries 
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joined in the announcement of commencement of the ACTA negotiations.34 
Although, as we will see below, the proponents of ACTA would be 
criticised for ignoring multilateral fora such as the WTO and WIPO in their 
efforts to establish ACTA, they unsuccessfully attempted to initiate 
discussions on IPR enforcement in the TRIPS Council. Thus, Peter K. Yu 
points out that as “these countries have claimed, the unwillingness of less-
developed countries to discuss enforcement issues gave them no choice but 
to explore discussions in another forum.”35 
Interestingly, after the ACTA negotiations were well under way and it 
seemed that an agreement was likely to be forthcoming, the issue of IPR 
enforcement was again placed on the TRIPS Council’s agenda, but this time 
on the initiative of China and India. At a meeting of the TRIPS Council in 
June 2010, the representative from China expressed concern “about the 
TRIPS-plus enforcement trend” embodied in ACTA, which might cause at 
least the following problems: 
First were potential legal conflicts and unpredictability. Though TRIPS 
required only minimum standards of IP protection and allowed Members 
to implement in their laws more extensive protection, it also provided 
certain conditions for applying such extensive protection. First, such 
protection should “not contravene the provisions” of TRIPS. Secondly, it 
required Members to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights did not themselves become barriers to 
legitimate trade. Thirdly, these extensive protections should not 
inappropriately restrict the inbuilt flexibilities and exceptions in the TRIPS 
Agreement. Fourthly, according to the chapeau of Article 20 of GATT 
1994, if applied as border measures, they should not violate other covered 
agreements under the WTO and not be applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination among 
Members or a disguised restriction on international trade, and only 
measures necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations could 
be applied, which was the so-called necessity test. 36 
The Chinese delegate expressed her country’s concern that ACTA would 
break the delicate balance “between the three pillars of GATT, GATS and 
TRIPS . . . between developed and developing countries, rights and 
obligations, technology innovation and transfer and dissemination of 
  
 34. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, Ambassador 
Schwab Announces U.S. Will Seek New Trade Agreement to Fight Fakes (Oct. 23, 2007), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/ambassador-schwab-announces-us-will-seek-new-trade-
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 35. Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA 64 SMU L. REV. 975, 
993 (2011) [hereinafter Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA]. 
 36. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Minutes of 
Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 2010, ¶ 252, IP/C/M/63, (Oct. 4, 
2011) (hereinafter Minutes of Meeting: Held in the Centre William Rappard on 8-9 June 
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technology, the advantage of producers and interests of users of technology 
. . . . [and between] economic welfare and social welfare including public 
health and nutrition.”37 She noted the “imbalance of interests between the 
developed and developing world in IP protection caused by the digital 
divide and the impact of TRIPs-plus enforcement on the allocation of public 
resources in developing countries.”38 She concluded that IPR infringement 
“was largely a problem during the process of development. Therefore, 
development was the crux of the matter.”39  
The representative from India supported China’s statement that the high 
levels of protection envisaged in ACTA were likely to disturb the balance of 
rights and obligations in the TRIPS Agreement and could restrain TRIPS 
flexibilities.40 He suggested that the released ACTA text “showed a general 
shift in the focus of enforcement which enhanced the power of IP holders 
beyond reasonable measure . . . shifting the enforcement forum towards 
customs administrative authorities and away from civil courts.”41 The U.S. 
representative said that the notion that TRIPS-plus enforcement standards 
were somehow a trend “was a problematic one and was misplaced” “[as] 
every national IP enforcement regime . . . was TRIPS-plus- “in the sense 
that national implementing measures for IP enforcement were necessary to 
address numerous procedural and substantive issues for which there was no 
TRIPS requirement.”42 He mentioned the attempts of the U.S., together with 
the EU, Japan, and Switzerland, to support a dialogue in the Council for 
TRIPS on the implementation of the existing enforcement obligations under 
the TRIPS Agreement, and to identify solutions to implementation 
deficiencies. However, he noted “through the course of past meetings of the 
Council, that Members of the WTO had widely divergent views on the 
nature of the enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and even, 
regrettably, on the appropriateness of discussing those provisions in the 
Council,” and that “members should not be surprised to see the concerned 
Members seeking to combat this threat elsewhere.”43  
Among the other ACTA negotiators, the representative of Korea referred 
to the right of WTO Members under Article 1.1 of TRIPS to implement in 
their domestic law more extensive protection than was required by the 
Agreement and that the public text of ACTA, stating that “[n]othing in this 
Agreement shall derogate from any international obligation of a Party with 
respect to any other Party under existing agreements to which both Parties 
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are party” and that “there was nothing more than this to clarify the concerns 
raised.”44 A similar point was made by the Japanese representative, who 
added that discussion on enforcement practices “should be conducted in a 
fact-based and analytical manner taking into account concrete situations and 
the types of measures to be considered.”45 The representative of Canada 
pointed out that “effective enforcement of IPRs was a fundamental aspect of 
the TRIPS Agreement that was not only a matter of establishing procedural 
remedies, but also of improving cooperation, capacity building and 
communication” and that “the objective of ACTA was not to undermine the 
TRIPS Agreement but to complement it by focusing on improving aspects 
of enforcement, including legal procedures, cooperation and 
communication, that the Council for TRIPS had so far been prevented from 
considering.”46 The representative of Australia also referred to the previous 
difficulty in discussing enforcement within the Council for TRIPS and 
explained that “[s]tandards in ACTA were largely built upon those 
negotiated within the WTO, and reflected the TRIPS consistent measures 
already in place in many WTO Member countries.”47 The Swiss 
representative also explained that the ACTA initiative was being undertaken 
because “thus far, attempts to even only discuss issues relating to the 
growing problem of counterfeiting and piracy in an open and constructive 
spirit in multilateral forums such as the Council for TRIPS had met with 
absolute rejection by some delegations, including China and India “[and that 
it]“considered its participation in the ACTA negotiations “as additional to 
its commitment and efforts at the multilateral level, particularly the WTO 
and WIPO.”48 The representative of New Zealand explained its participation 
in ACTA because it believed that ACTA would be an important, effective to 
combat the “increasingly prolific trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, 
through better enforcement mechanisms for intellectual property rights, 
including through international co-operation.”49 Finally, the representative 
from the EU explained that with the tenfold increase of counterfeiting and 
piracy fifteen years after the commencement of the TRIPS Agreement,  
[H]e failed to understand why Members who rightly enjoyed the 
flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement had to prevent other Members 
from also enjoying the flexibilities under the TRIPS Agreement to tackle a 
growing problem, the consequences of which in terms of risks for safety 
and health, and in terms of criminal organizations, were even worse in 
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developing countries that had less means, and were more exposed to traffic 
of spurious medicines.50 
Of the major developing countries, the representative of Brazil said his 
country “had always taken the position that enforcement was essentially a 
matter of domestic policy making and priority setting that had no place on 
the agenda of the Council . . . [and] preferred that the sharing of national 
experiences on enforcement . . . at WIPO’s Advisory Committee on 
Enforcement that had been specifically designed for that purpose.”51 In 
addition to supporting the concern of China and India about the impact of 
ACTA upon the delicate balance of TRIPS, he expressed the concern that 
the ACTA negotiating process “lacked the legitimacy of initiatives 
conducted in multilateral organizations” and that it might “end up being 
TRIPS-minus to the extent that it contributed to narrowing down the scope 
for flexibilities.”52 The representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of the 
African Group, expressed concern “about the erosion of policy space that 
might curtail Members’ ability to access medicines critical for the African 
continent” but he reported that the African Group was also concerned about 
the issue of counterfeiting and piracy “which had an economic impact in 
Members countries as many industries were closing down.”53  
When the 2 October 2010 of ACTA became available in the public 
domain, the Indian and Indonesian delegations took the opportunity to 
revisit the implications of ACTA for WTO Members at the October 26 -27, 
2010 TRIPS Council meeting.54 The delegate from India noted the broad 
reach of the border measures and that in scaling up the minimum 
enforcement level enshrined in the TRIPS Agreement, through its Most 
Favored Nation (MFN) provisions, ACTA would have a direct impact on 
exports, even of Members which were not involved in ACTA negotiations, 
“contrary to one of the main principles of the WTO rules based system, 
which was to liberalize trade.”55 He alleged that ACTA negotiators “decided 
among themselves to overturn the decision of the WTO dispute settlement 
panel in the recent China-IPRs case by reinterpreting the phrase 
‘commercial scale’ with respect to willful trademark counterfeiting and 
copyright piracy so as to refer to any activity carried out for a direct or 
indirect economic or commercial advantage.”56 He said that ACTA would 
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substantially increase customs authorities’ ex officio activity in enforcing 
intellectual property rights, limit the protection otherwise available to 
accused infringers under the TRIPS Agreement by potentially lowering 
knowledge thresholds and limiting due process requirements, and expressed 
concern that ACTA would set up “a plurilateral intellectual property 
enforcement body outside the purview of either WIPO or the WTO, which 
might undermine the role of the multilateral organizations.”57 After 
reiterating the arguments about interference with the delicate balance of the 
TRIPS Agreement, he concluded that “to find an effective and enduring 
solution to the problem, Members needed to step back from a purely 
mercantilist approach and needed to avoid exaggerating the issue of 
counterfeiting and piracy in view of the lack of empirical data.”58 The 
representative of Indonesia “urged WTO Members to refrain from 
supporting this TRIPS-plus initiative as it could create a new type of non-
tariff barrier, particularly for developing and least-developed country 
Members.”59  
Among the other major developing countries, the Brazilian 
representative added the concern that ACTA might be converted “into a 
truly international organization dealing with the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights, whose impact on WIPO and the WTO, especially on 
capacity building and technical assistance, was unpredictable at this 
stage.”60 The representative of China said that excessive or unreasonably 
high standards for intellectual property protection could unfairly increase 
monopolistic profits of right holders, eating into the consumer surplus and 
further broadening the gap between the rich and the poor in the world. She 
also pointed out that as ACTA did not have any multilateral WTO mandate, 
any negative spill-over effects of ACTA on WTO Members which were not 
party to ACTA would “be subject to review in various WTO councils and 
committees, but also subject to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and 
possible counter measures in accordance with the DSU, the TRIPS 
Agreement, GATT, GATS, and other WTO Agreements.”61 
Of the ACTA signatories, the representative of the U.S. (or United States 
representative?) outlined the provisions which were contained in the final 
draft of the ACTA highlighting the fact that “ACTA would []be the first 
agreement of its kind to promote several key best practices that contributed 
to effective enforcement of intellectual property rights” and he welcomed 
all Members who were interested in enhancing IPR enforcement to consider 
joining the agreement.62 The representative of Japan reiterated that ACTA 
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was consistent with WTO obligations and would be implemented in such a 
manner as to avoid the creation of barriers to legitimate trade.63 The 
representative of Canada “said that ACTA was consistent with the TRIPS 
Agreement . . . [A]nd that the objectives and principles of the TRIPS 
Agreement applied mutatis mutandis to ACTA.”64 Nor did ACTA create or 
alter rights relating to the protection of intellectual property rights, but 
rather “it set new standards for the enforcement of existing intellectual 
property rights which were complementary to those provided in the TRIPS 
Agreement.”65 This was supported by Australia.66 The representative of the 
EU claimed “a clear preference for dealing with enforcement within the 
WTO or WIPO” but that this had been frustrated by the refusal of a number 
of WTO Members to engage in any discussion on IP enforcement in the 
TRIPS Council obliging it to pursue such discussions outside this forum67 
The representative of Mexico explained that his country had suffered from 
counterfeiting and piracy in its new economic sectors such as clothing, 
tobacco, medical drugs, music, books etc. and that Mexico was a party to 
ACTA “because it was important to have effective border measures to 
combat counterfeiting and piracy.”68 In a written statement, Singapore 
focused its comments on the “value that [it saw] in participating in the 
ACTA process,” which included “the encourage[ment] of innovation, 
creativity and the growth of industry and commerce” and “strengthening 
cooperation to better protect the interests of consumers and industries 
alike.”69 It saw ACTA as complementing and strengthening the role of the 
multilateral institutions and their processes. 
On October 17, the final text of ACTA was circulated to WTO Members 
at the request of the delegations of Australia, Canada, the European Union, 
Korea, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, Switzerland, and the U.S.70 
II. PLURILATERAL ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT (ACTA) 
PROPOSED 
The idea of establishing a new agreement on IPR enforcement has its 
origins in the Global Congress on Combating Counterfeiting and Piracy, 
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organised for the first time in 2004 by the World Customs Organization 
(“WCO”) in collaboration with Interpol with the participation of a number 
of business organizations, which was concerned with “the rampant theft of 
intellectual property.”71 At the Second Global Congress on Combating 
Counterfeiting and Piracy hosted by Interpol at Lyon in November 2005, 
Japan had proposed a Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Counterfeits and 
Pirated Goods. The twin central features of this proposed treaty were 
proposals for the confiscation of the proceeds of IP crimes and the 
extradition of IP criminals.  
The Treaty also proposed to address a number of matters that had been 
omitted from the border control provisions of the TRIPS Agreement. These 
provisions focus upon the imports of infringing products. It also proposed 
controls over the export and transshipment of counterfeit and pirated goods. 
The Japanese Treaty also proposed the removal of the de minimis exception 
contained in TRIPS of importation for private use. An area of enforcement 
the Treaty addressed was the deterrence of the distribution and sale of 
counterfeit and pirated goods on the Internet. Finally, a dispute settlement 
mechanism was proposed, together with deterrent sanctions. At the end of 
the Congressional session, the participants adopted the Lyon Declaration, 
which recommended the further consideration of “Japan’s proposal for a 
new international treaty.”72 The Japanese Treaty proposal was reiterated at 
the Third and Fourth Global Congresses on Counterfeiting and Piracy in 
Brussels 2006 and Geneva 2007.  
Paralleling the Japanese initiative the U.S. contemplated collaborating 
with its trading partners to develop an international strategy to fight 
counterfeiting and piracy. In 2005, pursuant to its Strategy Targeting 
Intellectual Property (“STOP!”) Initiative, the United States Trade 
Representative (USTR), Susan Schwab, “led interagency teams to meet with 
key trading partners to advocate closer cooperation in fighting piracy and 
counterfeiting, and to advocate sharing of ‘best practices’ for strong legal 
frameworks.”73 “In 2006 the USTR encouraged the interagency Trade 
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC), representing the interests of twenty U.S. 
government agencies, to endorse the concept of a multi-party, ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
ACTA.”74 In explaining the origins of ACTA, in a Freedom on Information 
proceeding, Assistant USTR, Stanford McCoy, explained:  
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USTR proposed that a group of leading IPR-protecting nations could work 
together to set a new standard for IPR enforcement that was better suited 
to contemporary challenges, both in terms of strengthening the relevant 
laws and in terms of strengthening various frameworks for enforcing those 
laws. The interagency TPSC concurred with USTR’s recommendation that 
USTR begin contacting trading partners to join a plurilateral ACTA.75 
From 2006, the U.S. and Japan had begun joint discussions on a new 
multilateral treaty to combat counterfeiting and piracy.76 During 2006 and 
2007 these discussions were extended to include Canada, the EU and 
Switzerland. The Japanese treaty proposal was superseded by the 
announcement on October 23, 2007, by the U.S., EU, Japan, South Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Switzerland, and Canada of negotiations for a 
Plurilateral Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). The use of the 
word “plurilateral” was presumably to distinguish ACTA from existing 
multilateral trade agreements, such as TRIPS and the various bilateral free 
trade agreements negotiated between various trading partners subsequent to 
the establishment of the WTO and the regional free trade agreements such 
as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the trade 
agreements of the EU; specifically, U.S. announcement stated that the 
“ACTA will not involve any changes to the TRIPS Agreement, rather, the 
goal is to set a new, higher benchmark for enforcement that countries can 
join on a voluntary basis.”77 
 The European Commission indicated that it would use the ACTA “to 
create a new layer of intellectual property protections because it mandates 
from EU Member States to negotiate the ACTA with a list of specific 
countries, including the U.S., Japan, Korea, Mexico and New Zealand.78 
One of its aims is described as “[c]reating a strong modern legal framework 
which reflects the changing nature of intellectual property theft in the global 
economy . . . .”79 A statement by METI Minister Akira Amari, stated that “it 
is essential to establish a new international framework aimed at 
strengthening the enforcement of intellectual property rights” to deal with 
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“serious and significant threat to the world economy” caused by the 
proliferation of pirate and counterfeit goods. 80 
III. TRANSPARENCY OF THE ACTA NEGOTIATIONS 
In December 2007, before formal negotiations commenced, the USTR 
requested that its negotiating partners agree to be bound by a confidentiality 
agreement it had prepared.81 Subsequently, this was used by the USTR to 
classify all correspondence between ACTA negotiating countries as 
“national security“ information on the grounds that it was confidential 
“foreign government information.”82 Similarly, its negotiating partners 
justified their failure to divulge information about ACTA to their 
confidentiality obligation. Thus for more than two years, no official drafts 
of the treaty were released for public scrutiny and the specific terms under 
discussion in the negotiations were not identified. This lack of information, 
as well as the restricted participation of states in the negotiation of the 
ACTA and the exclusion of public interest groups from the negotiating 
process was the subject of widespread criticism, particularly by civil society 
groups.83 Exacerbating this criticism was the revelation that certain favoured 
bodies were obtaining access to documents.  
In September 2008, the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Public 
Knowledge, two U.S. civil society organizations, filed a lawsuit under the 
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requesting the release of records 
concerning ACTA “as a matter of public interest” to acquire documents 
such as “participant lists, agendas, presentations and documents distributed 
at, or received at, meetings of USTR staff with” representatives of the 
entertainment, luxury, and pharmaceutical industries, “agents, 
representatives and officials of international entities dealing with the 
enforcement of intellectual property,” and any other “agency memoranda, 
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briefing notes, and analysis concerning ACTA. “However, the two 
organizations dropped the lawsuit in June 2009 after the Obama 
administration classified the ACTA negotiations a matter of national 
security.”84 
In November 2008, the Foundation for a Free Information Infrastructure 
(FFII) applied to the Council of the European Union for access to 
documents concerning ACTA. This request was refused by the Council on 
the ground that “unauthorised disclosure . . . could be disadvantageous to 
the interests of the European Union or of one or more of its Member 
States,” as the negotiations are still in progress and their disclosure “could 
impede the proper conduct of the negotiations.”85  
In September 2009, another U.S. civil society organization, Knowledge 
Ecology International (KEI),86 reported that the USTR was using 
nondisclosure agreements “to selectively share copies of the ACTA Internet 
text outside of the USTR formal advisory board system.”87 On September 
11, 2009, KEI submitted a Freedom of Information request to the 
USTR, asking for the names of persons who had signed these agreements, 
as well as copies of them. On October 9, 2009, it received copies of these 
agreements identifying a total of 32 persons who received the Internet 
texts.88 These included representatives from: the Business Software Alliance 
(3), eBay (4), Google (3), News Corporation (2), a law firm, Wilmer Hale 
(2), Intel (2) Dell, Verizon, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Time Warner, 
Consumer Electronics Association (2), the International Intellectual 
Property Alliance (IIPI), and four persons from two civil society 
organizations: Public Knowledge (3) and the Centre for Democracy and 
Technology. The USTR also informed KEI that seven persons received the 
ACTA Internet text as members of the Industry Trade Advisory Committees 
on Intellectual Property Rights (ITAC 15),89 as well as three persons from 
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visited Nov. 6, 2012).  
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the Industry Trade Advisory Committee on Information and 
Communications Technologies, Services, and Electronic Commerce (ITAC 
8).90 These are two of a number of committees established by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and the Office of the USTR to “engage business 
leaders in formulating U.S. trade policy.”91 The role of the business 
community in the formulation of United States IPR trade policy has been 
the subject of extensive analyses in relation to the negotiation of the TRIPS 
Agreement,92 and so it is unexceptional that similar business representatives 
have been involved in contributing to U.S. policy on the formulation of the 
ACTA. As will be seen below, criticism was leveled about the lack of 
transparency by those persons within and outside the U.S. who were denied 
access to negotiating texts. 
Indeed, the official position taken by the negotiating parties until April 
2010 was that draft texts did not exist. Yu suggests that on the basis of the 
history of the way in which the TRIPS Agreement evolved, this may well 
have been the case, as the earlier sessions may have been taken up with 
amassing information.93 In any event, as the USTR noted in its denial of the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation’s request under the Freedom of Information 
Act, ACTA-related documents concerned “information that is properly 
classified in the interest of national security pursuant to Executive Order 
12958.”94 This Executive Order, issued in April 1995, allowed documents to 
be classified as confidential when their unauthorized disclosure “reasonably 
could be expected to result in damage to the national security.”95 It is 
difficult to see how information about an agreement concerned with 
intellectual property enforcement could have national security implications. 
The first intimation of the content of the ACTA was a “Discussion Paper 
on a Possible Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement” which was posted to 
  
Intellectual Property Strategy Center, P.C., Zippo Manufacturing Company (also former 
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the Wikileaks website.96 Other sources include the websites of negotiating 
parties which identified the matters under discussion in the ACTA 
negotiations, from which the content of the ACTA could be inferred.97 
Responding to an increasing crescendo of calls for the publication of the 
ACTA, in February 2009 the USTR issued a “Summary of Key Elements 
Under Discussion.”98 The USTR’s Summary stated that “ACTA delegations 
are still discussing various proposals for the different elements that may 
ultimately be included in the agreement. A comprehensive set of proposals 
for the text of the agreement does not yet exist.”99 It provided “an overview 
of the elements suggested under the different headings and highlights the 
main issues.”100 The USTR noted that “discussions are ongoing; new issues 
might come up and other issues may finally not be included in the 
agreement.”101  
Calls for greater transparency were made even by supporters of ACTA. 
For example, Dan Glickman, the CEO of the Motion Picture Association of 
America wrote to Senator Patrick Leahy, chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, and to USTR Ron Kirk, that “outcries on the lack of 
transparency in the ACTA negotiations . . . distract from the substance and 
the ambition of the ACTA which are to work with key trading partners to 
combat piracy and counterfeiting across the global marketplace.”102 In 
March 2010, a fact sheet was published informing on the content and the 
objectives of the agreement.103 It addressed the transparency issue by stating 
that the steps negotiating parties had taken to provide more information to 
the public included: “issuing a summary of the issues under discussion, 
publishing agendas ahead of each negotiating round and issuing press 
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INSTITUT FÜR GEISTIGES EIGENTUM (Mar. 2010), https://www.ige.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/ 
Juristische_Infos/e/acta_factsheet.pdf. 
 104.     Id. 
104 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
releases shortly after the conclusion of each round.”104 However, the press 
releases did little more than list the participating countries and the subjects 
which were addressed. 
The problem with this lack of transparency was that various versions of 
the alleged ACTA have been made available, causing concern to those who 
consider themselves to be adversely affected. For example, the French civil 
rights organisation La Quadrature du Net, on January 18, 2010, placed a 
fifty-six page consolidated version of the text of an EU stakeholder dialogue 
meeting shortly after its conclusion.105 This version was of particular 
concern to NGOs and organizations concerned with the Internet freedom. 
Probably the most strident calls for transparency were made by 
politicians. Michael Geist lists legislators from Canada, France, Germany, 
New Zealand, Sweden, and the U.S. who called for the ACTA to be made 
public.106 “On January 21, 2010 UK Junior Business Minister David Lammy 
was quoted as saying that he could not put documents about ACTA in the 
House of Commons Library because other countries wanted to maintain 
secrecy.”107 However, on March 17, 2010, he was reported as being in 
favour of placing the draft text in the public domain.108 This change of heart 
was no doubt attributed to a resolution of the European Parliament on 
Transparency and State of Play of the Anti Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
that “[the European] Commission should immediately make all documents 
related to the ongoing international negotiations on the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) publicly available.”109 The Resolution stated that  
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) will contain a new 
international benchmark for legal frameworks on what is termed 
intellectual property right enforcement. The content as known to the public 
is clearly legislative in character. Further, the Council confirms that ACTA 
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includes civil enforcement and criminal law measures. Since there can not 
be secret objectives regarding legislation in a democracy, the principles 
established in the ECJ Turco case must be upheld.110 
The Turco case concerned a request by Mr. Maurizio Turco, the Italian 
Radical MP and former MEP, to the European Council for access to 
documents appearing on the agenda of a Justice and Home Affairs Council 
meeting, including an opinion of the Council’s legal service on a proposal 
for a directive laying down minimum standards for the reception of 
applicants for asylum in Member States. The Council had refused to 
disclose the legal opinion on the ground that it deserved special protection 
so as not to create uncertainty regarding the legality of the measure adopted 
further to that opinion; the Court of First Instance upheld the Council’s 
refusal111 but the decision was reversed by the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ).112 Regarding the fear expressed by the Council that disclosure of an 
opinion of its legal service relating to a legislative proposal could lead to 
doubts as to the lawfulness of the legislative act concerned, the ECJ held 
that it was precisely this openness which contributed to conferring greater 
legitimacy on the institutions in the eyes of European citizens and 
increasing their confidence in them by allowing different points of view to 
be openly debated.  
On April 15, 2010, a number of European Members of Parliament from 
the Green Party wrote to the WIPO Director General, drawing his attention 
to the EU Resolution of March 10, 2010 “showing the growing concern of 
European citizens regarding ACTA” and requesting “an expert assessment 
and analysis of the current provisions of ACTA” from WIPO’s institutional 
viewpoint “as one the two specialised organisations entrusted with the issue 
of norm-setting in the field of intellectual property rights and related 
issues.”113 The letter noted “with disappointment that ACTA has bypassed 
the multilateral WTO and WIPO institutions which have structured and 
practised processes to assure participation, information sharing and 
transparency in international norm-setting negotiations” and it commended 
WIPO’s practices of making negotiating texts available, when distributed to 
all members of the negotiation as well as procedures which allow accredited 
non-governmental organisations to attend meetings and organise side-
events. This was contrasted with the negotiations for the 8th round of ACTA 
being negotiated in New Zealand, which was characterised as “secret from 
the public and consumers, and in defiance of the principles of democratic 
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decision making.”114 The letter then sought answers to a number of 
questions about the negotiation of international IP norms. There is no 
formal record of an answer to this letter, although in a joint statement issued 
by the ACTA negotiating partners it was suggested that “it is accepted 
practice during trade negotiations among sovereign states to not share 
negotiating texts with the public at large, particularly at earlier stages of the 
negotiation.”115  Although the word “trade” appears in the title of the 
ACTA, it is questionable whether the Agreement can properly be 
chracterised as a “trade agreement” given that it is largely concerned with 
IP enforcement and contains no provisions that facilitate or promote trade.116 
In anticipation of the ACTA negotiators’ meeting in Wellington in April 
2010, participants at a “PublicACTA Conference” April 10, 2010 
promulgated the Wellington Declaration for the consideration of the 
negotiators.117 This Declaration appears to have been actuated by concerns 
about possible attacks on Internet freedoms. In relation to transparency, it 
called for full transparency and public scrutiny of the ACTA process 
including release of the text after each round of negotiations.118 
On April 16, 2010, following the 8th round of negotiations, a Joint 
Statement was issued by participants explaining that “negotiations have now 
advanced to a point where making a draft text available to the public will 
help the process of reaching a final agreement” and that “the consolidated 
text coming out of these discussions” would be made available to the public 
on April 21, 2010.119 On that day a “Consolidated Text” prepared for public 
release was made available, described as a “PUBLIC 
Predecisional/Deliberative Draft.”120 Most of the text was in square 
brackets, indicating a lack of agreement on those provisions. In a press 
release, EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht declared that the ACTA 
“will be fully in line with current EU legislation. . . . The agreement will not 
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include provision which modify substantive intellectual property law, create 
new rights or change their duration.”.121 The publication of the consolidated 
text was described as a partial victory for transparency, which would not 
have happened without the agitation of civil society organizations and the 
various leaked documents.122 The victory was described as partial because 
the published text was “decided without any input from consumer 
organisations or ordinary people.”123  
Responding to these concerns, meetings were held between ACTA 
negotiators and civil society representatives at the time of the 9th round of 
negotiations in Lucerne in July 2010 and civil society and business 
representatives at the time of the Tokyo round in October 2010. 
Consolidated texts of ACTA were issued in August, October and November 
2010. The final text was released on December 6, 2010 after a meeting of 
negotiators in Sydney for what they called “legal scrubbing.” It was noted 
that “in fitting form” this final meeting was “performed behind closed 
doors” and that the host Australian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and Trade 
“did not answer press inquiries on the agenda or a list of discussed 
changes.”124  
The negotiation of ACTA by a select group of invited countries, in 
negotiations attended by a lack of transparency will inevitably taint its 
acceptance as an international IP enforcement standard, particularly on the 
part of the uninvited. In an early account of the ACTA a commentator wrote 
that “the activity envisaged by the plan is more usually undertaken by trade 
bodies such as the WTO, the G8 group of industrialised nations and WIPO” 
but that a statement by the European Commission “said that it felt it needed 
more room to maneuver than those bodies provided.”125 It was pointed out 
that the “European Commission wants to create a new layer of intellectual 
property protections because it says that existing structures such as WIPO 
are not flexible enough.”126 As the Director General of WIPO pointed out, at 
the time of the Lucerne round, it is “a bad development for a multilateral 
agency, that member states start to do things outside. Either the machinery 
works, or it doesn’t,” and he concluded that “[I] think [that this] is the real 
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significance of ACTA.”127 He said that the challenge is first, to “make the 
multilateral system relevant” because international problems require an 
international solution, as opposed to a partial one.128 Secondly, the most 
vulnerable countries are the ones that most need the inclusiveness of the 
international system in which all countries have a voice.129 Thirdly, it is bad 
public policy for solutions to happen by default.130 
A study by Jeremy Malcolm of a number of international institutions 
observed that “[e]ven the WTO, the least participatory of the organizations 
studied, posts all of its official documents online, and most of the other 
institutions also make available negotiating texts.”131 He concluded that 
“ACTA meets none of the basic best practices for transparency of the 
existing institutions of the intellectual property policy regime.”132 This study 
was referred to in the submission to the USTR of thirty U.S. legal 
academics cautioning against the acceptance of the Agreement by the 
President as an executive act.133 They pointed out that “ACTA was drafted 
under unusual levels of secrecy for a legislative minimum standards 
agreement.”134 They concluded that the “kind of secrecy envisioned and 
practiced by the USTR needlessly created and fostered an adversarial 
relationship with the public that reinforced the worst fears and criticism 
about international intellectual property lawmaking” and that “[t]his has 
further undermined the legitimacy of the ACTA negotiating process, and 
ACTA itself.”135  
Despite the criticisms about the ACTA negotiating process, concerns 
about the lack of transparency continue. In March 2011, a request under the 
U.S. Freedom of Information Act by the NGO Knowledge Ecology 
International (KEI) to study a Congressional Research Service study of 
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ACTA and its legality that was undertaken for the U.S. Senate and shared 
with the USTR was denied.136 
IV. POST NEGOTIATION DEVELOPMENTS 
ACTA was submitted to the respective authorities in participating 
countries to undertake relevant domestic processes. Article 39 provides for 
ACTA to remain open for signature by participants in its negotiation137 and 
by any other WTO Members the participants may agree to by consensus, 
from March 31, 2011 until March 31, 2013. Article 40 provides that ACTA 
enters into force thirty days after the date of deposit of the sixth instrument 
of ratification, acceptance, or approval. “The Government of Japan will 
receive signatures as the nominated Depositary of the Agreement.”138 
The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) sought 
written comments from the public on the final text of the ACTA in 
connection with consideration of U.S. signature of the agreement, by 
February 15, 2011.139 In response to this request, Public Knowledge urged 
that the USTR should “[s]eek to include, as part of the agreement, an agreed 
statement reflecting the understanding that ACTA would not require 
changes to U.S. law,” that it would “[n]ot coerce non-ACTA countries to 
accede to the agreement” and “employ a more open and inclusive process as 
it negotiates the proposed Transpacific Partnership (TPP) agreement.”140 
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The International Trademark Association (INTA), responding to this 
invitation, in a letter dated February 15 2011, recommended that the ACTA 
Committee, established under the Agreement, “should help other countries 
develop assessments of the economic, social and other benefits of 
participating in ACTA or at a minimum adopting its principles” and that the 
Committee “should also ‘recruit’ other non-signatories to sign and 
implement this agreement.”141  
It had been pointed out that “[t]he US Government has made clear that it 
intends to conclude ACTA as a ‘sole executive agreement,’ meaning that it 
will enter into effect upon the signature of the President or his 
representative, without being formally presented for approval to either 
house of Congress.”142 In a submission to the USTR, thirty U.S. legal 
academics wrote a submission calling “on the Obama administration to 
comply with the Constitution by submitting the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement (ACTA) to Congress for approval” pointing out that “the 
executive branch lacks constitutional authority to enter international 
agreements on intellectual property without congressional consent.”143 A 
Global Congress on Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, held 
between August 25-27, 2011, “convened over 180 experts from 32 countries 
and six continents to “help re-articulate the public interest dimension in 
intellectual property law and policy.”144 It issued the Washington-
Declaration on Intellectual Property and Public Interest which made a plea 
for reasonableness and proportionality of legal penalties, processes, and 
remedies to the acts of infringement they target and to preserve the right of 
countries to “retain the rights to implement flexibilities to enforcement 
measures and to make independent decisions about the prioritization of law 
enforcement resources to promote public interests.”145 The Declaration was 
a response to the passage of ACTA. 
On November 24, 2010 the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 
ACTA, which stressed, inter alia, that any agreement reached by the EU on 
ACTA must comply fully with the acquis communautaire and noted that as 
a result of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the 
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Parliament will have to give consent to the ACTA text prior to the 
agreement’s entry into force in the EU. In November 2010, the Policy 
Department of the EC’s Directorate-General for External Policies issued the 
terms of reference for an external Study on ACTA to “provide a concise and 
comprehensive overview” of the Agreement and to “respond to certain key 
questions which have been raised by the MEPs during the negotiation of the 
agreement.”146 In February 2011, an Opinion was issued by a group of 
European academics on ACTA which claimed that certain ACTA 
provisions were not entirely compatible with EU law particularly in relation 
to criminal enforcement.147 In response to the criticisms made in the 
Opinion in March 2011, the European Commission held a meeting with 
representatives of non-governmental organisations, as part of its DG Trade 
Civil Society Dialogue.148 At this meeting the Commission rejected the 
Academics Opinion stating that no legislative changes would be required as 
ACTA went no further than the existing EU enforcement rules. On April 27, 
2011, the European Commission released a Working Paper in which it took 
issue with this Opinion.149 In June 2011, the Study which the Policy 
Department of the EC’s Directorate-General for External Policies had 
commissioned on ACTA was published.150 The primary recommendation of 
the assessment was that “unconditional consent would be an inappropriate 
response from the European Parliament . . . .”151 It proposed that if the 
European Parliament decided to give its consent “this should be conditional 
on the inclusion of statements that provide interpretation and guidance on 
how member states should apply ACTA in a way that complies with EU 
member states international obligations.”152 It found that “the letter of the 
agreement is not incompatible with the Acquis but that there are no 
  
   146.  Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union, External Study on the 
ACTA Anti-counterfeiting Trade Agreement, PEOPLE.FFII.ORG (Nov. 15, 2010), 
http://people.ffii.org/~ante/acta/EXPO-Terms-of-Reference.pdf. 
 147. See Roberto D’Erme et al., Opinion of European Academics on Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, STATEWATCH.ORG, available at 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2011/jul/acta-academics-opinion.pdf. 
 148. See generally European Comm’n, Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade), 
Civil Society Meeting Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), EC.EUROPA.EU (Mar. 25, 
2011, 10:30 AM), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/february/ 
tradoc_147497.pdf. 
 149. Anselm Kamperman Sanders et al., Directorate-General for External Policies of 
the Union, The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement ( ACTA): An Assessment (June 2011), 
http://www.erikjosefsson.eu/sites/default/files/DG_EXPO_Policy_Department_Study_ACT
A_assessment.pdf. 
 150. Directorate-General for External Policies of The Union, Directorate B, Policy 
Department, Study The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): An Assessment, 
Brussels, European Parliament, June 2011, http://www.erikjosefsson.eu/sites/default/files/ 
DG_EXPO_Policy_Department_Study_ACTA_assessment.pdf 
 151. Id. at 66. 
 152. Id. 
112 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1 
guarantees that its implementation will be.”153 Consequently, it was 
recommended that the European Parliament “may therefore wish to consider 
a need for a clarification of and guidance on how ACTA will be 
implemented especially the border and criminal enforcement measures as 
well as the in-transit procedures.”154  
On June 28, 2011, the European Commission circulated a Proposal for a 
Council Decision on the conclusion of the ACTA with the country parties to 
the negotiation.155 At the request of the Greens/European Free Alliance 
group in the European Parliament an Opinion was prepared on whether the 
final version of ACTA and its foreseen legislative procedure was in line 
with the European Convention on Human Rights and/or the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.156 This opinion concluded that the current draft of 
ACTA “seriously threatens fundamental rights in the EU and in other 
countries, at various levels.”157 Specifically, it asserted that “an explicit de 
minimis rule and an explicit public interest defence are the minimum that 
are required” to bring the criminal enforcement provisions into conformity 
with the European Convention and Charter.158 The overall assessment was 
that. 
ACTA tilts the balance of IPR protection manifestly unfairly towards one 
group of beneficiaries of the right to property, IP right holders, and 
unfairly against others. It equally disproportionately interferes with a range 
of other fundamental rights, and provides or allows for the determination 
of such rights in procedures that fail to allow for the taking into account of 
the different, competing interests, but rather, stack all the weight at one 
end.159 
In September 2011, the Committee on International Trade (INTA) of the 
European Parliament filed a request to its Legal Services to advise on the 
compliance of ACTA with the EU acquis.  
Mindful of the controversy generated by the ACTA negotiations on 
February 22, 2012, the European Commission announced that it would seek 
an advisory opinion from the European Court of Justice before moving 
  
 153. Id. at 8. 
 154. Id.   
   155.     Proposal for a Council Decision on the Conclusion of the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement between the European  
Union and its Member States, Australia, Canada, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United 
Mexican States, the Kingdom of Morocco, New Zealand, the Republic of Singapore, the 
Swiss Confederation and the United States of America, COM (2011) 380 final (June 24, 
2011).  
 156. Douwe Korff & Ian Brown, Opinion on the Compatibility of ACTA with the 
ECHR and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, THE GREENS/EUROPEAN FREE ALLIANCE, 
http://rfc.act-on-acta.eu/fundamental-rights. 
 157. Id. at 58. 
 158. Id.  
 159. Id. at 61.    
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forward with the ratification of the ACTA. This was explained as a means 
of easing the concerns of European citizens about whether the agreement 
could lead to censorship.160 A reflection of this concern was a petition 
received on February 28, 2012 by the European Parliament signed by more 
than 2.4 million Internet users against ACTA.  
Australia and New Zealand reported that their respective parliamentary 
committees would be scrutinizing ACTA before action is taken.161 On 
October 16, 2010, the Australian Minister for Trade commended the 
Agreement, stating that the Government would make a final decision on 
ratifying the ACTA treaty after it was examined by the Joint Standing 
Committee on Treaties.162 This examination does not yet appear to have 
taken place, but in March 2011 the Australian Government released the 
Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising The Bar) Bill 2011, which 
proposed to make a number of significant amendments to the major 
Australian industrial property statutes.163 In addition, the Bill contained a 
suite of measures for enhancing trademark and copyright enforcement, 
including measures for the confiscation of counterfeit and pirate goods in 
line with ACTA. The Bill was introduced into the Senate on June 22, 2011.  
On January 31 and February 7, 2011 the House of Commons Standing 
Committee on Canadian Heritage held hearings to determine the status of 
negotiations on the free trade agreement with the EU and to find out the 
position of Canada’s negotiators in talks to sign ACTA. The Minister of 
International Trade reported that the Copyright Modernization Bill had been 
introduced to the Canadian Parliament to support Canada’s obligations 
under ACTA. The Standing Committee called on the Government of 
Canada to ensure that Canada’s commitments to the implementation of 
ACTA “are limited to the agreement’s focus on combating international 
counterfeiting and commercial piracy efforts; and that the Government of 
Canada retains the right to maintain domestic copyright policies that have 
been developed within the framework of its commitments to the World 
Intellectual Property Organization and the Berne Convention.”164 
  
 160. Press Release, European Comm’n, Statement by Comm’r Karel De Gucht on 
ACTA (Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement) (Feb. 22, 2012) 
(http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=778).    
 161. Monika Ermert, Still a Long Way to Go for Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, (Sept. 8, 2011, 9:23 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/2011/09/08/still-a-
long-way-to-go-for-anti-counterfeiting-trade-agreement/.    
 162. Craig Emerson, Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement to Benefit Creative Industries, 
(Nov. 16, 2010), http://www.trademinister.gov.au/releases/2010/ce_mr_101116. 
 163. Explanatory Memorandum from The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Austl., 
Intellectual Prop. Laws Amendment (Raising The Bar) Bill 2011 (2010-2011) 
(http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/s837_ems_561ef790-9811-
43d0-b14f-04c924723c94/upload_pdf/356916em.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf). 
 164. HOUSE OF COMMONS, 40th PARLIAMENT, 3d SESS., STANDING COMM. ON 
CANADIAN HERITAGE, THE CANADA-EUROPEAN UNION COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC AND 
TRADE AGREEMENT, THE ANTI-COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT, AND ISSUES REGARDING 
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ACTA has had a chequered history in Mexico. A Working Group of the 
Senate conducted hearings which resulted in a resolution of the Senate on 
September 28,2010, requesting that the President stop the process of 
negotiations for Mexico to sign the agreement.165 This was largely based on 
objections to the lack of transparency in the negotiating process.166 After 
publication of the final version of the ACTA, the Working Group again 
recommended rejection of ACTA by Mexico.167 A resolution of the Senate 
in July 2011 requested the President not to proceed with signature of 
ACTA.168  
In Switzerland, it was reported in September 2011 that “the internal 
process preparing the decision for signature is ongoing” and that “[t]here is 
no timeline . . . .”169  
To some extent, the implementation of ACTA by a number of signatory 
countries is being overshadowed by their participation in the negotiations 
for the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement. This is being negotiated 
between Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, 
the U.S., and Vietnam. President Obama set the APEC summit in November 
2011 as the target for the settlement of negotiations. This Agreement is 
described by some commentators as the “Son of ACTA”170 or as 
“everything the U.S. wanted in ACTA but didn’t get.”171  
 
  
CULTURAL DIVERSITY (Mar. 2011), available at http://publications.gc.ca/collections/ 
collection_2011/parl/XC61-403-1-1-04-eng.pdf. 
 165. Point Proposed Agreement with the Federal Executive will Remove the Trade 
Negotiations or Anti-Counterfeit ACTA, SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA (Oct. 5, 2010), 
http://www.senado.gob.mx/index.php?ver=sp&mn=2&sm=2&id=26924. 
 166. Mike Masnick, Mexican Senate Unanimously Votes To Remove Mexico from 
ACTA Negotiations, TECHDIRT.COM (Oct. 6, 2010, 7:37 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20101005/17320811304/mexican-senate-unanimously-votes-to-remove-mexico-
from-acta-negotations.shtml. 
 167. Letter from Eloy Cantú Segovia et al., Senator, Comm. on Trade and Indus. 
Promotion, to Manlio Fabio Beltrones Rivera, Chairman of the Bd. of the Senate of the Rep. 
(July 20, 2011) (http://www.senado.gob.mx/sgsp/gaceta/61/3/2011-09-06-1/assets/ 
documentos/GrupoPlural_ACTA.pdf). 
 168. Mike Masnick, Mexican Senate Calls on President To Reject ACTA, 
TECHDIRT.COM (July 28, 2011, 10:07 PM), www.techdirt.com/articles/20110727/ 
23163815295/mexican-senate-calls-president-to-reject-acta.shtml#comments. 
 169. Ermert, supra note 161.    
 170. Nate Anderson, Son of ACTA: Meet the Next Secret Copyrighting Treaty, 
ARSTECHNICA.COM (Mar. 11, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/03/son-of-acta-meet-the-next-secret-copyright-treaty.ars. 
   171.     Michael Geist, U.S. Intellectual Property Demands for TPP Leak: Everything it 
Wanted in ACTA But Didn't Get (Mar. 11, 2011), http://www.michaelgeist. 
ca/content/view/5686/125/.    
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INTRODUCTION  
Global food price spikes in recent years have led to food riots and 
government-imposed emergency price controls,2 reminding the global 
community of the integral connections between food security and political 
and economic stability. With nearly one billion people already suffering 
from chronic hunger,3 and the expected 70 percent rise in demand for food 
by 2050,4 increased and sustained agricultural productivity and production 
will be a critical component of achieving global food security, which is 
integral to political stability, particularly in developing countries. 
In response to this challenge, global leaders, convened at the G-8 
Summit in L’Aquila, Italy in 2009, launched the L’Aquila Food Security 
Initiative.5 This $20 billion pledge, contributed over three years, deepened 
donor governments’ short-, medium-, and long-term investments in 
agriculture and rural development in developing countries to combat food 
insecurity and was designed to catalyze broader economic growth, 
  
 1. Dr. J. “Vern” Long is a Senior International Agriculture Research Advisor with 
the US Agency for International Development’s (USAID) Bureau for Food Security. She 
manages agricultural research programs and covers intellectual property issues related to 
agricultural research.  She holds a PhD from Cornell University in plant breeding. The views 
expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of USAID or the U.S. Government. 
 2. The 9 Billion People Question: A Special Report on Feeding the World, THE 
ECONOMIST, Feb. 26, 2011, at 2.  
 3. See “L’Aquila” Joint Statement on Global Food Security: L’Aquila Food 
Security Initiative (AFSI), GROUP OF 8 SUMMIT 2009,  http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/ 
G8_Allegato/LAquila_Joint_Statement_on_Global_Food_Security%5B1%5D,0.pdf (last 
visited June 28, 2012) [hereinafter L’AQUILA]. 
 4. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, HOW TO FEED THE WORLD IN 2050 
at 2, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/docs/expert_paper/How_to_Feed_the_ 
World_in_2050.pdf. 
 5. L’AQUILA, supra note 3.  
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prosperity, and stability.6 Building upon the commitments and progress 
from L’Aquila, in 2012, the G-8 renewed its commitment to food security 
through the establishment of the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition, with the ambitious goal of “achiev[ing] sustained and inclusive 
agricultural growth and rais[ing] 50 million people out of poverty over the 
next 10 years.”7  
One of the objectives of the New Alliance for Food Security and 
Nutrition is to increase agricultural yields and close the productivity gap in 
Sub-Saharan African countries by increasing the dissemination and 
adoption of improved seeds and new technologies.8 Though the G-8 effort is 
focused on the transfer of technology already “on the shelf” to improve 
African agriculture, these efforts are inherently linked to the broader donor 
community’s support of agricultural research. The donor community, 
including bilateral and multilateral donors, has increased its investments in 
international agricultural research in recent years, as seen in Figure 1 
below.9 This reversed a trend from previous decades and is largely due to 
the growing recognition that research provides the necessary pipeline of 
technologies and knowledge to strengthen global food security. This 
commitment is significant, as the donor community contributed nearly $700 
million in 2010 to the Consultative Group on International Agricultural 
Research (CGIAR), the primary purveyor of public sector agricultural 
research targeted to advance agricultural productivity and production among 
poor, subsistence farmers in the developing world.10 
  
  
 6. Id. at 1.  
 7. Fact Sheet: G-8 Action on Food Security and Nutrition, THE WHITE HOUSE (May 
18, 2012), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/18/fact-sheet-g-8-action-
food-security-and-nutrition. [hereinafter WHITE HOUSE].  
 8. Id. 
 9. CONSULTATIVE GRP. OF INT’L AGRIC. RESEARCH [CGIAR], FINANCIAL REPORT 
2010 6, available at 
http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/5280/2010_CGIAR_Financial_Report.pdf?se
quence=1 (last visited July 3, 2012). 
 10. Id. 
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Figure 1. Donor support to CGIAR, 2006-2012 (in millions USD)11 
 
 
 
Though the donor community has funded international agricultural 
research for decades, issues associated with intellectual property have 
become an increasingly important feature in the agricultural research 
landscape—among both public and private sector actors.12 While the 
CGIAR has managed intellectual property issues on a center-by-center 
basis, in March 2012, after nearly one year of negotiation, the donor 
community and the CGIAR adopted the “CGIAR Principles on the 
Management of Intellectual Assets,” a system-wide policy to guide the 
management of intellectual assets produced or acquired by CGIAR 
centers.13 Further, international agreements, such as the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture14 and the Nagoya 
Protocol to the Convention on Biological Diversity,15 are being 
implemented to address access to and benefit-sharing from the use of 
genetic resources, the building blocks of agricultural research. Greater 
understanding of this evolving legal landscape is critical, so that researchers 
pursuing international agricultural research funded by the public sector can 
more effectively work towards improving global food security. This paper 
will briefly describe these international agreements and policies and how 
they relate to publicly-funded, agricultural research intended to increase the 
  
 11. Id. 
 12. MICHAEL BLAKENEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND FOOD SECURITY 5 
(2009).   
 13. CGIAR Fund, Update, March 2012, available at http://cgiarfund.org/ 
Resourcesnew/9. 
 14. ITPGRFA, International Treaty of Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture website, http://planttreaty.org/.   
 15. CBD, Convention on Biological Diversity website, http://www.cbd.int/abs/. 
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availability and accessibility of innovations to enhance economically and 
environmentally viable smallholder agricultural production and 
productivity.  
I. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH & GLOBAL FOOD SECURITY 
Agricultural research is a key driver for advancing agricultural 
productivity,16 and as such, it is a significant component of international 
efforts to improve global food security. Public sector investments in 
agricultural research are most likely to improve food security,17 and 
historically, the public sector was the key developer of Green Revolution 
technologies.18 CGIAR centers were established during the 1960s and 1970s 
to serve as hubs of international public sector agricultural research19, and 
CGIAR scientists (both before and after the centers were established) were 
key contributors of Green Revolution technologies, primarily improved crop 
genetics.20 A synthesis by Suresh Pal21 illustrates that CGIAR research, 
particularly crop genetic improvement, has had a significant positive impact 
on poverty reduction, agricultural growth and environmental protection. It 
also attributes much of the impact from crop genetic improvement on the 
free exchange of plant genetic resources and partnerships with national 
agricultural research systems (NARS).  
II. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH & ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES 
Given the role of agricultural research in advancing global food security 
goals, attention to factors that can enhance or impede research is critical. 
During the development of Green Revolution technologies by public sector 
researchers, “there was no consideration of any role that IP might play in 
agricultural innovation.”22 Further, researchers during this period operated 
in an environment of relatively free movement of genetic resources and 
  
 16. See PAUL HEISEY, ISSUES IN FOOD SECURITIES: AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND 
DEVELOPMENT, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY, AND FOOD SECURITY, US DEPT. OF AGRIC 
(June 2001), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/media/303967/aib765-10_1_.pdf. 
 17. See id. 
 18. BLAKENEY, supra note 12, at 4.  
 19. FAO, INTRODUCTION TO THE INT’L TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES FOR 
FOOD AND AGRIC 64, Rome, (February 2011), available at http://www.planttreaty. 
org/content/training-resources. 
 20. Suresh Pal, Impacts of CGIAR Crop Improvement and Natural Resource 
Management Research: A Review of Evidence, 24 AGRIC. ECON. RES. REV. 185, 187 (2001).  
 21. See id. 
         22. BLAKENEY, supra note 12, at 5. 22 
22
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improved crop varieties resulting from their use.23 As noted above, the free 
exchange of plant genetic resources was identified as a key factor 
underlying the impacts from CGIAR research on crop genetic 
improvement.24 Access to a variety of genetic resources is critical in 
agricultural research, particularly for crop genetic improvement. There are 
generally two parts to the issue of access for crop genetic improvement. 
First, a wide variety of genetic resources, which can originate from 
anywhere, are necessary to screen for potentially valuable traits. Once a trait 
is identified, it would then be integrated into crops grown in a particular 
area. Thus, access to genetic resources from the target region (e.g., local 
crop varieties) is necessary to ensure that the new trait is introduced into 
crops already known to perform well under local farming conditions. 
Access to genetic resources is critical for both identifying important new 
traits as well as ensuring the relevance of emerging technologies to target 
beneficiaries, such as smallholder farmers in developing countries. 
However, currently emerging systems for managing access to and benefit-
sharing from the use of genetic resources are being implemented at the 
national level and could restrict access to the range of genetic resources 
needed for agricultural research.25  
The Nagoya Protocol (NP) was adopted in 2010 under the Convention 
on Biological Diversity.26 The objective of the Nagoya Protocol is to 
provide a “transparent legal framework for the effective implementation of 
 . . . fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the utilization of 
genetic resources.”27 Further, contracting parties to the Nagoya Protocol are 
obligated to “take measures in relation to access to genetic resources, 
benefit-sharing and compliance.”28 As the Nagoya Protocol is implemented 
at the national level— and this process is only just beginning— it is unclear 
how implementation will affect international research collaborations. Some 
have voiced concern that the Nagoya Protocol could stifle academic 
  
 23. See Kelly Day Rubenstein and Melinda Smale, International Exchange of 
Genetic Resources: The role of information and implications for ownership: the Case of the 
U.S. National Plant Germplasm System, 2, EPTD Discussion Paper 119 (July 2004). 
 24. See PAL, supra note 20. 
 25. Commission on Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture. Background Study 
paper No. 42. “Framework study on food security and access and Benefit-sharing for genetic 
resources for food and Agriculture” (September 2009) http://www.fao.org/nr/cgrfa/cgrfa-
back/en/?no_cache=1.  
 26. See CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (CBD), Status of Signature, and 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, http://www.cbd.int/abs/nagoya-
protocol/signatories/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2011) for a list of countries that have signed 
and/or ratified the Nagoya Protocol. All countries, except the U.S., Andorra, South Sudan 
and the Holy See, have ratified the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), though the 
U.S. has signed the Convention. Id.  
 27. About the Nagoya Protocol, CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY, 
http://www.cbd.int/abs/about/#objective (last visited Aug. 19, 2012).    
 28. Id. 
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research through the limitations on sharing of genetic resources.29  Given 
the collaborative, multi-national nature of public sector international 
agricultural research, developed and developing country researchers alike 
must be educated about the Nagoya Protocol and their rights and 
responsibilities when conducting collaborative research. 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (“Treaty”) entered into force in 2004.30 This Treaty establishes a 
global system to provide farmers, plant breeders and scientists with access to 
plant genetic materials and provides for terms and conditions on benefit-
sharing from the use of plant genetic resources.31 The Treaty is a separate 
instrument from the Nagoya Protocol and is considered a specialized 
instrument for a specific category of genetic resources as described in Article 
4 of the Nagoya Protocol.32 The Treaty’s multilateral system of access and 
benefit-sharing was developed in response to the way in which plant genetic 
resources are used to develop new materials.33 That is, a number of plant 
genetic resources may be used to develop a single final variety and 
attributing the value of the final variety to any single parental genetic 
resource would be challenging. Through the Multilateral System, parties to 
the Treaty make plant genetic resources under national jurisdiction (e.g., 
national seed banks) available to others for research and breeding.  
Those who access genetic materials through the Multilateral System 
agree that they will freely share any new developments with others for 
further research or, if they want to keep the developments to themselves, 
they agree to pay a percentage of any commercial benefits they derive from 
their research into a common fund to support conservation and further 
development of agriculture in the developing world.34 
Through the establishment of a benefit-sharing fund, the Treaty 
Secretariat facilitates the distribution of resources to advance goals of 
conservation of plant genetic resources for agriculture and building capacity 
in developing countries to conserve and conduct research with these genetic 
resources.35  
  
 29. Sikina Jinnah & Stefan Jungcurt, Global Biological Resources: Could Access 
Requirements Stifle Your Research? 323 SCI 464, 464-65 (2009). 
 30. See ITPGRFA, supra note 14. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
art. 4, Oct. 29, 2010, available at http://www.cbd.int/abs/text/articles/?sec=abs-04 
[hereinafter Nagoya Protocol].    
 33. See FAO, 19, supra note 19. 
 34. What is the Multilateral System?, INT’L TREATY ON PLANT GENETIC RESOURCES 
FOR FOOD AND AGRIC., http://www.planttreaty.org/content/what-multilateral-system (last 
visited Aug. 19, 2012).  
 35. See ITPGRFA, supra note 14. 
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Plant genetics resource collections held by the CGIAR research centers 
represent the largest collection of these resources for food and agriculture.36 
These plant germplasm collections have been entered into the Multilateral 
System (MLS) to enable researchers globally to have access to these unique 
collections.37 Thus, the Treaty has direct relevance to agricultural research 
carried out to advance the goals of global food security, especially as the 
CGIAR and collaborating scientists use these genetic resources to improve 
crop varieties produced by smallholder farmers in developing countries. As 
the Nagoya Protocol has not yet entered into force,38 implementation of the 
Treaty is more advanced than implementation of the Nagoya Protocol, 
leaving some researchers to find that they can only obtain some of the 
genetic resources they need to pursue their work. For example, a plant 
breeder may be able to obtain unique plant germplasm from the CGIAR, but 
may not be able to obtain a wide variety of plant pathogens used to evaluate 
plant resistance to a new disease. Plant pathogens would fall under the 
purview of the Nagoya Protocol,39 and until governments have systems in 
place to enable the movement of the genetic resources, research in some 
areas may be significantly delayed. This could have significant 
consequences for food security. In the event of an emerging plant health 
threat, like Ug99, a virulent wheat stem rust to which roughly 80% of the 
wheat crop in Africa and Asia was susceptible when it appeared,40 
consequences can be significant if access to the genetic resource is 
encumbered. In this case, had Ug99 spread to these susceptible regions 
before researchers and governments had had a chance to identify and 
disseminate resistant wheat varieties, wheat-dependent populations in these 
regions could have faced serious food insecurity.41 Given the importance of 
access to genetic resources for international agricultural research, the 
implementation of international agreements governing access to and 
benefit-sharing from the use of genetic resources can have significant 
consequences for global food security.  
  
 36. Carlos Perez del Castillo, Genetic Resources Scoping Study Report, 1, (February 
2011) See http://library.cgiar.org/bitstream/handle/10947/2701/CGIAR_Consortium_Board-
Commissioned_Genetic_Resources_Scoping_Study.pdf?sequence=1. 
 37. See FAO, supra note 19. 
 38. See CBD, supra note 26. 
 39. See Article 3, Scope, Nagoya Protocol, CBD, www.cbd.int/abs/text/ 
articles/?sec=abs-03. 
 40. Introduction, CIMMYT INT’L MAIZE AND WHEAT IMPROVEMENT CENTER, 
http://apps.cimmyt.org/gis/rustmapper/index.htm (last modified June 9, 2010).   
 41. See FAO wheat rust disease global programme, www.fao.org/agriculture/ 
crops/core-themes/theme/pests/wrdgp/en/. 
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III. AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Though as noted earlier, researchers developing the Green Revolution 
technologies may not have considered intellectual property rights,42 public 
sector agricultural researchers must consider these issues given the current 
legal landscape. Recognition of the links between intellectual property 
rights issues and food security is increasing, as evidenced by the negotiation 
of a new IP policy for the CGIAR in 2012 and the recognition by the G-8 
New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition to “[e]xplore opportunities 
for applying the non-profit model licensing approach that could expand 
African access to food and nutritional technologies developed by national 
research institutions.”43 Part of the emphasis on intellectual property rights 
issues comes from increasing engagement of the private sector by the 
traditional donor community in international development efforts. Though 
the private sector has participated in many, often less visible, ways in past 
development efforts, international development donors increasingly 
recognize the role the private sector can play in both focusing private sector 
investment on agricultural research for smallholder producers in developing 
countries as well as facilitating the deployment of technologies developed 
by public sector investments to poor smallholder producers in developing 
countries.44 Naseem and his colleagues reviewed policy options that could 
cultivate private sector investment in research and development (R&D) for 
agriculture in developing countries, and indicated that intellectual property 
rights are one important incentive to stimulate private investment in 
agricultural research, though the impacts on pro-poor agriculture are 
variable depending on a number of factors.45  Public sector research, 
especially that being undertaken by the CGIAR’s new research programs, 
contributes to the development of pro-poor technologies to improve the 
productivity of smallholder agriculture and/or reduce the vulnerability 
associated with agricultural production among poor smallholder 
producers.46 Through strategic engagement with the private sector, the 
outputs of research, both in terms of technology and knowledge, (e.g., 
greater understanding of factors to increase technology adoption among 
smallholders) can potentially reach greater numbers of target beneficiaries. 
  
 42. See BLAKENEY, supra note 12. 
 43. WHITE HOUSE, supra note 7. 
43.WHITE HOUSE, supra note 7. 
 44. Reuters, describes pledge announced at May 2012 G-8 discussion of global 
hunger and food security, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/18/us-g8-food-
idUSBRE84H0O920120518, (last visited Dec 11, 2012). 
 45. See Anwar Naseem, David J. Spielman & Steven W. Omamo, Private-Sector 
Investment in R&D: A Review of Policy Options to Promote its Growth in Developing-
Country Agriculture, 26(1) AGRIBUSINESS 143 (2010), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/CFPEXT/Resources/NaseemetalPrivateRDAgribusiness10.pdf. 
 46. See CGIAR Strategic Results Framework, http://www.cgiarfund.org/strategy_ 
results_framework. 
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Further, engagment with the private sector could potentially improve the 
sustainability of availability of technologies, through steady demand for 
pro-poor technologies, when priced and available in ways accessible to poor 
smallholders. To harness these opportunities available through the private 
sector, intellectual proprety rights are an important tool. Thus, donors have 
taken steps to address how and in what context intellectual property rights 
are asserted over publicly funded international agricultural research outputs 
through the negotiation of the CGIAR Principles on the Management of 
Intellectual Assets. 
During the recent reform process of the CGIAR system, intellectual 
property issues were raised, as individual CGIAR centers had, over time, 
established their own policies and procedures for managing intellectual assets 
and engaging with the private sector. The Principles were drafted to ensure 
that under the new CGIAR system, all CGIAR centers were guided by the 
same principles to manage their intellectual assets as these assets exist largely 
from decades of public sector funding. These Principles commit the CGIAR 
to “prudent and strategic use of intellectual property rights,” such as patents 
or plant variety protection, that are only to be pursued in situations necessary 
to improve the asset or “to enhance the scale or scope of impact on target 
beneficiaries.”47 The provisions also address exclusivity agreements that the 
CGIAR may undertake with third parties, to ensure there is a careful review 
of how and under what circumstances agreements are developed. This is a 
living document, subject to review and revision in two years from the 
adoption by the Fund Council in March 2012. The review will enable donors 
to learn how intellectual assets management is faring under these principles, 
and what new or unexpected impacts this has for how the CGIAR engages 
with partners, and most importantly, to examine how these evolving 
principles can best be structured to increase the impacts of public sector 
funded research on smallholder producers in the developing world.  
LOOKING FORWARD 
Intellectual property issues are increasingly relevant to the public-sector 
international agricultural research landscape. Given the expected significant 
increases in public sector funding in the coming years to address global 
food security issues, and the increasing role of public-private sector 
engagement, intellectual property rights may be an increasingly important 
tool to help achieve impacts from these investments. Additional research on 
how and in what contexts to best use intellectual property tools to achieve 
the intended impacts from this expansion in international agricultural 
research funding will be critical for the international donor community as it 
strives to meets its commitment to addressing global food security.  
  
 47. See CGIAR 7th Fund Council Meeting documents Agenda Item 9,  
www.cgiarfund.org/7th_fund_council_meeting. 
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By 2050, the Philippine population is projected to increase by as much as 41 
percent, from 99.9 million to nearly 153 million people. Producing enough 
food for such an expanding population and achieving food security remain a 
challenge for the Philippine government. This paper argued that intellectual 
property rights (IPR) can play a key role in achieving the nation’s current 
goal to be food-secure and provided examples to illustrate that the presence 
of sound intellectual property (IP) helps foster research, development, and 
deployment of agricultural innovations. This paper also offered key 
recommendations about how the IP system can be further leveraged to 
enable access, creation, and commercialization of new and innovative 
agricultural practices and technologies to enhance the nation’s agricultural 
productivity, meet rice self-sufficiency, and sustain food security.  
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INTRODUCTION  
At a basic level, food security is about fulfilling each individual’s human 
right to food.2 The Rome Declaration on World Food Security and the 
World Food Summit Plan of Action describes it as “when all people, at all 
times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe, and 
nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an 
active and healthy life.”3 This simply means that a food-secure population 
does not live in hunger or fear of starvation. For the Filipino people, the 
presence of rice—the country’s major staple—on the table already 
symbolizes food security and emancipation from hunger and malnutrition.  
Based on FAO’s latest publication titled, The State of Food Insecurity of 
the World 2011, the Philippines is one of the few Asian developing 
countries currently on track to cut its “food-insecure” population in half by 
2015.4 The Philippine government recently claimed that due to increased 
rice production in the past two years, the Philippines will be able to achieve 
its target of rice self-sufficiency (i.e. less rice importation), hence, achieve 
food security by 2013. With 50 million more mouths to feed by 2050, 
however, there is a constant pressure and marching mandate for the country 
to address hunger and malnutrition, expand domestic rice production, and 
continue to improve productivity of the country’s rice industry.  
This paper argues that the presence of a sound IP system is essential to 
the access, generation, efficient and effective commercialization of new and 
improved agricultural innovations to boost Philippine agriculture and foster 
rice self-sufficiency, which, in this country, is equated with food security. 
Higher productivity in the agriculture sector backed with appropriate 
government incentive policies, such as IPR, can increase food availability 
and income, resulting in economic growth and more opportunities for 
people to break out of the poverty-hunger-malnutrition trap. This view 
complements the report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights 
(CIPR) Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, 
which stated that by stimulating invention and new technologies, IPR can 
help increase agricultural production, promote domestic and foreign 
investment, facilitate technology transfer, and improve the availability of 
  
 2. Philippe Cullet, Food Security and Intellectual Property Rights in Developing 
Countries 1 (2003), available at http://www.IPRonline.org/resources/docs/PCull.Food_ 
sec_IPR_7.11.03.pdf. 
 3. U.N. FAO, Rome Declaration on World Food Security (Nov. 13-17, 1996), 
available at http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_ file=/docrep/003/w3613e/ 
w3613e00.htm. 
 4. See U.N Food & Agric. Org. (FAO), The State of Food Insecurity in the World 
46, Annex Table 1.1 (2012), available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/016/i3027e/i3027e.pdf.  
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food to combat hunger.5 This view also supports recent econometric 
findings that IPR are important policy tools that promote agricultural 
development in developing countries.  
This paper begins with an overview of the Philippine agriculture sector 
and the role of the rice sub-sector in the country’s economic growth and 
food security objectives. The second and third sections present the 
importance of innovation to modernizing agriculture, the link of innovation 
and IPR, an update on the implementation of IPR laws and measures in the 
Philippines, and the relevance of the expansion of IPR protection on 
agriculture. These sections put into context the role of IPR in the country’s 
effort to address food security and make the country self-sufficient in terms 
of rice. The fourth section presents two case studies featuring the 
experiences of the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice) and the 
Philippine Center for Postharvest Development and Mechanization 
(PhilMech). This section aims to illustrate that IP, when well-managed, 
helps the access, generation, and commercialization of agricultural 
innovations to benefit the country’s rice industry. Specifically, this section 
shares PhilRice’s success story on its rice varietal improvement program 
through effective transfer of biotechnology highlighting the case of golden 
rice and PhilMech’s success story on the implementation of its new 
licensing protocol to deploy agricultural machinery effectively. Finally, the 
last section offers concluding remarks focused on lessons learned and 
recommendations on how IP can be further leveraged to meet rice self-
sufficiency and attain food security in the Philippines.  
I. A LOOK AT PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE AND THE RICE SECTOR  
The Philippines is an emerging economy and archipelago consisting of 
more than 7,100 islands situated in Southeast Asia. Although the 
contribution of agriculture to the national output has been decelerating over 
the years (See Figure 1), the Philippines remains largely an agriculture-
based economy. The Philippine agriculture sector performs critical roles for 
the country’s economic growth and development, as it is a source of food 
and vital raw materials; a source of jobs and employment especially for the 
rural poor a significant market for the products of the non-agricultural 
economy; and a source of surplus labor to the industry and services sectors.6  
  
 5.  See generally Comm'n on Intellectual Property Rights, Integrating Intellectual 
Property Rights and Development Policy (2002), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/ 
text/final_report/reportwebfinal.htm. 
 6. Cielito F. Habito & Roehlano M. Briones, Philippine Agriculture over the Years: 
Performance, Policies, and Pitfalls, WORLDBANK.ORG1-2 (2005), http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/INTPHILIPPINES/Resources/Habito-word.pdf. 
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The country’s rice sector is one of the main sources of growth for the 
country’s agriculture.7 In 2010, rice accounted for 21.86 percent of gross 
value added in agriculture and 2.37 percent of GNP.8 Labor absorption by 
the rice industry is highest among the agriculture sub sectors that involve 
11.5 million farmers and family members. Close to three-fourths of farm 
household income is derived from rice farming and related activities.9  
For 99.9 million Filipinos, rice is indeed life. Rice is the primary food 
source that is very much embedded in their cultural heritage and the most 
important food crop, essential to the nation’s food security, poverty 
alleviation, and improved livelihoods. Rice provides the necessary calories 
to cover the daily energy needs of Filipinos and accounts for 35 percent of 
the average caloric intake of the population to as high as 60-65 percent for 
households in the lowest income quartile10. One Filipino consumes an 
average of 119 kilograms per year based on 2008 data.11  
Rice, the country’s main staple, is planted over 2.7 million hectares (M 
ha). The average farm size in the Philippines is 1.5 hectares (ha). In 2010, 
rice was harvested from some 4.35 M ha, 7 percent higher than the area 
harvested for 2000, which is an indication that farmers are planting more of 
the crop.12 Production wise, the rice industry has been performing well, with 
a growth rate of 2.89 percent from 1980 to 2010. Over the past three 
decades, production has more than doubled despite the El Nino 
phenomenon and other natural and man-made factors that have affected the 
country (see Figure 2). In 2010, production reached 15.77 million metric 
tons (MT) mark,13 or 27.29 percent higher than in 2000. Rice yield per 
  
 7. See Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, Performance of Philippine Agriculture, 
Jan.-Dec. 2011, BUREAU OF AGRIC. STATISTICS, PERFORMANCE OF PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE 
JANUARY-DECEMBER 2011, available at http://www.bas.gov.ph/?Ids=downloads_ 
view&id=516 (last visited Jan. 11, 2012). 
 8. Nat’l Statistical Coordination Bd., National Accounts of the Philippine Fourth 
Quarter 2010, PHILIPPINE NAT’L STATISTICAL COORDINATION BD. (Jan. 31, 2011), 
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/sna/2010/4th2010/2010hi4.asp. 
 9. Agri-Pinoy Rice Program, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES DEP’T OF AGRIC., 
http://www.da.gov.ph/index.php/2012-03-27-12-03-56/2012-04-13-12-38-11 (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2012). 
 10. Leocadio Sebastian, Pedro Alviola, and Sergio R. Francisco, Bridging the Rice 
Yield Gap in the Philippines (Minas Papademetriou, Frank Dent and Edward Herath ed. 
2000), available at ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/003/x6905e/x6905e00.pdf.  
 11. Kristine L. Alave, Filipinos urged to reduce dependence on rice, INQUIRER NEWS 
(Nov. 5, 2011, 2:47 AM), http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/88421/filipinos-urged-to-reduce-
dependence-on-rice.  
 12. See Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAOSTAT, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/567/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=567#ancor (last visited Dec. 15, 
2012) [hereinafter FAOSTAT Database].  
 13. See FAOSTAT Database, supra note 12.  
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hectare has also improved through the years, averaging 3.5 tons per hectare 
(t/ha) in 2000 to 2010, more than double the figures in the 1990s.14  
Notwithstanding the steady increase in production and yield, the 
Philippines, a rice self-sufficient country in the 1970s, cannot satisfy its own 
demand and has increasingly relied on rice imports since the 1990s to 
ensure its food security.15 To meet its population’s requirements, it imports 
rice from the world’s top rice exporting countries, such as Thailand and 
Vietnam. It is the world’s biggest rice importer, averaging 2.27 million MT 
per year in 2000 to 2010 (see Figure 3).16 Such huge importation is due to 
several factors: small rice areas (at 4.35 M ha)compared to that of Asia’s 
major rice producing countries;17 shrinking rice harvested area to feed 
increasing number of people;18 the frequent occurrence of typhoons and 
other calamities (average of 3 typhoons per month, which coincides with the 
cropping season); high post-production losses at 15 percent (mostly from 
sun drying); 19 low milling rice recovery because of outdated rice milling 
facilities;20 and rice wastage.21  
  
 14. Philippine Rice Industry: Facts and Figures, PINOY RICE KNOWLEDGE BANK, 
http://www.pinoyrkb.com (last visited Jan. 9, 2012). 
 15. Ronilo A. Beronio, Jane G. Payumo & Rowena Villanueva, Status of Public Rice 
Biotechnology Research and Development and Commercialization in the Philippines, in 
BUSINESS POTENTIAL FOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY 161, 161 (Paul S. Teng ed. 2007), 
available at http://www.apo-tokyo.org/00e-books/AG-19_BusinessPotential/AG-19_ 
BusinessPotential.pdf (“A buffer stock of 60 days’ worth is maintained through import to 
ensure food security.”). 
 16. See FAOSTAT Database, supra note 12.  
 17. FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE U.N. THE STATE OF FOOD 
INSECURITY IN THE WORLD: HOW DOES INTERNATIONAL PRICE VOLATILITY AFFECT DOMESTIC 
ECONOMIES AND FOOD SECURITY (2011), available at http://www.fao.org/ 
docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e.pdf (stating that rice area harvested for China in 2010 is recorded 
at 29.49 M ha, 44 M ha for India, 12.31 M ha for Indonesia, 10.25 M ha for Thailand and 
7.41 M ha for Vietnam). 
 18. Pinoy Rice Knowledge Bank, Philippine Rice Industry: Facts and Figures, 
PHILRICE (last visited Sept. 17, 2012), http://www.pinoyrkb.com/main/resources/facts-and-
figures (follow “Philippine Rice Industry Q & A 2” hyperlink). 
 19. The Philippines is known for its “highway dryers,” the cheapest, but unreliable 
method of drying high moisture paddy. Dante de Padue, Rice Post Harvest E-mail 
Conference Draft Summary V.1.2, FOOD & AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE U.N. (June 
1998) (conference papers), http://www.fao.org/docrep/X5427E/x5427e0d.htm# 
drying%20of%20high%20moisture%20paddy). U.N. & SOCIAL COMMISSION FOR ASIA AND 
THE PACIFIC, ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND RURAL POVERTY ALLEVIATION: POTENTIAL AND 
BEST PRACTICES IN ASIA 120-45 (2002).  
 20. Joji Co, Panel Discussion, Private Sector Investments to Improve Rice Milling 
Efficiencies and Reduce Post-Harvest Losses, at the USAID Food Security Conference: 
“Improving Access, Advancing Food Security” (July 18-19, 2011), available at 
http://aseanfoodsecurityfoodproduction.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/12-herculano-joji-co-
rfs.pdf.  
 21. In 2008, the Philippine Food and Nutrition Research Institute reported that every 
Filipino wastes on average 3.3 kg/year. With 94 million people, total wastage of the country 
is 0.3 t, 36% of 2011 rice imports. Aileen Macalintal, That Rice You Throw Away, RICE 
TODAY, Apr.-June 2012, at 14.  
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The Philippine Department of Agriculture claims that the country’s rice 
import situation can be changed and the country can become rice self-
sufficient. This can be done by modernizing the country’s rice sector as 
envisioned in the country’s Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Plan. 
Specifically, the country’s rice modernization efforts are now focused on 
optimizing: the use of existing rice farms and labor productivity through 
new and improved technologies, from production to postharvest operations 
adapted to the agro-climatic conditions of the country; infrastructure 
development (e.g., irrigation and roads); farmers’ training; and policy 
development. In 2010, the country’s rice production improved by 15 
percent, cutting the import volume to 0.86 million MT, more than 57 
percent volume reduction of the country’s 1999’s import. By 2013 and 
onwards, the Philippine government is aiming to attain rice self-sufficiency 
again.  
II. IGNITING AGRICULTURAL INNOVATIONS THROUGH INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The 2001 Human Development Report stated: “innovation and 
technological advance has contributed greatly to the acceleration of human 
progress in the past several centuries and that those contributions have the 
promise of even greater acceleration.”22 There is general agreement that 
innovations based on existing or emerging technologies, especially when 
linked to a national innovation system, are crucial for growth. Innovations 
are also important to increase competitiveness, productivity, and social gain 
within organizations, among institutions, and across various sectors of the 
economy. In the rice sector, there is no doubt that technological innovations 
have contributed to increased production volumes and incremental yields 
over the past decades. For instance, the use of new, high-yielding rice 
varieties, mechanization, fertilizers, and pesticides, which were promoted 
by the Green Revolution23 of the 1960s and 1970s, increased average rice 
productivity and rice supplies. The agricultural innovations during this 
period enabled the Philippines to become a net exporter of rice (albeit on a 
small scale) in the late 1970s. Green Revolution technologies were also 
claimed to have contributed to the overall economic growth of the country 
by increasing the incomes of farmers who were then able to afford tractors 
  
 22. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2001: MAKING 
NEW TECHNOLOGIES WORK FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 25 (2001), available at 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/completenew1.pdf (last visited Sept. 17, 2012). 
 23. The term “green revolution” was coined William Gaud, former Director of the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), when he described the 
spectacular increases in cereal crop yields in Pakistan, India, China, then to other developing 
countries. Norman Borlaug Institute for Plant Science Research, The Green Revolution & Dr. 
Norman Borlaug: Toward the “Evergreen Revolution,” AGBIOWORLD, http:// 
www.agbioworld.org/biotech-info/topics/borlaug/green-revolution.html.  
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and other modern equipment. The Green Revolution also promoted the use 
of electrical energy and consumer goods, which increased the pace and 
volume of trade and commerce.24 Publicly-funded national and international 
agricultural research institutes also played a significant role in the 
development of these agricultural technologies.  
Agricultural innovations can be part of the toolbox to achieve food 
security and rice self-sufficiency objectives. However, development and 
implementation need a supportive environment in which to thrive, and 
intellectual property rights (IPR) protection plays a key role in creating such 
an environment. IPR are certain creations of the human mind that are given 
the legal protection of property rights.25 Article 27 (2) of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights provides a broader definition of IPR as “the 
right to the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.26 Several 
distinct forms of IPR exist, including copyrights, patents, trademarks, plant 
variety protections, trade secrets, and geographical indications. These rights 
refer to the creator’s right to exclude others and thereby control the use, 
sale, application, and distribution of his or her creations for a fixed and 
determinable period of time. IPR are justified from two distinct 
perspectives: either as a personal right, or as an economic incentive for 
investment in creative activities.27 
Protection of IPR has a deep history in the Philippines. Starting in 1947, 
through Republic Act No. 165, the country already provided protection for 
inventions, utility models, and industrial designs. The Philippine 
government has made intellectual property a state policy by incorporating it 
into the 1987 Constitution. The Philippine government likewise supported 
several international agreements that promote the use of IP. It became a 
member of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 1980. In 
1992, it became a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), 
which recognizes the sovereignty of countries over their genetic resources, 
which can be subject to IPR. In 1995, the Philippines joined the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) Framework Agreement on Intellectual 
Property Cooperation. It joined the World Trade Organization in 1995, and 
ratified the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
  
 24. FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE U.N., THE STATE OF FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE 2000 (2000) available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/x4400e/x4400e00.htm 
(follow “Food and Nutrition Security: Why Food Production Matters” hyperlink). 
 25. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 308 (3d ed. 2004). 
 26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) A (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration], available at 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/.  
 27. See WILLIAM LESSER, Patenting of Plants and Animals: The Impacts on the 
Canadian Agri-Food Sector (1995), available at http://www.agr.gc.ca/policy/ 
patent/elesser.html.  
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(TRIPS)Agreement in 1996, which sets the IP standards of today. In 2004, 
the Philippines ratified the international seed treaty, the International Treaty 
on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA), and now 
implements the standard material transfer agreement (SMTA) for the 
transfer and exchange of biological and genetic resources. All of these 
international treaties must be reconciled with local legislation, and either 
complemented or supplemented by national laws and policies. The 
Philippines has promulgated several pieces of legislation, which parallel 
these treaties. 
In 1998, the country’s IP law, the Intellectual Property Code of the 
Philippines, was updated to comply with TRIPS provisions. The Philippine 
IP Code further strengthens protection of the rights of its inventors, 
trademark owners, authors, and other creators of intellectual property 
through patent, utility model, industrial design, copyright and other related 
rights, geographical indications, and trademark28. A pertinent provision of 
this legislation relates to the patentability of life forms, which specifically 
excludes the patenting of plant varieties, animal breeds, and essential 
biological processes for the production of plants and animals, while 
allowing for the patenting of microorganisms, non-biological, and 
microbiological processes. In response to TRIPS, the Philippines also 
enacted the 2002 Plant Variety Protection Act (RA 9268), patterned after 
The International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) , which provides sui generis (of its own kind) system protection for 
plants and gives rights to breeders. In 2002, Executive Order 247 was issued 
to prescribe the guidelines and a regulatory framework for the prospecting 
of biological and genetic resources, its by-products, and derivatives for 
scientific, commercial, and other purposes consistent with the CBD. 
Republic Act 9147 or the “Wildlife Resources Conservation and Protection 
Act” reinforced Executive Order 247. Several issuances by the Department 
of Environment and Natural Resources and the Department of Agriculture 
have likewise been released to regulate bio-prospecting in the country. In 
compliance to the CBD’s Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, the 2002 
Administrative Order No. 8 of the Philippine Department of Agriculture 
was issued, which provides rules and regulations for the importation and 
release into the environment of plants and plant products derived from the 
use of modern biotechnology. Recently, the country has enacted the 
Philippine Technology Transfer Act, 2009 (RA No. 10055) similar to the 
1980 US Bayh-Dole Act in the United States that sets rules on IP ownership 
and unifies national and institutional technology transfer efforts to 
strengthen the country’s domestic industries. Table 1 presents the summary 
  
 28.  Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines, Rep. Act No. 8293, § 151(1)(c) 
(1997), available at http://www.chanrobles.com/legal7intellectualpropertycodeofthe 
philippines.html#INTELLECTUAL_PROPERTY_CODE_OF_THE_PHILIPPINES.  
 
2013] Intellectual Property and Opportunities for Food Security in the Philippines 133 
of national IP legislation and membership of the Philippines in international 
agreements on IPR implementation.  
At the institutional level, policies and offices for managing IP are being 
developed both at the department/ministry and agency levels: the 
Department of Agriculture and some of its attached agencies, such as 
PhilRice; the Philippine Center for Postharvest Development and 
Mechanization (PhilMech); the Bureau of Agriculture Research; the 
Department of Science and Technology; and the University of the 
Philippine System. These public sector institutions are actively leveraging 
on the country’s IPR system to protect and commercialize inventions. The 
number of Philippine institutions wanting to improve capacity on IP has 
also increased (personal communication). A survey done by Payumo and 
Grimes (2011) among Philippine scientists and researchers revealed that a 
majority of them are aware on the concept of IPR and the developments and 
issues linking IPR with agriculture and agricultural biotechnology.29 
III. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RELEVANCE TO AGRICULTURE  
Traditionally, IPR were not applied to agriculture. In recent times, this 
position has changed, especially with the ratification of the TRIPS 
Agreement, a compulsory requirement of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO). TRIPS,30 central to stronger establishment of IPR around the 
world,,31 obliges WTO members to provide most of the existing types of 
IPR protection for all inventions, such as those with utility in agriculture. 
The nature and scope of IPR for genetic resources, including plant 
varieties, are also discussed in two international treaties: the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (CBD) and the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (ITPGRFA). Additional pressure to 
strengthen protection, especially for plant varieties in developing countries 
(beyond the minimum TRIPS requirements), is also being exerted in 
bilateral trade negotiations between developing countries and the United 
  
 29. Jane Payumo & Howard Grimes, Institutional Responses on Strengthened 
Intellectual Property Rights in Agriculture and Needs’ Assessment on Intellectual Property 
Management of Public Research Institutions in Asian Developing Countries, 42 J. RES. 
ADMIN. 42, 50 (2011).  
 30. TRIPS sets a minimum international standard for IPR protection and effective 
and appropriate enforcement mechanisms. MCCARTHY ET AL., supra note 25, at 628.  
 31. Daniele Archibugi & Andrea Filippetti, The Globalization of Intelletual Property 
Rights: Four Learned Lessons and Four Theses, 1 J. GLOBAL POL’Y 137, 138 (2010); see 
also Carlos Correa, Reviewing the TRIPS Agreement, in A POSITIVE AGENDA FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ISSUES FOR FUTURE TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 221, 221 (2000), 
available at http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtsb10_en.pdf.; see generally KEITH E. 
MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2000).  
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States and Europe.32 Member-countries of these international agreements 
allow the use of IPR to protect plants, varieties, genes, and a majority of 
tools and processes that can be used for agricultural research.  
Patents, plant breeders’ rights (PBRs) or plant variety protection (PVP), 
trademarks, geographical indications (GIs), and trade secrets are forms of 
IPR that are relevant to the agriculture sector. Patents are probably the most 
important IPR today for agricultural goods and services because they 
provide, wherever available, the strongest protection for patentable plants, 
animals, and biotechnological processes for their production. New varieties 
of crops produced through sexual reproduction (seed) or tuber propagation 
can be granted PVP, an alternative to a patent, if they are distinct, uniform, 
and stable. Trademarks (e.g., Roundup Ready®) are used to distinguish 
agricultural goods and services from similar goods and services and indicate 
their source or origin, thereby influencing consumers’ decisions.  
GIs are marks associated with products originating from a country, 
region, or locality where the quality, reputation or other characteristics of 
the product are essentially attributable to its geographical origin (e.g., 
Darjeeling tea of India, Cognac brandy of France, and Roquefort cheese of 
France, etc.).In addition to these four forms of IPR, trade secret law offers 
further protection relevant to plants. Trade secrets are important for hybrid 
varieties (e.g. corn varieties), where commercialized F1 seeds ensure hybrid 
vigor only for the first generation of plants. In this case, the valuable 
“information” is in the parent lines, which typically are not commercialized 
and which can be effectively protected by trade secret law.  
The existence of above types of IPR protection has encouraged more 
investment in agriculture, especially from the private sector, which is now 
the largest investor for agricultural research worldwide33. The use and 
development of materials for which IPR protection is sought does not only 
apply in the commercial sectors. Public research universities, especially in 
developed nations such as the United States, European countries, and Japan, 
and now in developing countries such as China and Taiwan, have been 
rapidly patenting to encourage commercialization of research, such as in 
agricultural biotechnology, to enhance the impact of publicly-funded 
research and development (R& D), promote economic growth through the 
  
 32. THE WORLD BANK, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: DESIGNING REGIMES TO 
SUPPORT PLANT BREEDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1 (2006), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTARD/Resources/IPR_ESW.pdf.  
 33. Roughly, one third of the $32 billion total public and private agricultural research 
investment worldwide comes from the private sector. See MAARTEN J. CHRISPEELS and 
DAVID E. SADAVA, PLANTS, GENES AND CROP BIOTECHNOLOGY 42, (2d ed. 2003). Gerard 
Barry and Robert Horsch, Evolving Role of the Public and Private Sector in Agricultural 
Biotechnology for Developing Countries, in AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE POOR: 
PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE 183 (G.J. Persley and M.M. Lantin, eds, 
2000), available at www.cgiar.org/biotech/rep0100/Barryh.pdf.  
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creation of companies around academic technologies, create new jobs, and 
raise revenues that can be used to support academic research.  
The expansion of IPR to agriculture, however, has caused mixed 
reactions over the past decades, and researchers have undertaken growing 
work to shed light on these debates, both from theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. Empirical findings support the conclusion that the expansion 
of IPR helps promote research investments and innovation, leading to 
significant economic activity and development.34 Empirical studies also 
support the importance of IPR policies and the link of adequate IPR to 
agricultural development.35 Findings of other studies, on the other hand, 
found that IPR elevate inequality across and within countries by mostly 
benefiting large private companies and rich countries, at the expense of 
small companies and poor countries, especially in the use of genetic 
resources.36 . They also claimed that IPR could potentially stifle R&D 
efforts of national research agencies. However, reviews of literature show 
there are limited studies on determining the practical implications of IPR in 
agriculture in specific countries, such as the Philippines. The next section 
presents some additional evidence that can fill some of these knowledge 
gaps under the Philippine setting. 
IV. MANAGING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PHILIPPINE RICE SECTOR: 
CASE STUDIES  
The expansion of IPR in agriculture, and its increasing influence in 
agriculture, has demanded new roles and opportunities for public research 
institutions in the Philippines. This section presents the experiences of two 
Philippine institutions under the country’s Department of Agriculture, 
namely the Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice) and the Philippine 
Center for Postharvest Development and Mechanization (PhilMECH). With 
main headquarters in Nueva Ecija, the Philippines’ rice granary, these 
institutions have important roles in generating and disseminating 
  
 34. Michele Boldrin & David Levine, The Case Against Intellectual Property, 92 
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW 209 (2002); see also JAMES D. GAISFORD ET AL, THE 
ECONOMICS OF BIOTECHNOLOGY (2001). Sunil Kanwar, Innovation and Intellectual Property 
Rights (Ctr. for Dev. Econ., Delhi School of Econ., Univ. of Delhi, Working Paper No. 142, 
2006). David M. Gould & William C. Gruben, The Role of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Economic Growth, 48 J. OF DEV. ECON. 323, 323-50 (1996). 
 35. Jane Payumo, Howard Grimes & Philip Wandschneider, Status of National 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) Systems and Its Impact to Agricultural Development: A 
Time Series Cross Section Data Analysis of TRIPS Member-Countries, 5 INT’L J. FOR INTELL. 
PROP. MGMT. 82, 82-99 (2012). 
 36. NRRDN is a formal and functional structure of 57 strategically located agencies 
around the country: two national centers, six branch stations representing the country’s major 
rice-growing zones, 14 regional research centers, and 35 cooperating stations. Partners, 
PHILRICE, http://www.philrice.gov.ph/?page=partners&page2=national (last visited Sept. 17, 
2012). 
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technological solutions for the rice sector. Cases were purposely drawn to 
acknowledge the efforts of these institutions as early adopters of IPR 
management for public research institutions in developing countries. These 
cases show the institutionalization of a sound institutional IP framework 
facilitates access and commercialization of technologies and tools such as 
seeds and machinery.  
A. Case Study 1. Accessing Biotechnology: PhilRice’s Experience  
PhilRice, established in 1985 as a government instrumentality under the 
Philippine Department of Agriculture, leads the country’s national rice 
efforts. It accomplishes this mission through research, technology 
development, policy advocacy, and knowledge transfer. The Institute’s 
current efforts are focused on the development and deployment of 
sustainable agricultural innovations. Examples of such developments 
include new crop varieties and cropping systems with high-yield potential 
even in adverse agro-climatic conditions (drought and flooding) that 
requires less chemical inputs, but with enhanced pest, disease, and stress 
tolerance. Producing inexpensive machinery and tools for rice cultivation to 
further improve output and productivity of the rice sector is also included in 
the Institute’s rice research and development (R&D) program. PhilRice 
works closely with members of the National Rice Research and 
Development Network (NRRDN)37 and other national stakeholders across 
the Philippines. It also actively collaborates with global research and 
development (R&D) partners such as the International Rice Research 
Institute (IRRI) on rice varietal improvement, policy, and technology 
transfer, among others.  
PhilRice embarked on a modest but organized effort to access and use 
modern biotechnology38 to enhance its rice varietal improvement, one of its 
key R&D programs.39 The institute implements the following biotechnology 
research: 
  
 37. The Philippines advocates the safe and responsible use of modern biotechnology 
and is noted for being the first Asian country to commercialize planting of the genetically 
modified corn. Biotechnology research in the country is primarily being undertaken to 
address food security, equitable access to health services, sustainable and safe environment, 
and industry development, which are the four goals of the 1997 Agriculture and Fisheries 
Modernization Act (AFMA). Saturnina C. Halos, Agricultural Biotechnology in the 
Philippines, SEARCA BIOTECHNOLOGY INFORMATION CENTER 1-6, http://bic.searca.org/ 
seminar_proceedings/bangkok-2000/I-country_papers/halos.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
 38. Other PhilRice’s R&D programs focuses on developing natural products and 
value-adding systems, impact evaluation, policy research and advocacy, and development of 
location-specific rice technologies for irrigated, rainfed, and upland areas. PHILRICE, supra 
note 36. 
 39. See generally JEROEN VAN WIJK, JOEL I. COHEN & JOHN KOMEN, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS FOR AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY: OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1993); Karim M. Maredia et al., Technology Transfer and 
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1. DNA marker technology to map agronomically important traits in 
rice such as yield components, seedling vigor, resistance to rice 
tungro virus, green leafhopper, brown planthopper, and blast; de-
velop/apply molecular marker aided selection techniques for tungro 
and bacterial leaf blight (BLB); and analyze genetic diversity of rice 
germplasm;  
2. In vitro techniques to improve grain quality and develop lines with 
tolerance to adverse conditions (cold, salinity, drought); 
3. Map-based and expression-based techniques to clone agronomically 
important genes like tungro resistance; and 
4. Agrobacterium-mediated transformation and particle-gun bom-
bardment to produce rice plants with resistance to BLB, blast, 
sheath blight, stemborer, and tungro and with tolerance to drought 
and salinity.  
Implementation of these projects and development of final biotechnology 
products require investment in facilities, manpower, and linkages, which 
PhilRice has built through the years with support from the national 
government and its international partners and donors. The acquisition of 
biotechnology tools is also very important. PhilRice has acquired these tools 
through various technology acquisition and transfer methods, which 
include: donations, material transfer agreements (MTAs), licensing 
arrangements, joint ventures, overseas training of technical staff, purchase 
of product and equipment, exchange of information at international 
meetings, and information in the public domain. Table 2 presents some of 
PhilRice’s technology transfer arrangements involving biotech products 
particularly for transgenic rice research. This list excludes MTAs with IRRI. 
Most of the materials under these agreements are plasmid constructs, clone 
DNA sequences, promoters, vectors, selectable markers, and transgenic 
seeds. Several rice varieties produced using molecular marker and tissue 
culture technologies are currently being commercialized in the country.  
However, the increasing proprietary nature of modern biotechnology and 
agriculture, its effects on material exchange, and how to deal with them 
have become major concerns of the Institute and its scientists. It is often 
said that currently, no biotechnology R&D project can be implemented 
without touching any IP issues. Access to new technologies and modern 
scientific methods covered by IPR, and their eventual commercialization, 
would now require formal and complex licensing agreements with 
corresponding royalty payments to the IP owners to avoid infringement of 
IPR.40  
  
Licensing of Agricultural Biotechnologies in the International Arena, 17 AGBIOTECHNET 1, 
1-7 (1999). 
 40. World Health Organization (WHO), Nutrition: Micronutrient deficiencies: 
Vitamin A deficiency (2012), http://www.who.int/nutrition/topics/vad/en/. 
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Public research institutions in developing countries, such as PhilRice, 
have evolved in a world without IPR. It is against these backdrops that the 
Institute exerted major efforts to build its capacity to deal with IPR matters, 
starting in 1998 and going fully operational in 2003. In 2004, PhilRice was 
the first attached agency of the Philippine Department of Agriculture to 
initiate an IPR policy, which is focused on proactive generation, protection, 
and commercialization of IPR. PhilRice was also the agency which setup its 
own IP management office. The Institute has also embarked on continuing 
IP education programs for its scientists and staff, so they will be more aware 
on the concept of IP and understand the ever-evolving legal environment in 
the area of IPR, especially the areas that affect the use and access of biotech 
innovations and genetic resources. These IP awareness campaigns translated 
to high respect for IPR among PhilRice scientists and staff, lessened their 
fear of the unknown, and brought back their enthusiasm to exchange 
materials with their foreign counterparts. With IP policy and institutional 
mechanisms in place, any form of modern biotechnology, such as that of 
golden rice (discussed in the next section), should be within the reach of 
PhilRice and its scientists.  
Guided by the IP policy, the institute proactively pursues protection of its 
research results and technologies (e.g., rice wine making process, 
engineering prototypes, varieties, and publications) through several forms of 
IPR, such as patents, PVP, copyright, and trademarks. The PhilRice’s IPR 
portfolio, which includes biotechnology inventions, has grown throughout 
the years. In 2010, about PhP 3.5 million (USD 81,395) were generated as 
new sources of R&D money and incentives for researchers. The Institute 
had nine pending patent applications, and 23 knowledge products were 
deposited at the National Library and given with Certificates of Copyright 
Registration and Deposit. In terms of plant protection, TGMS varieties 
underwent two seasons of distinctness, uniformity, and stability testing. 
New applications were submitted for newly developed varieties including 
their female parents and for restorer lines. The institute also connects to the 
private sector to commercialize IP generated from its research activities.  
1. The Golden Rice Project  
PhilRice, an active member of the Golden Rice Network, leads the 
development of new golden rice varieties tailored to specific rice-growing 
conditions in the Philippines. Golden rice is one potential tool to reduce vitamin 
A deficiency (VAD) in the Philippines and can contribute to food security needs of 
the country. Vitamin A deficiency increases the risk of death from certain 
common disease infections among young children41.  
  
 41. Antonio A. Alfonso, Project Leader, Golden Rice, Powerpoint presentation at the 
Southeast Asian Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture 
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It is also the leading cause of blindness among children. VAD has been 
the cause of death of about 670,000 and blindness for 350,000 children 
around the world.42 Approximately 90 million Southeast Asian children also 
suffer from VAD43. Deficiency in vitamin A also causes night blindness and 
increases risk of maternal mortality among pregnant and nursing women. In 
the Philippines, VAD is addressed through dietary diversification, vitamin 
A capsule supplementation, and food fortification. However, VAD 
continues to adversely affect many people, especially the last 10-20 percent 
in the hardest-to-reach areas in the Philippines. Hence, there is a need to 
develop and deploy new, improved tools to supplement existing measures 
and overcome vitamin A deficiency among at risk populations.  
Developed by Ingo Potrykus (ETH-Zurich, Switzerland) and Peter Beyer 
(University of Freiburg, Germany), the vitamin A-enriched rice contains a 
gene maize and another gene from a common soil bacterium. Added 
through genetic transformation, the two genes completed the biosynthetic 
pathway for beta-carotene in the rice grains. Beta-carotene is a pro-vitamin 
A carotenoid that is converted into vitamin A in the body of humans and 
animals when that individual’s vitamin A status is low or deficient. Unlike 
vitamin A, beta-carotene has no known toxicity level. Because rice is the 
country’s main staple, golden rice has the potential to reach many Filipinos. 
It was estimated that eating about one cup a day of golden rice could 
provide half of an adult’s vitamin A needs.  
Putting together the golden rice technology platform, however, required 
the use of multiple inventions with complex IP ownership. The overall 
Freedom-to-Operate (FTO) analysis44 and product deconstruction of golden 
rice tentatively identified 15 tangible property (TP) components and 70 
patents (with 31 assignees) of potential relevance45 (See Table 3 for the IPs 
relevant to golden rice). Syngenta (formerly AstraZeneca), the world’s 
largest agricultural biotechnology company, has acquired the rights to 
golden rice from Greenovation (the company formed by the original 
inventors) and was able to negotiate access to all pieces of the puzzle 
necessary for the intended humanitarian purposes of the technology forming 
  
(SEARCA) Forum: Straight from the Scientists: Golden Rice: A Potential Tool to Address 
Vitamin A Deficiency in the Philippines (Aug. 26, 2011). 
 42. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), Golden Rice and vitamin A 
deficiency (2012), https://www.integratedbreeding.net/sites/default/files/attachments/ 
golden_rice_project_brief_2012.pdf. 
 43. FTO is defined as the ability to practice or use an innovation for a particular 
technology. See Richard C. Atkinson et al., Public Sector Collaboration for Agricultural IP 
Management, 301 SCIENCE 174, 174-75 (2003). 
 44. See generally R. DAVID KRYDER, STANLEY P.KOWALSKI & ANATOLE F. 
KRATTIGER, THE INTELLECTUAL AND TECHNICAL PROPERTY COMPONENTS OF PRO-VITAMIN A 
RICE (GOLDEN RICE™): A PRELIMINARY FREEDOM-TO-OPERATE REVIEW (2000). 
 45. Jorge E. Mayer, Peter Beyer & Ingo Potrykus, The Golden Rice Project, GOLDEN 
RICEPROJECT, http://www.goldenrice.org/PDFs/The_Golden_Rice_Project_Mayer_et_al_ 
2006.pdf (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
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the golden rice patent pool.46 The Golden Rice Humanitarian Board, which 
now provides strategic guidance to development and deployment of golden 
rice, manages sub-licensing arrangements on the use of the technology by 
breeding institutions in developing countries such as PhilRice and the 
International Rice Research Institution (IRRI). The golden rice research at 
PhilRice is being funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (through 
research grants to the University of Freiburg and IRRI), Rockefeller 
Foundation, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) (also through IRRI) and the Philippine Department of Agriculture. 
PhilRice also works closely with IRRI and the Helen Keller International, a 
nonprofit organization dedicated to preventing blindness and reducing 
malnutrition worldwide. Besides PhilRice, national institutions in India, 
Vietnam, Bangladesh, China, and Indonesia have sublicense rights to this 
technology to integrate it to local varieties. The International Services for 
the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications was also an important player 
in helping to solve the IPR issues in golden rice and served as a technology 
broker to enable the transfer of golden rice to these countries. 
The participation of PhilRice in the golden rice project is one of the best, 
and most clearly documented, examples of developing country access to 
biotechnology through IPR management and mechanisms. The Philippines 
has IPR protection mechanisms in place to allow protection for products and 
processes involving biotechnology, which prevents imitation and 
unauthorized use of these technologies. The country also continues to 
strengthen its IPR protection mechanisms to further encourage the private 
sector and investors to protect and transfer technologies to the Philippines.47 
The existence of patent protection on golden rice in the Philippines (Patent 
title: Method for improving the agronomic and nutritional value of plants 
Application No. 1-2000-00496) and the number and the legal provisions of 
the IP-related agreements (e.g., sublicensing agreement with Golden Rice 
Humanitarian Board48) that PhilRice need to accomplish did not discourage 
its research administrators and scientists to negotiate for access and use the 
technology for its rice improvement program. PhilRice’s involvement in the 
golden rice project is driven by its national mandate, its existing manpower 
  
 46. The Philippines was not considered in the Priority Watch List of the U.S. Trade 
Representative in 2010 due to its improving IPR enforcement mechanisms. See highlights of 
report at Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, USTR Releases 
2010 Special 301 Report on Intellectual Property Rights (Apr. 30, 2010), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2010/april/ustr-releases-2010-
special-301-report-intellectual-p. 
 47. For further explanation on the golden rice licensing agreements, see Golden Rice 
Project: Golden Rice Humanitarian Board, http://www.goldenrice.org/Content1-
Who/who4_IP.php (last visited Dec. 15, 2012). 
 48. The field testing of golden rice is now being evaluated using the same national 
regulatory policies that the country used to approve commercialization of GM (genetically 
modified) crops, starting as early as 2002 with the commercial planting of Bt (Bacillus 
thuringiensis) corn event MON810. 
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and facilities, and the well-established national regulatory policies on 
biosafety49. Despite golden rice becoming a cause célèbre50 for years due to 
its technical and IPR issues, the golden rice research at PhilRice is moving 
forward, with the final product expected to be commercialized in the next 
two years. One popular rice variety currently being developed by PhilRice to 
have a Golden Rice counterpart is PSB Rc82 (Peñaranda), a popular, high-
yielding, and widely grown rice variety. In accordance with regulatory 
requirements, PhilRice will conduct field and laboratory tests to generate 
regulatory data that will serve as basis for possible regulatory approval. 
PhilRice will subsequently conduct more extensive field tests to establish 
agronomic performance for varietal approval. PhilRice is also developing a 
‘3-in-1’ variety of golden rice, which will have resistance to the rice tungro 
disease and bacterial blight, two of the most devastating rice diseases in the 
country. The incorporation of pest resistance would reduce yield losses and 
is expected to drive farmer adoption. 
B. Case Study 2. Commercialization of Mechanization Technologies 
PHilMech’s Experience 
Agricultural mechanization, as one of the major and important 
components of agricultural modernization, is one of the major thrusts of 
PHilMech. PHilMech, formerly the National Postharvest Institute for 
Research and Extension, then renamed to Bureau of Postharvest Research 
and Extension, was established in 1978 as a bureau under the Philippine 
Department of Agriculture. It was mandated to generate, extend, and 
commercialize appropriate and problem-oriented agriculture and fishery 
post-harvest and mechanization technologies.51 It was tasked with 
spearheading the development of the country’s post-harvest industry 
through dynamic orchestration, research, technology promotion, and policy 
advocacy. The institute’s research, development, and extension (RD&E) 
thrusts focus on: 1) increasing the profitability through efficient drying and 
dehydration; 2) promoting appropriate handling, storage and processing 
techniques for increased food value; 3) preventing and controlling 
mycotoxin, pests and diseases toward food preservation and safety; and 4) 
empowering stakeholders toward profitable entrepreneurship.52 Three 
departments implement PHilMech’s R&D activities: post-harvest 
engineering, food protection, and post-harvest systems and analysis. The 
  
 
 49. Golden rice, one of the products of genetically modified technology, and its 
promised benefits to prevent blindness and death from vitamin A deficiency in millions of 
children, has become an intimate public debate across the globe.  
 50. About Us, PHILMECH, http://www.philmech.gov.ph/?page=aboutus (last visited 
Dec. 15, 2012). 
 51. Programs, PHILMECH, http://www.philmech.gov.ph/?page=programs (last 
visited Dec. 15, 2012). 
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Training and Extension Department facilitates technology transfer of 
PHilMech’s R&D outputs.  
To support the Philippine Department of Agriculture’s rice 
mechanization program in collaboration with some members of the national 
rice R&D network, PHilMech develops and deploys appropriate 
technologies, machinery, and systems to address the country’s rice 
mechanization needs and provides practical solutions to the post-harvest and 
post-production problems faced by rice farmers. To help achieve the 
national rice sufficiency objectives by 2013, PHilMech was tasked by the 
national government to help increase rice production through farm 
mechanization by five percent and to reduce the country’s postharvest 
losses from 15 percent to five percent.  
Since the average Filipino rice farmer has very small, and often 
scattered, land holdings, averaging two or less hectares, PHilMech 
concentrates on developing and promoting modern tools and machinery for 
small to medium-scale rice farming operations. PHilMech’s engineers adapt 
imported technologies to suit local farming conditions. Currently, PHilMech 
promotes four pieces of rice drying equipment, which use rice hull and 
biomass as a fuel. These pieces of equipment are distributed to rice 
producing provinces in central Philippines. Based on its nationwide 
assessment in July 2011, PHilMech’s flatbed dryers have improved the 
earnings of farmers and farmer organizations because of the improved 
quality of their paddy and reduced postharvest losses.53 Farmers who dry 
their harvest using flatbed dryers can sell their produce at prices of up to 
100 percent higher than the rice dried on the pavement, streets or highways. 
Sun drying the harvested crop on these areas is a common practice in the 
country.  
1. Sustaining R&D’s Linkage to Industry: PHilMech’s New 
Licensing Protocol 
PHilMech’s more than 30 years of R&D involvement has led to 
significant research findings, such as prototypes of machinery, which are 
disseminated to the farming sector through a two-pronged approach. 
Farmers tend to adopt technologies they have witnessed working in their 
areas. Hence, the first approach (agricultural extension) involves technology 
promotion through demonstrations during field days and agricultural trade 
exhibits. Although this is a conventional technology transfer approach, the 
conduct of technology demonstrations has been proven to be one of the 
most appropriate extension strategies in promoting vital technologies in the 
  
 52. PhilMech Says Flatbed Dryers Boost Farmer Incomes, MANILA TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2011), http://www.manilatimes.net/index.php/business/5857-philmech-says-flatbed-dryers-
boost-farmer-incomes. 
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farming sector. Technology demonstration activities also include advising 
farmers on the features and benefits of the new technologies and persuading 
them to try the new ones. Through this scheme, PHilMech transfers its 
technologies, generated information, and tacit knowledge on postharvest to 
the farmers for free. However, there are some PHilMech-generated 
technologies that cannot be directly transferred to farmers or in the 
marketplace; hence, support from intermediaries are needed for farmers and 
other stakeholders to easily access the technologies.  
Meanwhile, some technologies and techniques generated by PHilMech 
require the support of the industrial community for them to be 
commercialized. Thus, the Institute’s second approach, called industrial 
extension, is being implemented to transfer the technologies to the private 
sector, such as local agricultural machinery manufacturers. This group of 
PHilMech’s partners plays critical roles in the mass fabrication of machines 
and operates on economies of scale to produce and sell the machines at a 
lower price. This approach relates to the new paradigm for technology 
transfer, shifting from the informal and free exchange of discoveries, 
innovative ideas, materials, and technologies, to the use of more formal and 
creative approaches tailored to commercialization agreements.  
Under this second approach of technology transfer, manufacturers apply 
for PhilMech accreditation to get access and commercialize its machines. 
With three years of renewable accreditation, the technology 
commercialization agreement is done via a Memorandum of Agreement, 
which specifies procedures and policies stipulating that PhilMech’s designs 
and technical assistance are made available to co-operating manufacturers. 
The commercialization involves two phases. The initial commercialization 
phase, which takes about one year, covers the period when the manufacturer 
produces commercial units to be used for government promotional 
activities. The full commercialization phase, called the utilization phase, is 
the stage when demand for the machine has already been established and 
the manufacturer takes full responsibility on the promotion, marketing, 
sales, and sales support for the machines.  
The Industrial Promotion Program (PIPP) (formerly Industrial Extension 
Program), launched in 1989, implements the second strategy of 
commercializing the PHilMech’s technologies. A major objective of the 
PIPP is to foster postharvest equipment manufacturing in the Philippines by 
providing manufacturers with designs of appropriate agricultural equipment 
and by extending technical assistance on fabrication, testing, marketing, and 
operation. PIPP serves as a linchpin between the technology generators 
(engineers, science research specialists, and designers) and the users of 
technology. Specifically, the program conducts socio-economic and demand 
surveys, identifies the right market location, conducts demonstration and 
pilot tests, and accredit local manufacturers. It also implements the 
following activities in support of these functions: provision of technical 
assistance to manufacturers; provision of assistance to initial adopters, such 
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as cooperatives, in securing easy loan packages so they can acquire 
PhiMech’s technologies; and implementation of incentive awards program 
for top performing manufacturers to encourage the undertaking of joint 
machine development. Since the establishment of PIPP, the Center has a 
pool of accredited local manufacturers and fabricators, who develop and sell 
commercial units of improved maize shellers, moisture meters, mobile flash 
dryers, in-store dryers, and outdoor postharvest storage.  
Despite the success of PIPP, gray areas on IPR remain unresolved, such 
as how to manage intellectual property (original designs of PHilMech’s 
engineers and improvements made by the manufacturer) and how PHilMech 
as a Center, and its engineers, will acquire recognition for invention and 
receive monetary benefits from the process. The Department of 
Agriculture’s national technology commercialization and the benefits 
gained by PhilRice in its IP and technology commercialization activities 
influenced PHilMech to organize itself to build its capability on IP 
management and licensing and promote public-private partnership to further 
disseminate its technologies. This attempt and initiative of PHilMech to 
initially support the management of institutional IP and technology 
commercialization started during the last quarter of 2005. 
Currently, PIPP is institutionalizing other technology transfer modalities, 
like the execution of licensing agreements to fast track its technology 
commercialization activities. PIPP’s technology licensing protocol (See 
Figure 4), implemented by the Technology Management and Training 
Division, institutionalizes a uniform procedure for the non-exclusive 
licensing of the institute’s IP and equipment designs:  
 
1. Filing of application for a technology license. All prospective licen-
sees for PHilMech’s technologies submit letter of intent to PHil-
Mech Licensing Unit. The letter of intent comes with submission of 
several documents related to the applicant’s business.  
2. Initial evaluation and notice of eligibility. The Technology Man-
agement and Training Division evaluates the application, inspects 
the manufacturing capability and compliance of the manufacturer, 
and notifies the applicant if it meets all the requirements. Along 
with the notice is a confidentiality undertaking that the potential li-
censee needs to sign and a notice of payment of a non-refundable 
technology license fee.  
3. Release of engineering designs/drawings and fabrication by the 
company. The engineering designs/drawings will then be released to 
the company’s proprietor and, within a reasonable period of time, 
will be required to fabricate a prototype unit strictly in accordance 
with the specifications. Upon written request by the license appli-
cant, technical assistance maybe provided by PHilMech.  
4. Testing/Evaluation of Prototype Unit. Upon completion of the pro-
totype unit, the license applicant shall request the conduct of testing 
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and evaluation by the PHilMech. The testing and evaluation shall 
cover the prototype unit’s compliance with the technical de-
sign/drawing, fabrication specifications, if any, and performance 
standards.  
5. License Certificate/Contract. Once the prototype unit has satisfacto-
rily complied with the technical drawings, fabrication specifica-
tions, and performance standards, PHilMech shall cause the execu-
tion of a License Agreement and the issuance of a License Certifi-
cate to the qualified licensee. The licensing agreement, in particular, 
contains confidentiality provisions for how PHilmech’s intellectual 
property will be handled by the licensee, improvements made in the 
design and provisions for joint intellectual property, and payment of 
royalty fees by licensee to PHilMech.  
 
The new licensing protocol54 requires the Center to apply for IPR 
protection for all its designs. The new process serves as venue to level the 
playing field among the manufacturers, who are interested in becoming 
PHilMech’s licensee, which would allow them to use, make, sell, and/or 
lease the Center’s generated technologies. This protocol also provides due 
recognition to the inventions and IP of PHilMech’s employees and enables 
them to receive monetary entitlement to any technology commercialization 
activities. Recently, legal and policy developments in the country (e.g., 
Magna Carta for S&T workers,55 and the Technology Transfer Act56 
patterned after the 1980 US Bayh-Dole Act) provide positive prospects for 
the continuous implementation of this technology commercialization 
protocol to fast track public-private sector partnerships and incentivize 
PHilMech’s engineers.  
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND A WAY FORWARD  
In recent years, the Philippines has made progress in its state of food and 
agriculture; however, food insecurity for the future remains a major concern 
and is associated with a number of specific challenges. The introduction and 
strengthening of intellectual property rights (IPR) in agriculture further 
constitutes a significant change in the policy environment for addressing 
food security. Although the Philippines has a long history of IPR 
implementation, the actual implications and magnitude of impact of the 
  
 53. PhilMech Technology Licensing Protocol, PHILIPPINE CENTER FOR POSTHARVEST 
DEVELOPMENT AND MECHANIZATION, http://www.philmech.gov.ph/Default.asp?page= 
licensing (last visited Sept. 10, 2012). 
 54. Rep. Act No. 8439, An Act Providing A Magna Carta For Scientists, Engineers, 
Researchers and Other Science and Technology Personnel In Government, available at 
http://www.chanrobles.com/republicactno8439.htm#.UM035-RQVe9.  
 55. See Rep. Act. No. 10055, Philippine Technology Transfer Act of 2009, available 
at http://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra%2010055.pdf.  
146 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1  
introduction of IPR in the agriculture, specifically to the rice sector, have 
yet to be ascertained. However, as presented in this paper, a number of 
points can already be made on how and why IP needs to be leveraged for 
food security and rice self-sufficiency.  
The Philippine Rice Research Institute (PhilRice) and the Philippine 
Center for Postharvest Development and Mechanization (PHilMech), are 
among the first national research institutions in the Philippines that have 
established respective models to actively manage institutional innovations 
and intellectual property (IP). Both institutions have also advance 
technology commercialization programs in support of the country’s food 
security and rice self-sufficiency objectives. The institutions implement 
activities to ensure that IP issues do not hinder research activities, and that 
research discoveries are properly managed, used, and transferred to the 
marketplace for the benefit of the rice industry. PhilRice and PHilMech also 
ensure that scientists and innovators receive appropriate recognition and 
necessary incentives.  
Specifically, PhilRice’s experience proves that strengthening IPR in 
agriculture, especially in agricultural biotechnology, did not impair its 
access to proprietary technologies needed for research. Although PhilRice’s 
involvement with the transfer of golden rice technologies came later and 
was largely downstream, following the earlier crucial steps of identifying 
IPR constraints, the Institute has formed the requisite organizational, 
technical, and IP capacity to better understand the IP provisions and legal 
implications of the different agreements on golden rice, and accelerate 
golden rice research towards its deployment and future commercial 
availability. On the other hand, PHilMech’s experience shows that with 
management, staff support, and enabling national policies, institutional IP 
that is developed using government funds can be protected and 
commercialized for the benefit of the institution and its scientists and 
engineers. Although the institution’s technology licensing protocol can be 
further simplified, it recognizes that IP protection is one important way to 
bring technologies to the market and indicates a change in perception 
among government R&D institutions. PHilMech’s experience shows that 
the old mindset on IPR as only important to the private sector is gradually 
changing.  
Overall, the two cases demonstrate that the presence of national and 
institutional IP framework and implementation of strategic IP activities 
serve as valuable tools for public research institution, which used to evolve 
in a world without IPR. These initiatives are starting to help these 
institutions enhance networking capabilities and linkages, improve access to 
modern technologies, disseminate technologies on a wider scale, as well as 
reward the scientists and researchers. These benefits of IPR add value in 
fulfilling mission and commitment as public research institutions working 
for the country’s food self-sufficiency and food security agenda. 
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PhilRice and PHilMech have taken the challenge and are taking strides in 
maximizing the advantages of IP to perform their public mission and deliver 
public goods. These government-funded research institutions in the 
Philippines may have its own set of circumstances (mission, goals, research 
focus and capacity, among others); however, these institutions both prove 
that embracing IP and technology commercialization can be advantageous 
not only to the public research institutes, but also in contributing to public 
mission to contribute to the country’s goal of rice self-sufficiency and food 
security. With the insights gained from the cases, we suggest that PhilRice, 
PHilMech, and other agricultural institutions in the Philippines consider the 
following call for actions to further support the sensible introduction and 
diffusion of new agricultural practices and technologies:  
Innovation needs collaboration and keeping collaboration from growing 
needs continuous institutional capacity building. Formation of partnerships 
between the technology suppliers, governments, and private entities that 
acquire and develop the technology, and the agriculturalists that deploy the 
technology should be actively nurtured. Several of these public-private 
collaborations have enabled transfer and access to some important 
innovations such as the golden rice. However, golden rice, albeit a success 
story in many ways, is also a wake-up call: reliance on external 
humanitarian entities to address critical food security issues could be 
limiting and unsustainable. Serious and committed capacity building efforts 
for developing countries should continue to foster sustainable improvement 
of absorptive capacity for innovations in agriculture. These efforts should 
focus on helping these economies move from being passive bystanders to 
becoming active participants in the technology transfer process necessary 
for the country’s food security.  
National agricultural research institutions, such as PhilRice and 
PHilMech, with existing IP management and technology commercialization 
capacity, should scale up IP management efforts, foster continuous learning 
especially on issues affecting genetic resources and germplasm, and step up 
to identify IP bottlenecks that can stifle access and commercialization of 
innovations. They need to take the lead in helping to build national IP 
portfolio (e.g., domestic filings), composed of local and indigenous 
innovations, and home-grown improvements on imported technologies to 
meet their particular agricultural needs. They also need to step and 
participate actively in technology access negotiations needed for food 
security. Lastly, national agricultural research institutions need to increase 
engagement in economic development activities by deploying research 
products using other avenues of technology commercialization (e.g., the 
formation of startup businesses) and expand market reach (e.g., the United 
States).  
IP issues in agricultural research and embracing IP by public research 
institutions necessitate many complex decisions, significant challenges, and 
changes. These involve investments, resources, systems, procedures, and a 
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different mindset among its personnel. Other institutions, however, may not 
have the resources to develop and implement the same strategies and 
activities done by PhilRice and PHilMech. Both institutions along with 
other Philippine institutions with quite advance IP capacity should take 
active role in training a supportive “community of IP experts” in the 
agriculture sector, form smart coalitions to spread the importance of IP, 
understand and address its issues as it affects agricultural research, and help 
implement the necessary institutional changes. This may be as simple as 
consolidating institutional expertise and cost-sharing among agencies in the 
country. Many advanced institutions in developed nations, which have a 
long history of managing ideas and technology commercialization of 
agricultural products, also offer capability building support to help 
developing countries and their institutions further enhance their competency 
on managing IP. Some of their practices may be transferable or modified as 
appropriate for the Philippines.  
Overall, IPR is an ‘enabler’ that can help drive delivery of innovative 
and productivity-increasing technologies crucial to agricultural and 
economic growth and achieving future needs for food security in countries 
such as the Philippines. The key is to match the proper IPR mechanisms 
with specific conditions, and to manage them effectively and efficiently for 
more extensive innovative research, technology transfer, and wealth 
creation.  
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Gross value added, Agriculture, 1980—2010.  
Source: FAO (2012): FAOSTAT-Agriculture,
http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx  
Figure 2. Rice Production in the Philippines, 1980—2010.  
Source: FAO (2012): FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx.  
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Figure 3. Import quantity, rice (milled). 1980—2009. 
Philippines. Source: FAO (2012): FAOSTAT-Agriculture 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/339/default.aspx 
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Figure 4. PHilMech - Licensing protocol flowchart. Source: 
PHilMech (2012). PHILMECH TECHONOLOGY LICENSING 
PROTOCOL (2012), http://www.philmech.gov.ph/?page=lprotocol. 
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Table 1. Basis of the Philippine IPR system. 
 
National Laws 
1987 Constitution (Article XIV, Section 13) 
1997 Magna Carta for Science and Technology (S&T) Workers 
1998 Intellectual Property Code  
2002 Plant Variety Protection Act  
2010 Technology Transfer Act  
 
International Laws/Treaties  
1951 Berne Convention on Literary and Artistic Works 
1980 WIPO Convention 
1981 Budapest Treaty on Deposit of Microorganisms  
1984 Rome Convention on Performers, Phonograms and Broad-
casting Organizations  
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity  
1995 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property  
1995 Paris Convention on Industrial Property 
2001 Patent Cooperation Treaty 
 
Table 2. Biotechnology products and tools accessed by PhilRice from 
1996 to 2004. 
 
 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY MATERIALS 
AND DESCRIPTION 
 
 
INSTITUTION 
 
NO. OF 
IP-RELA-
TED 
PROV-
ISIONS 
1996 
1. pZ100 (plasmid construct) Salk Institute for 
Biological Studies 
2 
1. PBY520 and pTW-a 
(includes potato pin2 gene and bar 
gene for selection) and constructs’ 
map  
Cornell University 
 
4 
2. hva1-containing plasmid 
pBY520 
Cornell University 4 
1997 
1. Clone pC822-3 with Xa21 
Leucine Rich repeat and clone 
pB822-1 containing Xa-21 kinase 
University of 
California Davis  
3 
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2003 
1. pCambia-SB-IR2. A rice 
genomic DNA insert cloned into 
pCAMBIA 1305 vector. Insert is 
the indica (IR64) gene orthologous 
to the japonica (Nipponbare gene)  
Cornell Research 
Foundation  
 
8 
2. Genomic rice insert of 19 kb 
from IR64 cloned in Hd3 site of the 
pCAMBIA 1305.1 vector. The 
genomic insert comprises the 
homolog of the gene 
OSJNBa0017E08.19 found in the 
BAC OSJNBa0017EO8 
(AC068923) from Nipponbare 
Cornell Research 
Foundation  
 
8 
3. pSMAB801 construct 
containing multimer of CaMV35S 
promoter 
National Institute 
of Agrobiological 
Sciences, Tsukuba, 
Japan 
9 
4. PSMAB704 binary Ti plasmid 
vector carrying bar selectable 
marker gene  
National Institute 
of Agrobiological 
Sciences, Tsukuba, 
Japan 
9 
5. Stress tolerant transgenic cereal 
plants by hva1 genes  
Cornell Research 
Foundation  
9 
6. Monocot having dicot wound 
inducible promoter  
Cornell Research 
Foundation  
 
9 
2004 
1. Xa21 gene cloned to a 
modified pCambia 1300 vector w/c 
replaces hygromycin gene with PMI 
University of 
California Davis  
3 
2. Golden rice Prof. Potrykus and 
Syngenta 
>15 
 
Table 3. Intellectual Property Relevant to Golden Rice 
 
PRODUCT COMPONENT  SOURCE OF COMPONENT 
1. Rice germplasm transformed 
with gene constructs 
Taipei 309, from IRRI 
2. PGEm4   Promega 
3. PbluescriptKS  Strategene 
4. PCIB90 and AphIV gene: 
hygromycin phosphotransferase 
Ciba-geigy Limited (Novartis 
Seeds AG) 
5. CaMV35s promoter and Monsanto 
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terminator  
6. PKSP –1 and GT1 Promoter: 
glutelin storage protein 
Thomas Okita, Washington 
State University  
7. PUCET4 and Pea Rubisco 
transit peptide Crtl gene: phytoene 
desaturase 
N. Misawa, Kirin Brewery Co., 
Ltd. 
8. PPZP100  Pal Maliga, Rutgers University 
9. pYPIET4  Clontech, now marketed by Life 
Tech. 
10. Electroporation Apparatus 
and Microprojectile bombardment 
apparatus 
Bio-Rad Corp., Gene Pulser II 
System 
 
Source: R. David Kryder, Stanley P. Kowalski, and Anatole F. 
Krattinger, The Intellectual and Technical Property Components pro-
Vitamin A Rice (GoldenRice™): A Preliminary Freedom-To-Operate 
Review, ISAAA Briefs 20, available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/kc/Publications/pdfs/isaaabriefs/Briefs%2020.pdf. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)1 is presently in a state of 
crisis.2 The conflict began in 1996 and, in 2012, 1.7 million people were 
  
 * Sarah Warpinski is a third year law student at Michigan State University College 
of Law, a member of the Michigan Human Trafficking Task Force, and founder of the 
Modern Abolitionist Legal Society. Sarah spent five years in international relief and 
development work and child protection in Africa and the U.S. prior to law school.  
 1. The Democratic Republic of Congo is located in central Africa. See infra map at 
Appendix II. On use of the term DRC, see infra Appendix I for a list of acronyms used in 
this Note. 
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still displaced due to armed conflict and human rights abuses.3 According to 
Human Rights Watch, government soldiers continue to rape and pillage 
civilians,4 often reducing them to forced labor or services.5 In November 
2012, the conflict intensified as the eastern city of Goma fell to the 
Rwandan-backed M23 rebels, displacing an additional 80,000 civilians and 
increasing the threat of widespread human rights abuses.6 In addition to 
conflict, poverty has also worsened for the Congolese; the gross national 
income per capita plummeted more than 50% from 1990 to 2011.7 Last 
year, the United Nations Development Programme ranked the DRC number 
187 out of 187 countries in its annual calculation of the United Nations 
Human Development Index (UNHDI).8 Poverty only increases the 
vulnerability of women and children to exploitation, such as trafficking in 
persons.9  
  
 2. Human Rights Watch, Country Summary Democratic Republic of Congo 1 
(January 2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/drc_2012.pdf 
[hereinafter 2012 HRW Country Summary].  
 3. Id. at 2. 
 4. Throughout this Note, the term “civilians” will be used to include both unarmed, 
uninvolved persons caught in the cross fire of armed conflict and also persons forced to 
participate in armed conflict against their will through abduction, coercion, and other forms 
of exploitation, such as child soldiers and sex slaves. Discussion of sexual exploitation and 
human rights abuses is limited to these two categories of civilians, and does not cover abuses 
against willingly-conscripted armed soldiers by other armed individuals.                                                                   
 5. Id. Armed conflict between the government and the M23 rebels in eastern DRC 
led to concern about mass human rights abuses. See U. N. Human Rights Office of the High 
Commissioner (citing “Appalling” Human Rights Record of Leaders of M23 Mutineers in 
DR Congo, Pillay Fears Further Abuses (Jun. 19, 2012), www.ohchr.org/en/ 
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12251&LangID=E).  
 6. Human Rights Watch, DR Congo: US Should Urge Rwanda to End M23 Support 
(November 20, 2012), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/20/dr-congo-us-should-urge-
rwanda-end-m23-support. See also Chair of the United Nations Group of Experts on the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Addendum to the interim report of the Group of Experts on 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (S/2012/348) concerning violations of the arms 
embargo and sanctions regime by the Government of Rwanda, ¶ 2, S/2012/348/Add.1 (Jun. 
21, 2012) (suggesting that the Rwandan government provided material support to M23 
armed forces) [hereinafter Group of Experts Interim Report]. 
 7. U.N. Development Program, infra note 8, at 2 (Table A indicates gross national 
income per capita of $542 in 1990 decreasing to $280 per capita in 2011, a cumulative drop 
of more than 51%).  
 8. U.N. News Service, U.N. Human Development Rankings Place Norway at the 
Top and DRC Last, UNITED NATIONS NEWS SERVICE (Nov. 2, 2011), 
www.un.org/apps/news/printnewsAr.asp?nid=40290. The UNHDI is based on life 
expectancy, literacy, and gross national income per capita. According to the most recent data, 
the poverty line is $1.25 per day, with 59.2% of Congolese living on less daily. See U.N. 
Development Program, Democratic Republic of the Congo: HDI Values and Rank Changes 
in the 2011 Human Development Report, 2, 5, available at http://hdrstats.undp.org/ 
images/explanations/COD.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2012). 
 9. G.A. Res. 55/25, Convention on Transnational Organized Crime, Annex II 
Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Crime, art. 
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In eastern DRC, gender-based violence (GBV) is an extreme affront to 
Congolese women and children, with more than 200,000 victims subjected 
to sexual violence since 1996.10 Even though the Congolese government, in 
2006, ratified a new Constitution and passed a law criminalizing sexual 
violence offenses, perpetrators still exploit women and children with 
impunity, and victims remain largely unprotected.11 The international 
community has condemned the sexual violence in the DRC and regional 
authorities call for “all the armed groups active in eastern DRC to 
immediately put a[n] end to the rape and all kinds of violence against 
women and children” and for “the DRC [G]overnment to take all necessary 
steps for the effective implementation of the 2006 laws on sexual abuse, 
including the pursuit and punishment of the perpetrators of rape and other 
acts of violence against women.”12 Yet, the sexual violence still continues 
with relative impunity and women and children are unprotected.13  
In addition to rape, the attacks on civilians have included “accompanying 
abduction, enforced prostitution and enslavement of victims.”14 The United 
States has recognized these abuses as trafficking in persons, specifically 
manifested through forced conscription of child soldiers, labor trafficking, 
forced prostitution, and sexual slavery.15 Due to the Congolese 
  
9(4), U.N. Doc. A/Res/55/25 (adopted Nov. 15, 2000; signed Jan. 8, 2001; entered into force 
Dec. 25, 2003), available at http://www.uncjin.org/Documents/Conventions/dcatoc/ 
final_documents_2/convention_%20traff_eng.pdf (listing poverty as a factor that makes 
women and children vulnerable to trafficking) [hereinafter Trafficking Protocol]. 
 10. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security 
Council Resolution 1820, ¶ 12, U.N. Doc. S/2009/362 (July 15, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. 
S/2009/362]. Some United Nations estimates from 2010 are as high as 500,000 victims, with 
an additional 1,100 women raped monthly. See discussion, infra at 6-8 for more details on 
GBV in the DRC. 
 11. Id. (“[S]exual violence continue[d] unabated in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.”). See also Rashida Manjoo & Calleigh McRaith, Gender-Based Violence and 
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Areas, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 11, 26 (2011)(“[V]ery 
little has changed in the lives of most women, as both state and non-state actors continue to 
commit acts of GBV with impunity. In the [DRC] . . . GBV remains unchecked despite new 
national legislation.”).  
 12. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution on the Crimes 
Committed Against Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo, (Nov. 10-24, 2010) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/48th/resolutions/173/. For the 
international response, see S.C. Res. 1960 (2010), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1960 (2010) (Dec. 
16, 2010) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 1960].  
 13. Human Rights Watch, supra note 2, at 2. See generally GLOBAL NETWORK OF 
WOMEN BUILDERS, SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1325: CIVIL SOCIETY MONITORING 
REPORT 2011-DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO 88, 91 (Annie Matundu Mbambi trans., 
2011), available at http://www.gnwp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/DRC1.pdf.  
 14. U.N. Doc. S/2009/362, supra note 9, at ¶ 13. 
 15. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2011 129-30 (June 
2011), available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/ [hereinafter TIP REPORT 2011]. 
See also Rep. of the Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Criminal Courts, Preparatory Comm’n 
for the Int’l Crim. Court, Mar. 13-31, June 12-30, 2000, art. 7 (1) (g)-3, U.N. Doc. 
PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) [hereinafter ICC Elements of Crimes]. For 
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government’s failure to comply with the minimum standards to prevent 
trafficking, prosecute perpetrators, and protect victims, the United States 
Department of State Trafficking in Persons Report ranked the DRC as a 
Tier 3 country, the lowest level, in 2010, 2011, and 2012.16  
This Note will analyze the current responses to gender-based violence in 
the conflict-ridden eastern DRC, and will show that incorporating efforts 
targeting gender-based violence as a form of human trafficking could lead 
to greater justice for victims by increasing prevention, prosecution, and 
protection as required by international human trafficking law.                          
Part I summarizes the war in the DRC and demonstrates that conflict has led 
to rampant sexual violence. Part II discusses the existing international 
human rights-based laws designed to impose an obligation on the DRC to 
respond to sexual violence. Part III asserts the human rights-based approach 
is insufficient to protect victims and that international human trafficking 
laws should be utilized to help protect victims of a specific type of gender-
based violence: sexual slavery. Part IV proposes that, in fulfillment of 
international obligations and with international support, victim-centered 
methods by the Congolese Government could help prevent further 
trafficking in persons, decrease impunity for perpetrators of sexual slavery, 
and protect victimized women and girls in the DRC.                                                                   
I. BACKGROUND: GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE IN THE CONGO CONFLICT  
The Congo Wars have been characterized by the highest death toll in a 
humanitarian crisis since World War II.17 Since 1998, between 3 million and 
5.4 million Congolese have died because of the conflict in the DRC.18 This 
deadly violence has been accompanied by the rampant use of rape as a tool 
  
information on the definition of forced prostitution under national law 06/018, see infra note 
151 and accompanying text. In contrast, sexual slavery is characterized by (1) enslavement 
of another person (2) for one or more acts of a sexual nature. See ICC Elements of Crimes, 
art. 7 (1) (g)-2. 
 16. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2012 126 (June 2012) 
[hereinafter TIP REPORT 2012]. For background on Tier Rankings, see Trafficking in Persons 
Report 2011Tiers: Placement, Guide, and Penalties for Tier 3 Countries, U.S. DEPT. OF 
STATE, www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164221.htm (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) (Tier 3 is 
the lowest ranking, reserved for countries who completely fail to comply with the minimum 
standards set by the U.S. government for preventing, prosecuting and, protecting people from 
human trafficking); see also Memorandum on Steps to Combat Violence Against Women 
and Trafficking in Women and Girls, infra note 186.  
 17. See INT’L RESCUE COMM., MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO: 
AN ONGOING CRISIS 1 (2007), available at http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/ 
migrated/resources/2007/2006-7_congomortalitysurvey.pdf [hereinafter MORTALITY IN THE 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO] (an estimated 5.4 million deaths between 1998 and 2007, 
with 2.1 million since then end of the formal war in 2002).                                                                                          
 18. MORTALITY IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO, supra note 16, at ii. But 
see DR Congo War Deaths ‘Exaggerated,’ BBC NEWS, Jan. 20, 2010, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/8471147.stm.  
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of war, which continues to deteriorate today throughout eastern DRC.19 
Because of the need to protect civilians and stabilize the eastern part of the 
country, the mandate of U.N. Peacekeeping personnel on the ground has 
been extended to June 2013,20 with the 19,154 total uniformed personnel 
presently on the ground.21  
A. Conflict in the Congo 
From the very inception of the war, international actors have played an 
integral role in escalating the conflict.22 In what is now known as the First 
  
 19. S.C. Res. 2053 (2012), pmbl, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2053(2012) (Jun. 27, 2012) 
[hereinafter S.C. Res. 2053] (“Expressing deep concern at the deteriorating security situation 
in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including attacks by 
armed groups” and  
Remaining greatly concerned by the humanitarian situation and the 
persistent high levels of violence and human rights abuses and 
violations against civilians, condemning in particular the targeted 
attacks against civilians, widespread sexual and gender-based 
violence, recruitment and use of children by parties to the conflict, in 
particular the mutineers of ex-Congrès National pour la Défense du 
Peuple (ex-CNDP) and the 23 March Movement (M23)). 
 20. Id. at ¶ 1. Since 2000, peacekeeping troops deployed in the DRC have had the 
mandate to “take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment of its infantry battalions 
and as it deems it within its capabilities, to . . . protect civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence.” S.C. Res. 1291, ¶ 8, S/RES/1291 (2000) (Feb. 24, 2000). See generally 
S.C. Res. 1291, ¶7(g), S/RES/1291 (2010) (May 28, 2010) (discussing the comprehensive 
mandate of MONUC Phase II).  
 21. MONUSCO- UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION STABILIZATION MISSION IN THE 
DR CONGO, Facts and Figures, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/ 
facts.shtml (last visited Dec. 27, 2012) [hereinafter MONUSCO](providing an accounting of 
initial and current mission deployments in the DRC). It must be noted that the initial mandate 
established the U.N. Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (see S.C. 
Res. 1279 (1999), S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999)), but then name was changed to MONUSCO 
in 2010 (see S.C. Res. 1925 (2010), S/RES/ 1925 (Jul. 10, 2010)). Id. at MONUSCO 
Background, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/monusco/background.shtml.  
 22. The causes of the conflict in DRC are multitudinous, but many can be traced to 
the dynamics following the genocide of 800,000 Rwandan Tutsi and moderate Hutus in the 
bordering country of Rwanda. See generally JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF 
MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 13 (2011) (“The 
conflict in the Congo has many causes, but the most immediate ones came across the border 
from Rwanda . . . This genocide helped create the conditions for another cataclysm in 
neighboring Congo.”). After the genocide in Rwanda, the instability spread to the DRC. See 
MONUSCO, supra note 21, at MONUSCO Background. The beginning of the war in the 
DRC is a classic example of the principle that “[a] failed state’s civil wars may spark 
widespread human rights violations, starvation, and disease that prompt destabilizing refugee 
movements to neighboring countries.” John Yoo, Fixing Failed States, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 95, 
106-07 (2011). “Failed states may lack the means to prevent ethnic groups from attacking 
each other; the violence may not only reach genocidal proportions - as it did in Rwanda - but 
may also spread to nearby countries with similar tribal, ethnic, or religious fault lines, for 
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Congo War, Rwanda and Uganda supported rebel leader Laurent Kabila as 
he launched an attack to topple the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.23 Mr. 
Kabila took power and founded the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(formerly, Zaire) in May 1997, but soon fell out of favor with Rwanda for 
failing to exterminate the Hutu people, whom Rwanda considered to be 
enemy genocidaires, within the borders of the new DRC.24 The Second 
Congo War began in 1998 when the Rwandan-led coalition of African 
powers launched an offensive raid to expel Laurent Kabila from power.25 
Five regional states and the DRC signed the Lusaka Peace Accords in 1999, 
and the U.N. Organization Mission to the DRC was established.26 However, 
the conflict continued as Joseph Kabila took power after the death of his 
father in 2001, and the second war formally ended in 2002.27  
Even the recent national elections have been unable to bring stability to 
the region. After highly contested elections, President Joseph Kabila was 
elected for a second term in December 2011.28 According to Jason Stearns, 
long-time political activist and journalist in the DRC, President Kabila “is 
wary about creating a strong rule of law that could tie his hands.”29 Positing 
the president’s political motives for his actions, he states, “[e]ven the 
violence in the Kivus region, which continues until today, has not prompted 
major reforms in his army or police; he has preferred to co-opt dissent rather 
than to promote an impartial, disciplined security force.”30 As indicated 
above, political motivations and the ongoing impact of international conflict 
has resulted in societal collapse and governmental failure to protect its 
citizens from violence.  
B. Gender-based violence against women and girls 
Since the beginning of the war in 1997, Gender-based violence (“GBV”) 
has been used as a tool of war in order to subjugate the local population and 
maintain power over them.31 Because females are more often displaced by 
  
example, when the Rwandan genocide spilled over into the civil war in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo.” Id. 
 23. STEARNS, supra note 22, at 8. See also MONUSCO, supra note 20, at 
MONUSCO Background. 
 24. Stearns, supra note 22, at 8. 
 25. Id. 
 26. MONUSCO, supra note 21. 
 27. Id.  
 28. DR Congo Election: Court Confirms Joseph Kabila Win. BBC NEWS, Dec. 16, 
2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16229372 (the elections were 
held in November, but were contested vehemently until December 16). 
 29. STEARNS supra note 22, at 331-32. 
 30. Id. at 332. 
 31. U.N. Office of the High Comm’r on Human Rights, Report of the Mapping 
Exercise Documenting the Most Serious Violations of Human Rights and International 
Humanitarian Law Committed Within the Territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
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conflict and are responsible for collecting water, food, and firewood to 
ensure the family’s survival, “women and girls are the main victims of rape, 
mutilation, abduction into sexual slavery, and sexual exploitation during 
times of conflict.”32 The epic proportions of sexual violence have recently 
been exposed in South Kivu through a United Nations report mapping 
human rights violations in the DRC from 1997-2003.33  
The ongoing relationship between the Congo conflict and GBV is 
cyclical, with conflict leading to GBV and GBV, in turn, contributing to the 
destabilization of the region and its people.34 According to MONUSCO, the 
mass perpetration of sexual violence in the DRC since 1996 has 
consequences that continue today: “physical, emotional and economic 
consequences continue to pervade and reinforce instability particularly in 
the East.”35 Acts of GBV continue to permanently traumatize victims’ lives 
and destabilize the DRC.36 According to Amnesty International, on June 11, 
  
Between March 1993 and June 2003, ¶ 631 (2010) (unofficial translation from French 
original), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/ZR/ 
DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf [hereinafter Mapping Exercise] (“Sexual 
violence was frequently used to terrorise (sic) and subjugate the population. The different 
armed groups committed acts of sexual violence that could be likened to veritable campaigns 
of terror.”). 
 32. Confronting Rape and Other Forms of Violence Against Women in Conflict 
Zones Spotlight: DRC and Sudan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Afr. Affairs, Subcomm. 
on Int’l Operations & Orgs., Human Rights, Democracy, & Global Women’s Issues of the 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 45 (2009) [hereinafter Hearing: Confronting 
Rape] (statement of Robert Warwick, Director, International Rescue Committee).  
 33. Mapping Exercise, supra note 31, ¶ 611 (“All [armed forces] had one thing in 
common, however: the use of sexual violence. This violence took place under cover of a 
climate of widespread impunity and insecurity, and the perpetrators were often difficult to 
identify. The cases are too numerous to mention and the level of violence unspeakable.”). 
 34. The DRC Government explained in a recent report that conflict leads to large 
scale rape of women in the DRC, which causes “incalculable damage” in society. See Comm. 
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Consideration of Reports Submitted 
by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women Combined sixth and seventh periodic report of States Parties: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, 23, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/COD/6-7 (Dec. 21, 2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 Periodic Report].  
 35. MONUSCO, supra note 21, at MONUSCO Background. 
 36. Rape as a tool of war destroys the lives of its victims. One Congolese mother 
wrote poetically about her feelings on the horror:  
My bones are weak/ can’t protect my daughter no more/my voice is 
gone/ can’t scream any louder/ my eyes are getting weaker/ Tears 
easily flowing out/ . . . Sons that are turned into these monsters/ 
Joining armies of abusers and rapists/ Taught to destroy their 
mothers/ Kill their fathers/ Abuse their sisters with no remorse/ And 
that’s why/ I would prefer a bullet in the head/ Over another gang 
rape/ a knife on my throat/ over another political instability/A trail 
of tears over another sexual violence[.] 
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2011, 100 women were raped by government forces in an attack on the 
village of Nyakiele near Fizi town.37 This was the fourth incident of mass 
rapes by armed forces in eastern DRC in the last 18 months.38  
The scope of the continuing perpetration of GBV in eastern DRC is 
massive. In contrast to more conservative U.N. estimates, a 2011 
international health study indicated he actual number of victims could be as 
high as 407,397 to 433,785 in the preceding 12 months alone, particularly in 
North Kivu in eastern DRC.39 According to the report, there may be as 
many as 2 million victims of sexual violence throughout the DRC.40 
Congolese Government and civil society has long believed the perpetrators 
of these heinous rapes are foreign-armed militia.41 Yet, according to expert 
Margot Wallström,42 the Congolese government’s lack of control over its 
own armed forces contributes heavily to the proliferation of GBV in the 
region.43 
  
FBM FIDEL MWENDAMBALI NSHOMBO, ROUTE TO PEACE 2: A LIFE FOR LIVES 36-37 (2011) 
(emphasis added). See infra Appendix III for a poetic rendition of the rape of a mother in the 
eastern DRC and her cry for the world to help her.                                                                                                        
 37. New Mass Rapes in DRC are Result of Horrific Failure of Justice, AMNESTY 
INTERNATIONAL (June 23, 2011), http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/new-mass-
rapes-drc-are-result-horrific-failure-justice-2011-06-23. 
 38. Mapping Exercise, supra note 31, at 318-24.  
 39. Amber Peterman et al., Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against 
Women in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1030, 1060-67 
(2011). 
 40. Id.; see also Jeffrey Gettleman, Rapes Total in Millions in Congo, Study Finds, 
N. Y. TIMES, May 12, 2011, at A-4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/ 
world/africa/12congo.html (republished online as Congo Study Sets Estimate for Rapes Much 
Higher).  
 41. Hearing: Confronting Rape, supra note 32, at 40 (asserting that 500,000 women 
have been raped in the conflict and that “‘there will be security when the FDLR returns to 
Rwanda.’”) (quoting Chouchou Namegabe Nabinto, Founder, South Kivu Women’s Media 
Association, Democratic Republic of the Congo). The foreign-armed groups that civil society 
believes perpetrate the most GBV include the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) of Uganda and 
the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR). Until June 2012, the extent of 
foreign involvement in arming militias was largely speculative, but an interim U.N. Report 
has shown that the Rwandan Defense Minister and Uganda government officials have 
directly armed and trained the M23 armed faction that recently took power in the eastern city 
of Goma. See Group of Experts Interim Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 2; see also Johnny Hogg, 
Congo Demands Sanctions on Rwanda, Uganda, Reuters (Oct. 17, 2012), 
www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USBRE89G1LQ20121017. Both foreign governments 
vehemently deny any involvement with the mutinous faction. See Uganda and Rwanda Deny 
Supporting DRC Rebels, Al-Jazeera English- Africa (Oct. 17, 2012), 
www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/10/2012101714443887755.html.                                                                     
 42. U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict 
since early 2010. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Appoints 
Margot Wallström of Sweden as Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, U.N. 
Press Release SG/A/1220 (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.un.org/News/Press/ 
docs/2010/sga1220.doc.htm. 
 43. Margot Wallström, When Protectors Turn Predators: Army Reforms Needed to 
Counter Sexual Violence in the Congo, AFR. RENEWAL ONLINE (Jan. 16, 2012), 
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As explained above, the conflict in the DRC is characterized by 
extensive GBV, which continues to destabilize the eastern regions of the 
DRC and exacerbate the conflict. In the eastern DRC, an especially 
prevalent and destructive form of GBV is conflict-based sexual slavery of 
women and girls.44 Accordingly, the subsequent sections will explore the 
strengths and weaknesses of the current international and national responses 
to this form of GBV in the DRC.                                                                                                
II. HUMAN RIGHTS-BASED RESPONSES TO GBV IN THE CONGO 
As the following analysis will detail, under international law, the 
government of the DRC has the primary responsibility to create and enforce 
laws that protect its civilians.45 As the United Nations Security Council has 
repeatedly stated in its resolutions regarding the crisis in the DRC, the State 
has a responsibility “to prevent sexual violence and to combat impunity and 
enforce accountability,” to prosecute perpetrators, and provide holistically 
for the protection and reintegration needs of victims of sexual violence.46 
Moreover, in conflicts, the United Nations has consistently affirmed that 
national governments have the primary obligation to protect the most 
vulnerable among their civilians: “Stressing the primary role of national 
Governments [sic] in providing effective protection and relief to all children 
affected by armed conflicts [and] Recalling the responsibilities of States to 
end impunity and to prosecute those responsible for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and other egregious crimes perpetrated 
against children[.]”47 
International law must impose obligations on national governments to 
combat impunity and protect victims.48 Based on these obligations, and with 
  
http://www.un.org/africarenewal/web-features/when-protectors-turn-predators (it is critical to 
note that through the U.N. disarmament and demobilization process, the majority of the 
former forces of the twenty rebel forces have been integrated into the national army, a fact 
which may account for the lack of governmental control over the national army). 
 44. 2011 Periodic Report, supra note 34, at 23 (“With regard to the recent causes of 
most of the occurrences of sexual violence, it has been established that rapes, mutilations, 
sexual slavery and forced pregnancies have been used as a military weapon and have mainly 
been linked with conflicts and uniformed combatants.”). 
 45. While the obligation exists, it must be noted that international compliance 
measures are limited both in the human rights-based and human trafficking laws. See infra 
Part II.  
 46. S.C. Res. 1960, supra note 12, at 1-2. 
 47. S.C. Res. 1612 (2005), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1612 (2005), at 1 (July 26, 2005). 
 48. While outside the scope of this Note, regional law may in some cases be more 
efficient, particularly in recently post-colonial societies within Africa. For instance, the 
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region recognized that, while national, 
regional, and international involvement is necessary to ending impunity for sexual violence 
perpetrators, the regional protocols and projects “provide efficient and adequate framework 
for the prevention and fight against [GBV], and the prosecution and punishment of the 
perpetrators . . . .” International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, June 16-18, 2008, 
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the support of external nongovernmental and intergovernmental agencies, 
national laws must be enacted and then, effectively implemented by local 
law enforcement and legal professionals.49 Although obligations and 
relevant laws do exist, they do not appear to be enforced for the protection 
of individual victims.50 If not effectively enforced, to what extent do these 
international human rights standards and obligations impact women and girl 
victims of sexual slavery and other GBV in the DRC? Part II will explore 
the international human rights-based responses and how they have impacted 
national efforts to protect victims of GBV in the DRC.                                                                
A. United Nations Interventions: Peacekeeping and Monitoring 
Initiatives  
The United Nations, as the largest intergovernmental founded to protect 
peace and human rights, is the primary source for international obligations 
for national governments to protect their vulnerable populations.51 By 
passing Resolution 1325 in 2000, the United Nations Security Council for 
the first time acknowledged that “women and children account for the vast 
majority of those adversely affected by armed conflict . . . .”52 Moreover, 
Resolution 1325, entitled The Resolution on Women, Peace, and Security, 
“call[ed] on all parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect 
women and girls from gender-based violence, particularly rape and other 
forms of sexual abuse.”53 Resolution 1325 led to numerous other Security 
Council actions, including Resolution 1960, which sought the to improve 
implementation of Resolution 1325 by (1) admonishing states to 
immediately cease the practice of impunity for perpetrators of sexual 
violence in conflict zones and (2) increasing international communication, 
support, and monitoring of sexual violence against women and children in 
conflict.54 In particular, Resolution 1960 recognized the 
  
The Goma Declaration on Eradicating Sexual Violence and Ending Impunity in the Great 
Lakes Region, at 1, 7-8 (June 18, 2008) (listing eleven actions to be executed on the regional 
level to promote stability, protect victims, and punish perpetrators). 
 49. Office of the Senior Sexual Violence Adviser and Coordinator, Comprehensive 
Strategy on Combating Sexual Violence in DRC: Executive Summary, at 1 (Mar. 18, 2009), 
http://monusco.unmissions.org/Portals/MONUC/ACTIVITIES/Sexual%20Violence/KeyDoc
uments/Comprehensive%20Strategy%20Executive%20Summary.pdf [hereinafter MONUC 
Strategy]. 
 50. This conclusion is based on the continuing scourge of GBV, specifically sexual 
slavery, in the DRC despite the passage of laws and the existence of obligations to enforce 
the laws. 
 51. U.N. Charter pmbl.; see also official website of the United Nations, U.N. at a 
glance (last visited Dec. 27, 2012), http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/index.shtml (193 member 
states committed to achieving peace and human rights).  
 52. S.C. Res. 1325, at 2,U.N. Doc. S/RES/1325 (Oct. 31, 2000).  
 53. Id. ¶ 10. 
 54. U.N. Doc. S/2009/362, supra note 10, pmbl. 
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[r]esponsibilities of States to end impunity and to prosecute those 
responsible for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and other 
egregious crimes perpetrated against civilians and, in this regard, noting 
with concern that only limited numbers of perpetrators of sexual violence 
have been brought to justice, while recognizing that in conflict and in post-
conflict situations national justice systems may be significantly 
weakened.55 
These Resolutions have led to increased pressure on the Congolese 
Government to develop a national action plan to combat sexual violence and 
have also shaped the specific efforts of MONUSCO to assist the national 
government in ending impunity.56 Moreover, the Resolutions have been 
partly enforced by the creation of Special Rapporteur on Sexual Violence in 
Conflict, which monitors and advocates for greater state efforts to combat 
impunity and protect victims.57  
The United Nations has most directly intervened in the conflict in the 
DRC by deploying its peacekeeping mission through MONUSCO, which 
bears an “obligation to protect.”58 The MONUSCO operation has also taken 
strides to support the national government in ending sexual violence and 
other exploitation against women and children.59 Recently, the Security 
Council extended the MONUSCO mandate until June 30, 2013, with its 
stated primary focus to protect civilians using new and “innovative 
measures.”60 These innovative measures include admonishing the 
government of the DRC to work toward security sector reform61 and 
expressing concern over “the promotion within the Congolese security 
forces of well-known individuals responsible for serious human rights 
  
 55. Id. 
 56. See MONUSCO, supra note 21. 
 57. S.C. Res. 1888, ¶¶ 4-7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1888 (Sept. 30, 2009).  
 58. See generally SIOBHÁN WILLS, PROTECTING CIVILIAN: THE OBLIGATION OF 
PEACEKEEPERS 56-61 (2009) (providing an overview of the U.N. Mission to the DRC from 
inception to 2007). Sadly, in its early days, MONUC officers harmed civilians rather than 
protecting them when four U.N. peacekeepers raped 19 Congolese women in South Kivu by 
threatening their safety and then coercing their silence with food (bread, eggs, milk). Id. at 
274-75. According to the international definition of human trafficking, these deplorable acts 
could be considered human trafficking for forced prostitution, since coercion allowed the 
soldiers to exploit the women sexually. In more recent years, the peacekeepers have been 
accused of standing by during massacres, rapes, and kidnappings. See, e.g., Mungabo, infra 
note 175. “No one intervened to help the victims [of the massacre] despite their many 
appeals to FARDC soldiers present in the region. The same goes for the MONUC 
contingents, though there are plenty of them in Kaniola.” Id. 
 59. See MONUSCO, supra note 21. 
 60. S.C. Res. 2053, supra note 19, at ¶ 1 (“reaffirm[ing] that the protection of 
civilians must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources 
and encourages further the use of innovative measures implemented by MONUSCO in the 
protection of civilians.”). 
 61. Id. ¶ 6. 
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abuses.”62 Most significantly, the innovative measures have led to the 
formulation of the Comprehensive Strategy for Combatting Sexual Violence 
in Conflict (“Strategy”), including the provision of assistance and 
monitoring of the National Action Plan to Combat Sexual Violence.63 The 
overall goal of the strategy is to “strengthen prevention, protection and the 
response to sexual violence.”64 The four objectives are: (1) combating 
impunity for cases of sexual violence, (2) preventing and protecting victims 
of sexual violence, (3) reforming of the security sector and sexual violence, 
and (4) providing multi-sectoral response for survivors of sexual violence.65 
However, the major actors in the Strategy are U.N. institutions and 
committees, with the DRC government arguably taking on the role of 
beneficiary rather than lead participant. 
United Nations charter-based resolutions and interventions have helped 
promote peace in the region and have urged the protection of vulnerable 
populations. Significantly, the U.N. field offices have created a model 
holistic approach to respond GBV in the DRC. Yet, implementation has 
been limited thus far. The next section examines the international treaty-
based human rights responses to GBV and whether they actually protect 
victims of sexual slavery in the DRC.  
B. International Human Rights Laws addressing Sexual Violence 
Particularly when vulnerable victims’ voices are not being heard by 
nations, “international law is ultimately a tool for change: It seeks to 
positively influence the behavior of States.”66 Collaboration is required 
between intergovernmental and national institutions to end sexual violence, 
particularly in light of ongoing instability. The international community has 
recognized this need: “Deputy Secretary-General Asha-Rose Migiro [today] 
stressed that efforts to restore peace and stability in Africa’s Great Lakes 
region will not come to fruition unless the scourge of sexual violence is 
completely eradicated and justice systems are strengthened to end 
impunity.”67 Given the vulnerability of victims, the multitude of causes, and 
the long-term impact of the crimes, international human rights law 
  
 62. Id. ¶ 11. 
 63. MONUC Strategy, supra note 49.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id. at 2-3.  
 66. ANNE T. GALLAGHER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING 11 
(2010) [hereinafter THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING]. 
 67. UN officials Urge Eradication of Sexual Violence in Africa’s Great Lakes 
Region, UN NEWS CENTRE (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=40748&Cr=&Cr1=#.UG71GZg0WSo. 
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significantly contributes to keeping the focus on the victims’ rights and 
rehabilitation.68  
As will be shown below, the relevant international human rights treaties 
and resolutions prohibiting gender-based discrimination and sexual violence 
neither extend protections to all victims, nor do they cover enslavement as a 
tool of war such as sexual slavery. International human rights laws, thus, 
fall short of imposing obligations to provide full protection for victims of 
sexual slavery.  
1. International Bill of Human Rights  
Each of the foundational documents within international human rights 
law not only claim the “inherent dignity” and “right to liberty” of all 
persons, but also prohibit slavery.69 These foundational documents include 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. The Universal Declaration is an 
unenforceable non-treaty document, and the Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights possesses no expressly enforceable provision related to 
slavery. In contrast, Article 8 of the ICCPR, prohibiting slavery,70 is 
enforceable on States Parties through the individual complaint mechanism. 
Unfortunately, the Human Rights Commission has not issued a single view 
  
 68. In addition to international human rights law, in the DRC, where sexual 
exploitation occurs throughout post-conflict and active conflict zones, international 
humanitarian law, like the Geneva Convention and its Protocols I and II, plays a role in 
defining the obligations on armed combatants. However, while prohibiting inhumane 
treatment, including rape, international humanitarian law contains no overt reference to 
enslavement as a crime of war. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 
12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
(Protocol 1), Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 75. See also Protocol Additional to the 
Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), Dec. 7, 1978. 1125 U.N.T.S.609 art. 4. See also, 
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 209-10. 
 69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 1, 4, U.N. 
Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration of Human Rights] (borrowing 
terms from the International Slavery Convention of 1926, infra note 178: “No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their 
forms”); International Covenant on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), art.7, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) (“right of everyone 
to enjoy just and favorable conditions of work.”); International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 8, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force 
Jan. 3, 1976) (“(1) No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their 
forms shall be prohibited. (2) No one shall be held in servitude. (3)(a) No one shall be 
required to perform forced or compulsory labor.”). 
 70. “No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave-trade in all their forms 
shall be prohibited.” ICCPR, supra note 69, art. 8.  
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on state compliance with Article 8 based on an individual complaint (known 
as a communication).71  
The government of the DRC evinces a desire to abide by international 
human rights law. For instance, the DRC incorporated the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and all international human rights law into its 
2005 Constitution.72 Furthermore, the DRC has ratified the ICCPR and its 
optional protocol.73 Even if an individual in the DRC were to file a 
communication, which is authorized under the Optional Protocol, the 
likelihood of a prompt remedy for the violation is miniscule given the final 
outcome of such complaints: consent from the offending nation for the 
committee to review the complaint and present its views thereon.74  
While the founding documents of international human rights law 
principally establish the general dignity and rights of people, two additional 
human rights treaties have been particularly influential in shaping 
international responses to GBV, including sexual slavery, in conflict zones 
such as the eastern DRC. The subsequent sections will analyze effects of the 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 
and its two optional protocols, on the situation in the DRC.  
2. Convention on the Elimination of all forms of 
Discrimination Against Women  
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (“CEDAW”), an international human rights treaty, 
condemns violence against women as an aspect of discrimination against 
women.75 Significantly, the General Recommendation, a statement of how 
  
 71. U.N. General Assembly Rep. of the Human Rights Committee, Mar. 17, 2008 – 
Apr. 4, 2008, U.N. Doc. A/63/40; GAOR, 92nd Sess., Supp. No. 40 (2008). 
 72. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO 2005, pmbl. 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO] (reaffirming its 
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and “to the international 
instruments relating to the protection and promotion of human rights.”).  
 73. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, available at 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4& 
lang=en; Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx? src=TREATY 
&mtdsg_no=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 74. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
arts. 4, 5 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976), 999 U.N.T.S. 302 (requiring the Council to alert 
the offending State and give opportunity for State response to the complaint, followed by the 
Council’s consideration and submission of its “view” on the alleged violation).  
 75. Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, art. 6, G.A. 
Res. 34/180 (Dec. 18, 1979; entered into force Sept. 3, 1981), available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3970.html [hereinafter CEDAW]. See also 
Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, General Recommendation 
No. 19, ¶¶ 1-7, Jan. 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/47/38 [hereinafter CEDAW General 
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the treaty should be interpreted, states that “[a]rmed conflicts and the 
occupation of territories often lead to increased prostitution, trafficking in 
women and sexual assault of women, which require specific protective and 
punitive measures.”76 Moreover, all parties to the agreement (“States 
Parties”) have expressly condemned all discrimination that harms women, 
including the trafficking of women, in CEDAW.77 The General 
Recommendation expounds on Article 6, which condemns trafficking in 
women by confirming that trafficking is a form of gender-based violence 
and discrimination against women.78 When the article prohibiting trafficking 
is combined with Article 24, all States Parties are obligated to work toward 
the fulfillment of women’s right to be free from trafficking within their 
borders.79 As interpreted, the Convention requires States Parties to: (1) 
condemn discrimination against women, (2) adopt a policy against 
discrimination, (3) enforce equal protection of the law, and (4) “[t]ake 
action to prevent private as well as public acts of discrimination.”80  
The DRC government ratified CEDAW in 1986, prior to the onset of the 
war and the change in government.81 In 2006, the DRC submitted its Fourth 
and Fifth Periodic Reports on the implementation of CEDAW and, in 
response, the Committee on the Discrimination Against Women recognized 
the ongoing existence of sexual violence against women and admonished 
the government to protect women immediately:  
The Committee is deeply concerned about the continuing occurrence of 
rapes and other forms of sexual violence against women and the ingrained 
culture of impunity for such crimes, which constitute grave and systematic 
violations of women’s human rights. It is concerned about the insufficient 
efforts to conduct thorough investigations, the absence of protection 
measures for witnesses, victims and victims’ families. The Committee 
  
Recommendation] (“Gender-based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by 
women of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law or under 
human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of article 1 of the 
Convention”).  
 76. Id. art. 6 (interpreting ¶ 6 of CEDAW). 
 77. CEDAW, supra note 75, at art. 6 (“State parties shall take all appropriate 
measures, including legislation, to suppress all forms of traffic in women and exploitation of 
prostitution of women.”). It is important to note that, according to expert Anne Gallagher, 
“[o]f all the human rights bodies, the CEDAW Committee has been most explicit in 
identifying trafficking as a form of gender-based violence and therefore as unlawful 
discrimination.” THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 195.  
 78. CEDAW General Recommendation, supra note 75, ¶¶ 13-16 (interpreting Article 
6 of CEDAW).  
 79. CEDAW, supra note 75, at art. 24 (“States parties undertake to adopt all 
necessary measures at the national level aimed at achieving the full realization of the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant.” The right includes protection from trafficking from, to, 
or through the country where the woman resides.).  
 80. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 191-92.  
 81. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
supra note 75. (DRC signed Jul. 17, 1980, and ratified Oct. 17, 1986 with no reservations.). 
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urges the State party to take without delay all necessary measures to put 
an end to all forms of violence against women and the impunity of 
perpetrators. The State party should draft and adopt a law on violence 
against women. The Committee requests the State party to provide in its 
next periodic report detailed information on the causes, scope and extent 
of all forms of violence against women and on the impact of measures 
taken to prevent such violence, to investigate occurrences, to prosecute and 
punish perpetrators and to provide protection, relief and remedies, 
including appropriate compensation, to victims and their families.82 
Only months after that report, and more than twenty years after 
ratification, the CEDAW provisions were directly incorporated into the 
Congolese Law 06/018, which criminalized sexual violence, including 
sexual slavery.83 Since then, the Congolese Government has demonstrated 
its intention to protect women from sexual violence in compliance with its 
obligations under CEDAW.84 However, the most recent report elucidates the 
position of the DRC Government that sexual slavery is not a form of 
trafficking in women covered under Article 6 of CEDAW.85 
Thus, CEDAW has positively influenced the creation of law in the DRC 
and has opened the door to a degree of international monitoring of the 
national implementation of protections against GBV and trafficking in 
women. Unfortunately, Law 06/018, condemning sexual slavery and other 
GBV, has remained unenforced in the national courts.86 Moreover, since the 
2006 committee review of the DRC’s report, follow up monitoring has been 
mixed.87 There is hope for greater implementation of governmental 
  
 82. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Concluding 
Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women: 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ ¶ 13-14, U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/ COD/CO/5 (Aug. 25, 
2006) (emphasis added). 
 83. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 06/018 pmbl. (Dem. Rep. Congo).  
 84. The Congolese government submitted its combined sixth and seventh periodic 
report to the Committee, with a focus on sexual violence is the “Problem of the Moment.” 
See 2011 Periodic Report, supra note 34, at 21. 
 85. Compare 2011 Periodic Report, supra note 84, at 11 (reporting on 
implementation of art. 6, claiming “Trafficking in women is not a widespread phenomenon 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo”) with id. at 21-22 (more than one million cases of 
sexual violence reported in 2009, including “[v]iolence linked to armed conflict (inter alia, 
rape, [and] sexual slavery”).  
 86. TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 130-31 (“Law 06/018 specifically prohibits 
sexual slavery, sex trafficking, child and forced prostitution . . . . The government has not 
applied this law to suspected trafficking cases.”) (listing numerous cases where investigation 
ensued but the defendants escaped before trial). See infra Part IV for a detailed discussion of 
causes of impunity for perpetrators of sexual slavery in the DRC. 
 87. As evidenced by DRC’s lack of submission of a follow up report or review at the 
2008 session. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, Follow up Report (last visited Dec. 28, 
2012), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/followup.htm. Yet, the DRC has 
submitted its 2011 Periodic Report, supra note 84, which will be reviewed at the 55th 
Session, July 2013. See Office of the U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comm. on the 
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protection of victims because of the CEDAW Committee, which has 
repeatedly requested that the DRC “submit an exceptional report on alleged 
rape and other forms of sexual violence perpetrated against women in the 
context of the conflict.”88 The CEDAW Committee specifically request 
information about the Government’s actions to stop violence, provide 
remedies, and prosecute perpetrators, especially by State security forces.89 
Finally, a study on the impact of trafficking in women has also been 
requested.90                                                                                                                                   
3. Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Providing more specific protections for children than CEDAW provided 
for women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) expressly 
admonishes States Parties to protect children from sexual exploitation.91 The 
CRC also protects children from economic exploitation,92 all other forms of 
exploitation of children,93 and engagement in armed conflicts as soldiers or 
civilians.94 Article 19 makes sweeping requirements of States Parties, 
asserting that members  
  
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, 55th Session (July 2013) (last visited Dec. 
28, 2012), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/cedaws55.htm.  
 88. Comm. on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, List of Issues and 
Questions with regard to the Consideration of Periodic Reports, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
CEDAW/C/COD/Q/6-7 (Nov. 2, 2012) (to be discussed at the 55th Session in July 2013).  
 89. Id. ¶¶ 1, 2, 3.  
 90. Id. ¶ 10 (“a study to investigate the scope, extent, and causes of human 
trafficking and forced prostitution, particularly women and girls” and also requiring 
development of a “comprehensive national strategy to address trafficking in women.”) It is 
the author’s hope that such a study will reveal to the Congolese Government the nature of 
conflict-based sexual slavery and other conflict-based exploitative GBV as forms of human 
trafficking.  
 91. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, art. 34, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/25 (Nov. 20, 1989)  
(States Parties undertake to protect the child from all forms of sexual 
exploitation and sexual abuse. For these purposes, States Parties shall 
in particular take all appropriate national, bilateral and multilateral 
measures to prevent: 
(a) The inducement or coercion of a child to engage in any 
unlawful sexual activity; 
(b) The exploitative use of children in prostitution or other 
unlawful sexual practices; 
(c) The exploitative use of children in pornographic performances 
and materials.)  
[hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].  
 92. Id. art. 32.  
 93. Id. art. 36.  
 94. Id. art. 38(3).  
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shall take all appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational 
measures to protect the child from all forms of physical or mental 
violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent treatment, maltreatment or 
exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of parent(s), legal 
guardian(s) or any other person who has the care of the child.95  
Similarly, the CRC contains an article requiring state action to prevent 
child trafficking: “States Parties shall take all appropriate national, bilateral, 
and multilateral measures to prevent the abduction of, the sale of or traffic 
in children for any purpose or in any form.”96 By their express language, 
both of these latter provisions have significant potential to increase the level 
of obligation upon states to protect children from sexual exploitation.  
Supplementing the Convention, two optional protocols have been passed 
addressing the issue of trafficking in children, first for conscription into 
armed forces and, second, for sexual exploitation.97 The first optional 
protocol to the CRC recognizes the unique vulnerabilities of children in 
armed conflict98 and includes reporting, monitoring, and implementing 
provisions overseen by the Committee on the Rights of the Child.99 The 
Preamble of the second optional protocol seemingly draws all three treaties 
together:  
Believing that the elimination of the sale of children, child prostitution and 
child pornography will be facilitated by adopting a holistic approach, 
addressing the contributing factors, including underdevelopment, poverty, 
economic disparities, inequitable socio-economic structure, dysfunctioning 
families, lack of education, urban-rural migration, gender discrimination, 
irresponsible adult sexual behaviour (sic), harmful traditional practices, 
armed conflicts and trafficking in children.100  
  
 95. Id. art. 19 (emphasis added).  
 96. Id. art. 35 (emphasis added).  
 97. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflicts, G.A. Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/263 
(Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Conflict Protocol]; Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, G.A. 
Res. 54/263, U.N. Doc. A/54/263 (Jan. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Sale of Children Protocol].                                         
 98. Conflict Protocol, supra note 97, pmbl. (“Disturbed by the harmful and 
widespread impact of armed conflict on children and the long-term consequences it has for 
durable peace, security and development . . . .”). 
 99. Id. art. 8 (requiring state report on implementation within two years of state entry 
and ongoing reports at the request of the committee). 
 100. Sale of Children Protocol, supra note 97, pmbl. (emphasis added). See also id. 
art. 2 (defining three varieties of child trafficking as: “(a) Sale of children means any act or 
transaction whereby a child is transferred by any person or group of persons to another for 
remuneration or any other consideration; (b) Child prostitution means the use of a child in 
sexual activities for remuneration or any other form of consideration; (c) Child pornography 
means any representation, by whatever means, of a child engaged in real or simulated 
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While the second optional protocol clearly addresses only trafficking in 
children, as opposed to women and children, for sexual exploitation, this 
protocol may benefit all victims because of the detailed standards it sets for 
criminal investigation, prosecution, and protection of victims through 
national legal systems with support from the international community.101 
This protocol includes nearly an identical provision as the CRC regarding 
reporting and monitoring by the Committee.102                                                                           
The DRC has actively participated in the drafting of the CRC and has 
signed and ratified the Convention and the two optional protocols, although 
it lessened the impact of the first protocol by the terms of its declaration 
upon its accession to the CRC.103 The DRC has submitted its initial and 
second reports on implementation of the Convention to the Committee, with 
the latter being submitted ten years after the deadline.104 In its second report, 
the Congolese government acknowledged the link made in the second 
optional protocol105 between violence against children and all forms of 
sexual exploitation of women and children in times of war.                           
It alleged that that Congolese Law 06/018, prohibiting sexual slavery, was 
  
explicit sexual activities or any representation of the sexual parts of a child for primarily 
sexual purposes.”). 
 101. Id. art. 3-10 (covering procedural and substantive issues such as legislation for 
criminalization, jurisdiction, extradition, multilateral assistance in international 
investigations, restitution, protection of interests of the child in prosecution, evidentiary 
concerns, confidentiality, financial reparation for damages caused, and “international 
cooperation to assist child victims in their physical and psychological recovery, social 
reintegration and repatriation.”). 
 102. Id. art. 12. 
 103. U.N. Treaty Document Sys., Convention on the Rights of the Child (status as of 
Oct. 26, 2012) (signed May 20, 1990; ratified Sept. 27, 1990, without reservations), available 
at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter= 
4&lang=en [hereinafter Country Declarations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child]; 
U.N. Treaty Document Sys., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (status as of Oct. 26, 2012) (stating that 
the DRC joined by accession Nov. 11, 2001 without reservations)  
(“[p]ursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Protocol, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
undertakes to implement the principle of prohibiting the recruitment of children into the 
armed forces, in accordance with Decree-Law No. 066 of 9 June 2000 on the demobilization 
and rehabilitation of vulnerable groups on active service in the armed forces, and to take all 
feasible measures to ensure that persons who have not yet attained the age of 18 years are not 
recruited in any way into the Congolese armed forces or into any other public or private 
armed group throughout the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”) (emphasis 
added); U.N. Treaty Document Sys., Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography (status as of 
Oct. 26, 2012), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11-c&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 104. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention: Second Periodic Report of States Parties due in 
1997: Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/COD/2 (July 24, 2008) 
(showing report due in 1997, submitted Oct. 23, 2007).  
 105. See id.  
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passed in response to more than 30,000 female victims of sexual violence 
reported in eastern DRC between mid-2005 and mid-2006.106 The 
government expressly stated the definitions and interpretations of offenses 
were directly drawn from international law sources, including the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two optional protocols.107 The 
report also details the passage of both new laws related to sexual violence in 
the DRC: (1) Law 06/018, which defines the offenses of sexual violence, 
and (2) Law 06/019, which proscribes expedited and improved legal 
responses to sexual offenses under 06/018.108 Finally, the Congolese 
government explained the joint objectives of the national and international 
response to sexual violence, one of which is “[l]egal aid, by establishing 
legal clinics (orienting victims to judicial organs and providing legal 
assistance), including reform of the judicial system (combating impunity, 
strengthening capacities among magistrates).”109  
Therefore, the CRC and its two optional protocols have been effective 
tools in influencing the Congolese laws against sexual violence and 
monitoring implementation of those laws to protect child victims.110 Further, 
the CRC is an influential international law due to the almost universal 
national ratification of the treaties.111 Finally, the monitoring committee has 
been active in overseeing country conditions and works closely with 
relevant U.N. agencies to increase the effective implementation of programs 
that help keep children safe from exploitation and violence.112 The biggest 
drawback to this international tool is the narrowness of its express scope: 
females over age 18 are not protected.113                                                                                      
In summary, international human rights laws and rights-based responses 
have achieved some positive results in the DRC. Specifically, they have 
influenced the national constitution and the sexual violence laws. As 
demonstrated above, the U.N. peacekeeping mission has helped to monitor 
and draw attention to the abuses. The CEDAW and CRC Committees have 
  
 106. Id. ¶ 157-58. 
 107. Id. ¶ 160 (“Thus, the definition of rape now encompasses several situations 
which had heretofore been characterized simply as indecent assault. Mention should be made 
of the following new offenses: . . . forced prostitution . . . sexual slavery . . . sexual 
trafficking and exploitation of children . . . .”) (emphasis added).  
 108. Id. ¶ 159-69 (explaining the broad awareness-raising and advocacy by coalitions 
of local, national, regional, and international bodies to curb sexual violence in eastern DRC). 
 109. Id. ¶ 164(e) (emphasis added). 
 110. Id, ¶ 160. 
 111. Country Declarations of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 
103 (showing only the United States and Somalia have not ratified the CRC). 
 112. See Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Democratic 
Republic of Congo, ¶¶ 41, 42, CRC/C/COD/CO/2 (Feb. 10, 2009) (urging regional and 
national partnership in complying with U.N. study on violence against children). 
 113. Conflict Protocol, supra note 97, pmbl. (“promotion and protection of the rights 
of the child.”) (emphasis added).  
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also increased monitoring and reporting on GBV in eastern DRC. However, 
these responses are insufficient to confront the scope of the exploitation and 
GBV perpetrated in the eastern DRC.114 As an example, human rights 
treaties apply only to member states, thus, their impact is limited. Moreover, 
the impact is substantially inhibited, even within member states, by the 
narrow scope of the two most relevant treaties, with one focusing on 
women, while the other focuses on children. These gaps in coverage 
illustrate that a more comprehensive and holistic approach is needed in the 
DRC.  
Analyzing the offenses in the DRC as part of a broader scheme of 
trafficking will allow for an improved response bearing greater justice for 
victims. The “[c]omposite nature of the trafficking phenomenon guarantees 
that it does not sit comfortably within existing categories and boundaries of 
international law.”115 
Thus, a multi-pronged approach, drawing on various branches of 
international law, such as human rights, humanitarian, human trafficking, 
and criminal law will enable a more effective response to sexual slavery in 
the DRC.                                                                                                                                      
III. RESPONDING TO SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE DRC AS HUMAN 
TRAFFICKING  
While there has been expansive study of the GBV perpetrated throughout 
the DRC,116 relatively few reports or scholarly works analyze the scope of 
human trafficking in the context of the DRC conflict.117 Similarly, according 
  
 114. This in no way suggests that the human rights-based responses are not necessary 
or should be altogether avoided. In fact, they seem to play an important role in shaping 
national actions and enforcement. In other words, they are necessary but not sufficient. Many 
scholars believe that the human rights-based response and the human trafficking-based 
response are complementary. See Anne T. Gallagher, Human Rights and Human Trafficking: 
Quagmire or Firm Ground? A Response to James Hathaway, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 789 (2009). 
Not all scholars believe that the approaches are compatible. See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, 
The Human Rights Quagmire of “Human Trafficking,” 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 4 (2008) (“My 
own view, in contrast, is that the fight against human trafficking is more fundamentally in 
tension with core human rights goals than has generally been recognized.”). 
 115. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 8-9 
(“[I]nternational criminal law, international humanitarian law, labor law, migration law, and 
refugee law are all relevant.”).  
 116. Gaëlle Breton-Le Goff, Ending Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, 34 FLETCHER F. WORLD. AFF. 13 (2010) [hereinafter Ending Sexual Violence in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo]; Hearing: Confronting Rape, supra note 32 
(describing U.S. Senate hearing on combatting rape as a tool of war in the DRC and Darfur, 
Sudan); Manjoo & McRath, supra note 11, at 30 (“The reality of GBV in conflict and post-
conflict situations demands that the focus now shift toward the effective implementation of 
legal instruments that exist to combat violence against women.”); Navanethem Pillay, Sexual 
Violence: Standing by the Victim, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 459 (2009).                                                                
 117. But see Manjoo & McRath, supra note 11, at 12-13 (preliminarily suggesting that 
GBV could include trafficking, abduction, and slavery in conflict zones). Further, several 
 
176 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1  
to the author of the first legal treatise on human trafficking, little research 
exists to show that trafficking in the context of armed conflict is prohibited 
by international law.118  
Yet, according to emerging international and Congolese national 
standards, much of the GBV occurring in the DRC is also human 
trafficking;119 as such, the response to GBV in the DRC should employ the 
methods and tools of international trafficking in persons laws to prevent 
violations, prosecute the perpetrators, and protect the victims. 
Acknowledging that trafficking in persons is related to human rights and 
that national governments must combat the crime, the Human Rights 
Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons. The 
Special Rapporteur has stated that “[u]nless Governments and law 
enforcement agencies take the necessary steps to address trafficking in 
persons from both a human rights as well as a law enforcement perspective, 
the majority of trafficking cases will continue to go uncounted, the victims 
uncared for, and the traffickers unpunished.”120 The Trafficking Protocol 
expressly acknowledges the deficiencies of international human rights 
instruments in responding to crimes of trafficking: “taking into account the 
fact that, despite the existence of ‘a variety of’ international instruments 
containing rules and practical measures to combat exploitation of persons, 
especially women and children, there is no universal instrument that 
addresses all aspects of trafficking in persons.”121                                                                        
A. Prevalence of Human Trafficking in the DRC 
Based on the history of the abolition of the slave trade, the global 
community has affirmed its commitment to end trafficking in persons and 
has dedicated the resources to sustain the commitment.122 Since 2000, 
international law has defined human trafficking as:  
  
nongovernmental reports describe human trafficking in the context of the Congo conflict. 
See, e.g., The Congo Report: Slavery in Conflict Minerals, FREE THE SLAVES (June 2011), 
www.freetheslaves.net [hereinafter FREE THE SLAVES]. 
 118. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 209-10; 
“A consideration of trafficking in international humanitarian law (IHL) and international 
criminal law (addressing individual criminal responsibility for the most serious of all crimes 
often, but not always, associated with situations of armed conflict) must therefore proceed 
indirectly via an examination of related prohibitions including those that cover practices such 
as enslavement and sexual violence.” Id.                                                                                                                       
 119. See DONJA DE RUITER, SEXUAL OFFENSES IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 7 
(2011); “GBV not only involves rape, but also other forms of violence, such as . . . sex 
trafficking” and “[s]exual violence may also evidence the ownership and control necessary to 
establish the crime against humanity of slavery.” Id.                                                                                                     
 120. U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/16, infra note 137, at 7, ¶ 13. 
 121. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, at pmbl.  
 122. See generally 1926 Slavery Convention, infra note 178 and text at 40. 
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[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, 
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of 
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of 
vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the 
purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the 
exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual 
exploitation, forced labour (sic) or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs.123  
The United States has narrowed the international definition of human 
trafficking to specify the kinds of exploitation of human beings using the 
means of “force, fraud or coercion.”124  
Human trafficking often occurs during and after conflicts, and 
international laws were developed to confront this sad reality. For instance, 
in 2005, the U.S. government recognized that during and after armed 
conflict, “indigenous populations face increased security challenges . . . 
which result in myriad forms of violence, including trafficking for sexual 
and labor exploitation.”125 This recognition conforms with scholarly works 
that demonstrate the connection between conflict-driven instability and 
criminal enterprises like human trafficking.126 Because the international 
human trafficking laws took into account enforcement in conflict zones 
when developed, these laws may be aptly applied to protect victims 
suffering in situations of conflict. Moreover, the tools go beyond only 
protection for victims of sexual slavery; rather, they comprehensively apply 
to all forms and stages of human trafficking in every country.127  
1. Trafficking in persons in DRC: Trafficking for sex and labor 
exploitation 
Before turning to sexual slavery, the primary type of human trafficking 
examined in this article, it is important to note that many other forms of 
human trafficking are also prevalent in the DRC today. Some of these types 
  
 123. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 3(a).                                                                                         
 124. Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-
386, 114 Stat. 1464 (2000).  
 125. Unless the victim is a minor and the exploitation is sexual, then no proof of force 
fraud or coercion is required. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, 
Pub. L. No. 109-164, 119 Stat. 3558 (2006). 
 126. See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 22, at 107 (“The lack of central control can also allow 
criminal organizations to flourish, leading to the spread of drug smuggling, small arms trade, 
and human trafficking.”); see also Manjoo & McRaith, supra note 11, at 12-13 (suggesting 
that GBV after conflicts include “slavery, rape, forced impregnation/miscarriages, [and] 
kidnapping/trafficking.”). 
 127. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, at pmbl. (“[E]ffective action to prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons, especially women and children, requires a comprehensive 
international approach in the countries of origin, transit, and destination”) (emphasis added).  
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of trafficking include labor trafficking in illicit mining projects, forced 
conscription into armed forces, and forced prostitution.128 Furthermore, 
human trafficking assumes a wide range of forms, as evidenced by the 
international definition of human trafficking. This definition indicates that 
both sexual and labor services can constitute human trafficking when the 
trafficker has an exploitative purpose.129 These forms of human trafficking 
are, in fact, interrelated: “individuals may be enslaved within more than one 
type [of trafficking] simultaneously. It is not uncommon, for example, for 
members of armed groups to force an individual to work in the mines during 
the day and sexually exploit the same person at night.”130  
Labor trafficking of civilians by armed groups for the production and 
transportation of minerals is rife in eastern DRC.131 In the mining regions of 
the Kivus and Katanga Provinces, for example, a 2010 report found that of 
742 persons working in and around the mines, more than 40 per cent were 
enslaved, with some victims being as young as five years old.132 According 
to the United Nations, in the Rwandan-held mines, civilians are 
“conscripted by Rwandan forces to carry out mining under forced labour 
conditions.”133 Nongovernmental research studies indicate, however, that 
even after the government declared mining illegal in DRC, in the Kivus, 
“FARDC soldiers reportedly initiated forced recruitment of miners in night-
time raids on the town of Ndjingala.”134 The penalties for slaves unwilling 
or unable to work for the Congolese Army in the mines ranges from torture 
  
 128. TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 129-30. Compare TIP REPORT 2012, supra 
note 16, at 125-27 (showing substantial similarity to 2011 country narrative), available at 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/192594.pdf. 
 129. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 3 (stating the international 
definition of human trafficking). 
 130. FREE THE SLAVES, supra note 117, at 11. 
 131. See generally U.N. S.C. Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources 
and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18-19, S/2002/1146 
(Oct. 16, 2002) [hereinafter Illegal Exploitation Report].  
 132. Even children are forced to work in the mines and to militarily defend the 
territory of the Rwandan forces. See, e.g., Free the Slaves, supra note 117, at 10-12 
(reporting that two thirds of the children interviewed near the mines were enslaved). 
 133. Illegal Exploitation Report, supra note 131; see also Group of Experts Interim 
Report, supra note 6, at ¶ 2. The rebellion is led by General Ntaganda, who is wanted by the 
ICC for crimes against humanity, including enslavement and sexual slavery. See Rwanda 
Defence [sic] Chief Leads DR Congo rebels, UN Report Says, BBC NEWS (Oct. 17, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-19973366; see also TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 
15, at 125 (armed forces in eastern DRC “routinely used threats and coercion to force men 
and children to mine for minerals [and] turn over their mineral production”).  
 134. FREE THE SLAVES, supra note 117, at 12-13. Note: FARDC are the national 
Congolese Army. 
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to steep fines, which often lead to prolonged slavery through debt-
bondage.135  
According to the U.S. State Department’s 2011 Trafficking in Persons 
(TIP) Report and nongovernmental sources, additional forms of internal 
human trafficking exist in the DRC, such as child slavery to repay family 
debts,136 forced prostitution near mines and internally displaced persons 
camps,137 forced labor for armed forces,138 and forced conscription of men, 
women, and children into the armed forces.139 The State Department 
repeatedly emphasized in its 2011 TIP Report that “[e]lements of the 
national army increasingly perpetrated severe human trafficking abuses 
during the year . . .” 140 The offenses perpetrated by the national army in 
2010 included labor trafficking, forced conscription of child soldiers, and 
sex trafficking, i.e., sexual slavery, in the wake of massacres.141  
The issue of labor trafficking in the “conflict minerals” industry is a 
good example of the strong political will and public awareness about 
trafficking in persons. The exertion of political will resulted in legislative 
and financial interventions by the United Nations and the U.S. government 
to stop labor trafficking in mining to fund the conflict in the DRC.142 
  
 135. Id.; see also TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 129: “miners . . . are exploited 
in situations of debt bondage… forced to continue to work to repay constantly accumulating 
debts that are virtually impossible to repay.” 
 136. TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 129. 
 137. See, e.g., id. (“Congolese girls are forcibly prostituted in tent- or hut- based 
brothels or informal camps- including in markets and mining areas.”). 
 138. See id. (“between July 30 and August 2010, a coalition of [armed militias] and 
FARDC abducted 116 civilians from 13 villages in the Walikale area and subjected them to 
forced labor.”). 
 139. See id. (“In 2010, the FARDC actively recruited, at time through force, men and 
children for use as combatants… [f]rom September to December 2010… there were 121 
confirmed cases of unlawful child soldier recruitment . . .”). 
 140. Id. at 130. 
 141. TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 129-32. 
 142. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). The Act states:  
It is the sense of Congress that the exploitation and trade of conflict 
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
helping to finance conflict characterized by extreme levels of 
violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
particularly sexual- and gender-based violence, and contributing to 
an emergency humanitarian situation therein, warranting the 
provisions of section 13(p) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
as added by subsection (b).  
Id. sec. 1502(a). On the United Nations response, see S.C. Res. 1457, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1457(2003) (Jan. 24, 2003) (“Strongly condemn[ing] the illegal exploitation of 
natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo”). This resolution was based on a 
report by a panel of experts, commissioned by the U.N. Secretary-General, to study and 
report on the degree and consequences of exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC. Id. ¶ 
1. See Illegal Exploitation Report, supra note 131. 
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Significant public pressure precipitated these responses,143 and the result 
was greater enforcement of existing laws and development of new 
international responses.144 Public pressure of this level could also lead to 
greater enforcement of laws condemning other forms of human trafficking, 
such as sexual slavery.                                                                                                                  
2. Sexual Slavery as a form of human trafficking and GBV 
Since the beginning of the war in 1996, sexual slavery has been prevalent 
in the DRC.145 Often, young children are raped before being conscripted into 
the armed forces only to be forced into ongoing sexual violence after 
conscription.146 The United Nations Commission on Human Rights 
established the existence of sex slavery during armed conflict in the Special 
Rapporteur’s 1998 report.147 In 2003, the Commission reported the high 
  
 143. Conflict Minerals: Overview, ENOUGH PROJECT, 
http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict-minerals (last visited Apr. 22, 2012); Conflict 
Minerals, RAISE HOPE FOR CONGO, http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/ 
content/initiatives/conflict-minerals (last visited Apr. 22, 2012); Congo Week Showcases 
Conflict Minerals Debate, CONFLICT MINERALS (Nov. 7, 2012), http://conflictminerals.org/; 
Conflict Minerals, GLOBAL WITNESS, http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/ 
conflict/conflict-minerals (last visited Apr. 22, 2012); Mary Beth Sheridan, U.S. Financial 
Reform Bill Also Targets ‘Conflict Minerals’ From Congo, THE WASHINGTON POST, Jul. 21, 
2010, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/ 
AR2010072006212.html.Enough: The project to end genocide and crimes against humanity, 
Conflict minerals, official website at http://www.enoughproject.org/conflict-minerals (last 
visited April 22, 2012); Raise Hope for Congo, official website at 
http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/initiatives/conflict-minerals (last visited April 22, 
2012); Conflict Minerals: The Truth Underlying the Systematic Looting of Congo’s 
Minerals, official website at http://conflictminerals.org/ (published Nov. 7, 2011) (last visited 
April 22, 2012); Global Witness: Conflict Minerals, official website at 
http://www.globalwitness.org/campaigns/conflict/conflict-minerals (last visited April 22, 
2012); Mary Beth Sheridan, “U.S. financial reform bill also targets ‘conflict minerals’ from 
Congo,” in THE WASHINGTON POST (Jul. 21, 2010), available at http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/20/AR2010072006212.html (last 
visited April 22, 2012).  
 144. It must be noted that many critique the response of the United States to the issue 
of conflict minerals. See, e.g., David Aronson, How Congress Devastated Congo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 7, 2011, available at www.nytimes.com/2011/08/08/opinion/how-congress-
devastated-congo.html?_r=2&pagewanted=print (asserting that “[t]he provision came about 
in no small part because of the work of high-profile advocacy groups like the Enough Project 
and Global Witness, which have been working for an end to what they call ‘conflict 
minerals.’ Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank law has had unintended and devastating 
consequences . . .”). 
 145. See Ending Sexual Violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 
116, at 16-17. 
 146. Id. (“Sexual slaves were very badly treated; they were often tied up, locked in 
huts or holes in the ground filled with water, and frequently punished.”). 
 147. Special Rapporteur, U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights. Contemporary Forms of 
Slavery, Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices During Armed Conflict: 
Final Report submitted by Ms. Gay J. McDougall, Special Rapporteur, Sub-Comm’n on 
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incidence and destabilizing impact of sexual slavery in the armed conflict in 
DRC.148  
While all forms of GBV ravage society and subjugate its victims,149 
sexual slavery has the ultimate destabilizing impact by displacing victims 
from their communities, depriving them of their liberty, and then repeatedly 
degrading them with sexual violence. Sexual slavery has imposed years of 
bondage on many women and young girls150 throughout the conflict. In 
eastern DRC, virtually all armed factions in the region have perpetrated 
sexual slavery.151  
One poignant example of sexual slavery in the DRC is the story of 
Sophie, a child abducted at the age of thirteen. A group of soldiers held her 
at gunpoint during a village massacre forced her to become their “wife,” 
raping her each night and forcing her into daily labor servitude.152 Under the 
international definition of human trafficking, it is clear that Sophie was (a) 
recruited, transported, and harbored, (b) by use of force, (c) for the purpose 
of exploitation, including sexual slavery and forced labor. Thus, through her 
subjugation to sexual and labor slavery, Sophie became a victim of human 
trafficking.  
The international community has declared sexual slavery to be a 
manifestation of trafficking in persons153 and an international crime.154 Upon 
the founding of the International Criminal Court (ICC) with the ratification 
of the Rome Statute, a clear definition of sexual slavery emerged as both a 
crime against humanity and a war crime.155 The ICC Elements of Crimes—
like an international penal code exclusively governing genocide, crimes of 
war, and crimes against humanity—defines the elements of sexual slavery 
as:  
  
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN. 4/Sub. 
2/1998/13 (June 22, 1998). 
 148. Special Rapportuer, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Submitted by the Special Rapporteur Ms. Iulia Motoc, in Accordance 
with Comm’n on Human Rights Res., U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/2003/43 (Apr. 14, 2003). 
 149. Mapping Exercise, supra note 31, at 318, 329. 
 150. “Used as an instrument of terror, on the basis of ethnicity or to torture and 
humiliate, sexual violence often targeted young girls and children, some no more than five 
years old.” Id. at 331, ¶ 669. 
 151. Id. at 321-22, ¶¶ 641-42 (“Children were particularly affected by slavery and 
sexual slavery, a practice allegedly widespread among the Mayi-Mayi, ex-
FAR/Interahamwe/ALiR/FDLR, UPC, and armed Ugandan (ADF/NALU) and Burundian 
(CNDD-FDD and FNL) groups.”). In recent years, the Congolese Army has increasingly 
perpetrated sexual violence in eastern DRC. See Wallström, supra note 34. 
 152. FREE THE SLAVES, supra note 117, at 19.  
 153. Trafficking in persons is also known by the name “human trafficking.” 
 154. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF.183/9, 1998, arts. 
7(1)(g), 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi), (July 1, 2002) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 155. Id.; see also ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 15, Add. Pt. II.  
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(1) the perpetrator exercised any or all powers attaching to the right of 
ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, 
lending or bartering a persons or persons, or by imposing on them a similar 
deprivation of liberty [and] (2) The perpetrator caused such person or 
persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.156 
Due to the contentions of the drafters about the seeming requirement of 
commercial transaction in order to constitute sexual slavery, a footnote was 
added to the first element, stating: 
It is understood that such deprivation of liberty may, in some 
circumstances, include exacting forced labour or otherwise reducing a 
person to servile status as defined in the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices 
similar to Slavery of 1956. It is also understood that the conduct described 
in this element includes trafficking in persons, particularly women and 
children.157 
Under international criminal law, the elements of sexual slavery may be 
simplified to: (1) the enslavement of a person, (2) which caused the victim 
to engage in sexual acts.158 Furthermore, the U.N. Human Rights Council’s 
definition of the scope of human trafficking includes sexual slavery of 
women and children in armed conflict.159                                                                                     
In 2005, the newly ratified Constitution of the DRC incorporated the 
international legal understandings about sexual slavery, stating: “sexual 
violence committed against any person with the intention to destabilize or to 
displace a family and to make a whole people disappear is established as a 
crime against humanity.”160 Moreover, Article 16 prohibits all types of 
slavery: “No one may be held in slavery or in a similar condition.”161 The 
Constitution, thus, appears to forbid slavery and adopt the international 
definitions contained in the treaties that it has ratified.  
  
 156. ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(g)-2 (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. art. 7(1)(g)-2 n. 18 (emphasis added); see also Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual 
Slavery and the International Criminal Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 605, 642 (2004). 
 158. DE RUITER, supra note 119, at 14. It should be noted, however, that under the 
Rome Statute, there is a distinction between “enslavement,” categorized as a crime against 
humanity, and “sexual slavery,” categorized as both a crime against humanity and a war 
crime. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 213-14. 
 159. Special Rapporteur on Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 
Promotion and Protection of All Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, ¶ 16(1), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/16 (Feb. 
20, 2009) (Joy Ngozi Ezeilo) [hereinafter U.N. Doc. A/HRC/10/16] (defining human 
trafficking to include “participation in armed conflict- mercenaries/ child soldiers, sex 
slaves”). 
 160. CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, supra note 72, art. 
15 (emphasis added). 
 161. Id. art. 16. 
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Similarly, Law 06/018162 integrates the international definitions from the 
ICC Elements of Crimes, and expressly criminalizes forced prostitution,163 
sexual slavery,164 forced marriage,165 sex trafficking and exploitation of 
children,166 and child prostitution.167 Each crime in Law 06/018 has a unique 
definition under national and international law, although all are crimes of 
sexual violence that also are acts of human trafficking. Congolese law 
provides harsh criminal sanctions for commission of sex trafficking, 
including sexual slavery.168  
  
 162. Loi no. 06/018 Modifiant et Complétant le Decrét du 30 Janvier 1940 Portant 
Code Penal Congolais, 15 Journal Officiel de la République Démocratique du Congo (Jul. 
20, 2006) [hereinafter Law 06/018]. 
 163. Id. art.3, ¶ 3. Forced prostitution is defined as:  
Quiconque aura amené une ou plusieurs personnes à accomplir un 
acte ou plusieurs actes de nature sexuelle, par la force, par la menace 
de la force ou de la coercition ou encore en profitant de l’incapacité 
desdites personnes à donner librement leur consentement en vue 
d’obtenir un avantage pécuniaire ou autre. 
Id. (paraphrased translation: Whoever uses force, threat of force, coercion, or exploitation of 
a position of vulnerability to cause one or more persons to commit one or more acts of a 
sexual nature against such person or persons will and for the pecuniary gain of another 
person.) Compare, with ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 15, art. 7(1)(g)-3: 
1. The perpetrator caused one or more persons to engage in one or 
more acts of a sexual nature by force, or by threat of force or 
coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, 
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or 
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive 
environment or such person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine 
consent. 
2. The perpetrator or another person obtained or expected to obtain 
pecuniary or other advantage in exchange for or in connection with 
the acts of a sexual nature. 
 164. Law 06/018, supra note 162, art. 3, ¶ 5. Sexual slavery is defined under national 
law as:  
[Q]uiconque aura exercé un ou l’ensemble des pouvoirs associés au 
droit de propriété sur une personne, notamment en détenant ou en 
imposant une privation similaire de liberté ou en achetant, vendant, 
prêtant, troquant ladite personne pour des fins sexuelles, et l’aura 
contrainte à accomplir un ou plusieurs actes de nature sexuelle. 
Id. (paraphrased translation of the definition is: Whoever exercises independently or in 
association with others the right of property over a person, namely detention or a similar 
deprivation of liberty, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or trading a person for sexual 
ends, and who caused the person to carry out one or more sexual acts); contra ICC Elements 
of Crimes, supra note 15 and text at page 30. It is clear from this comparison that the DRC 
adopted the definition of the ICC almost verbatim in Law 06/018 defining sexual slavery.                                      
 165. Law 06/018, supra note 162, art. 3, ¶ 6. 
 166. Id. art. 3, ¶ 10.  
 167. Id. art. 3, ¶ 14. 
 168. TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 130-31.  
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Yet, in 2007, after the passage of the new constitution and sexual 
violence laws, sexual slavery continued unabated in the eastern DRC.169 In 
the village of Kaniola, located in the South Kivu province of the DRC, a 
group of Rwandan soldiers came from the neighboring forest to attack a 
family, looting their home and abducting three teenaged girls, including one 
named Nadine.170 The three girls were bound and hauled into the forest, 
forced to carry the possessions stolen from their home and told that they 
will soon become the soldiers’ “wives.”171 Congolese soldiers, in the 
company of the girls’ brother and father, burst in and rescued them from 
rape and servitude.172 Sadly, the Rwandan soldiers returned for Nadine in 
six months. She never returned home after that time.173 One month later, the 
soldiers massacred eighteen people in Kaniola; that day, “twenty-five 
[were] tied up and taken into the forest,” some as young as twelve years 
old.174 However, that time, surviving civilians said that the perpetrators of 
murder and abduction were soldiers from the Congolese Army.175  
In addition to the continuing perpetration of abuses by the army, 
governmental barriers to justice still exist. The International Federation for 
Human Rights, represented by various Congolese civil society 
organizations, asserts that the government barriers to accessing justice 
remain high: “legal costs are often very high; arrest warrants are often not 
executed; especially those against high-ranking soldiers in the national 
army; and the freedom of the accused can be bought or negotiated 
throughout the justice process, from the police station, to the courts, to the 
prisons.”176 Furthermore, this civil society association asserts that, in order 
to bring justice and reconciliation to victims of sexual violence in the DRC, 
  
 169. 2012 HRW Country Summary, supra note 2, at 2-3.  
 170. LISA J. SHANNON, A THOUSAND SISTERS: MY JOURNEY TO THE WORST PLACE ON 
EARTH TO BE A WOMAN 261-62 (2011). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. at 302-03.                                                                                                                                                
 175. Id.; see also Magellan Luanda Mungabo, DR Congo: A Detailed Report of a Visit 
to the Site of the Kaniola Massacre, AFRICA FILES (Marie Dowler, trans., June 7, 2007), 
http://www.africafiles.org/printableversion.asp?id=15323 (“The sight is sickening and 
revolting: skulls smashed, throats cut, bellies cut open, women raped with knives, mutilated 
bodies soaked in blood, the atrocity of men, women, and children forced into perverse sexual 
acts or carried off into the Mugaba forest towards Ninja in the Kabare region.”). According 
to human rights personnel on the ground in Kaniola, there is “an obvious complicity between 
the Congolese authorities and these foreign troops operating in South Kivu.” Id. Shortly after 
the massacre, evidence emerged that the Congolese Army had been collaborating with the 
FDLR and other militia to accomplish local objectives in the Kivus. See DR Congo Hutu 
Front ‘Helps’ Army, BBC NEWS, Oct. 2, 2007, available at http://news.bbc. 
co.uk/2/hi/africa/7023708.stm. 
 176. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS [FIDH], DEMOCRATIC 
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: BREAKING THE CYCLE OF IMPUNITY 10 (2008). 
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“the international community [must] call[] upon and support[] the 
Congolese authorities to fight impunity for the most serious crimes.”177  
As shown above, sexual slavery is a form of human trafficking and laws 
criminalizing it exist in the DRC, but are not currently being enforced. The 
next section will demonstrate that greater enforcement of laws, monitoring, 
and support could be provided through international human trafficking laws 
to enable national and local governments to achieve justice and protection 
for all victims of sexual slavery.  
B. International Human Trafficking Laws 
Beginning with the Slavery Convention of 1926, the world has 
acknowledged the need to abolish slavery as a pressing international issue. 
Early on, the international community so valued the purpose of 
“prevent[ing] and suppress[ing] the slave trade” and “bring[ing] about, 
progressively and as soon as possible, the complete abolition of slavery in 
all its forms”178 that all signatories undertook the commitment to provide 
assistance to all other nations in abolishing slavery and the slave trade.179 In 
1957, the Supplementary Slavery Convention came into force “to intensify 
national as well as international efforts towards the abolition of slavery, the 
slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery.”180 While 
modern definitions of slavery have evolved, the spirit of abolishing slavery 
and the slave trade, in all its forms, is equally clear in the modern 
international law against human trafficking: The Trafficking Protocol 
supplementing the Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
(COTC).181  
  
 177. Id. at 12. 
 178. 1926 Slavery Convention, art. 2, Sept. 25, 1926, available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/slavery.htm (entered into force Mar. 9, 1927) [hereinafter 
1926 Slavery Convention]. 
 179. Id. art. 4 (“The High Contracting Parties shall give to one another every 
assistance with the object of securing the abolition of slavery and the slave trade.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 180. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and 
Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery pmbl., Sept. 7, 1956, 3822 U.N.T.S. 40 (entered 
into force Apr. 30, 1957). 
 181. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, at pmbl. To date, there are 124 parties to the 
Trafficking Protocol, committing that “State parties shall take or strengthen measures . . . to 
alleviate the factors that make persons, especially women and children, vulnerable to 
trafficking.” Id. at Art. 9(4); see U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Signatories to the CTOC 
Trafficking Protocol: Status as at Sept. 26, 2008 at 11:45 A.M., 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/countrylist-traffickingprotocol.html (last 
visited Dec. 27, 2012) [hereinafter Signatories to the Trafficking Protocol]. 
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1. The Trafficking Protocol  
The Trafficking Protocol is an international convention that has become 
the preeminent tool in international law that defines and addresses human 
trafficking holistically.182 Indeed, the Trafficking Protocol developed out of 
“the need for a holistic approach where the crime control aspects of 
trafficking were addressed along with traditional human rights concerns.”183 
The threefold purpose of the Trafficking Protocol is to (1) “prevent and 
combat trafficking in persons, paying particular attention to the protection 
of women and children”; (2) “protect and assist victims of [] trafficking”; 
and (3) facilitate cooperation among the States.184 To implement these 
purposes, it specifically requires all States Parties to criminalize all forms of 
human trafficking;185 protect victims under domestic law;186 prevent 
vulnerability and revictimization through trafficking;187 and “provide or 
strengthen training for law enforcement, immigration, and other relevant 
personnel aimed at preventing trafficking as well as prosecuting traffickers 
and protecting the rights of victims.”188 Thus, the primary responsibility to 
enforce the protocol rests upon the member states.  
The Trafficking Protocol imposes obligations on States Parties to take 
positive steps, including “legislative reform, provision of remedies, and 
protection” to actually reduce the incidents of trafficking in persons within 
state borders.189 Specifically pertinent to decreasing legal impunity for GBV 
trafficking offenses, under international law, states must provide reparation 
or redress to individual victims where the State has been “directly or 
  
 182. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 78.  
 183. Id.  
 184. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, art. 2; see also THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF 
HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 79. The Trafficking Protocol’s approach is often 
referred to as the Three P’s: Prevention, Prosecution, and Protection.                                                                         
 185. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, art. 5 (including commission of trafficking, as 
well as attempt, conspiracy and accomplice to commit crimes of trafficking).                                                             
 186. Id. art. 6 (including physical safety and “ensur[ing] that its domestic legal system 
contains measures that offer victims of trafficking in persons the possibility of obtaining 
compensation for damages suffered.”). 
 187. Id. art. 9(1). 
 188. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 88. See also 
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, art. 10(2). 
 189. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 273 
(emphasis added); see also Anne T. Gallagher, Commentary to the Recommended Principles 
and Guidelines on Human Rights and Human Trafficking, 75-79, SELECTEDWORKS, Dec. 
2010, available at http://works.bepress.com/anne_gallagher/15 [hereinafter Commentary] 
(commentary on Principle 2). These obligations differ from the international human rights-
based obligations on states to “take all appropriate . . . measures” to, for example, “protect 
the child from all forms of . . . exploitation.” Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra 
note 91, art. 19(2) (requiring states to “provide necessary support for the child,” but criminal 
punishment is not a component of the obligations imposed).  
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indirectly involved” in committing the crime.190 Significantly, under the 
international Trafficking Protocol, this could involve either the state 
ensuring compensation from the offender or “requir[ing] the State itself to 
provide compensation, particularly in situations where the state has fallen 
short of the due diligence standard when it comes to preventing trafficking, 
investigating and prosecuting traffickers, and protecting victims.”191 In 
summary, international human trafficking law defines wrongful acts for 
which States are accountable, including failure to prevent and protect 
victims, and also obligates cessation and reparation.192 
Enforcement of the Trafficking Protocol among member states remains 
somewhat weak, but is rapidly improving. For instance, the initial member 
state compliance mechanisms contained in the Trafficking Protocol 
included only negotiation and arbitration of disputes between states within 
six months of a request for arbitration of the dispute.193 However, the 
Protocol supplements the COTC, which established a Conference of Parties 
(COP) to “improve the capacity of States to combat transnational organized 
crime and to promote and review the implementation of the Convention.”194 
The COP, which is overseen by the U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC), may increase implementation of the COTC by reviewing state 
actions and providing recommendations; facilitating trainings and providing 
technical assistance; and overseeing the interpretation of the COTC and its 
protocols.195 Thus, the COP may request reports from States Parties, hold 
regular meetings of member states, and compile a Global Report on 
trafficking.196 Since the first session of the COP, the compliance measures 
contained in the Convention have also been applied to all of its 
supplemental protocols, including the Trafficking Protocol.197 Even given 
  
 190. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 369 (“if a 
State is directly or indirectly involved in the violation of an individual’s right then that same 
State must make a genuine attempt to provide the injured person with some measure of 
reparation or redress.”). 
 191. Id.; see also id. at 223-31 (commentary on Principle 17). 
 192. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 222-23. 
The reparation required by the Trafficking Protocol would only apply to states to whom the 
trafficking can be attributed and who breached their due diligence requirement to protect. Id.. 
at 223.  
 193. Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9, art. 15(1)-(2). 
 194. Convention on Transnational Crime, G.A. Res. 55/25, art. 32(1) (Jan. 8, 2001), 
A/RES/55/25 [hereinafter COTC].  
 195. Id. art. 32(3); see also THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra 
note 66, at 467-73 (analyzing compliance measures within the Convention and its Protocols). 
 196. See id. at 467. One edition of the Global Report on Trafficking has been issued 
thus far. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, at 
122 (2009) [hereinafter U.N. Global Report on Trafficking].  
 197. Conference of Parties to the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime, Vienna, Austria, June 28 – 8 July, 2004, Report of the Conference of 
Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime on its 
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the application of these compliance measures to the Trafficking Protocol, 
experts assert that enforcement is weak because “the reporting procedure is 
a relatively crude mechanism for promoting or measuring compliance.”198  
In an effort to improve implementation of the Trafficking Protocol by 
member states, the UNODC commissioned a working group on trafficking 
in persons in 2009. The working group has met twice and issued a report 
with its recommendations following its January 2010 meeting.199 The 
recommendations included admonitions to all States Parties to respect the 
human rights of victims and to “increase their efforts to investigate and 
prosecute cases involving trafficking in persons.”200 Although the 
Trafficking Protocol has only been in force for less than a decade the efforts 
at implementation have increased rapidly through monitoring by the COP 
and the working group’s interpretation of the States Parties’ obligations.201                                
In 2005, the DRC became a party to the CTOC and Trafficking Protocol 
through accession, making no reservations to either instrument.202 The DRC 
submitted its initial state report to the COP in 2008, answering the 
trafficking questionnaire regarding appropriate legislation criminalizing 
trafficking in persons.203 The DRC government’s responses at that time 
indicated the existence of domestic legislation criminalizing all actions 
under the protocol, except for recruiting for exploitation.204 While the 2009 
  
First Session, Held in Vienna from Jun. 28 to Jul. 8, 2004, 5, U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2004/6 
(Sept. 23, 2004).  
 198. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 469 (using 
an assessment based on lack of opportunity to dialogue about state reports between states 
parties and COP). Furthermore, there is no individualized complaint mechanism under the 
CTOC and the “prospect of States Parties to the [CTOC] and its Trafficking Protocol being 
made subject to a rigorous oversight mechanism- or even a procedure capable of evaluating 
their performance of key obligations- appears to be remote.” Id. at 472.                                                                       
 199. See Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Transnational 
Organized Crime, Vienna, Austria, Jan. 27-29, 2010, Report on the meeting of the Working 
Group on Trafficking in Persons held in Vienna, January 27 to January 29, 2010, U.N. Doc 
COTC/COP/WG.4/2010/6 (Feb. 17, 2010).  
 200. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.  
 201. See THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 470. 
 202. Signatories to the Trafficking Protocol, supra note 181 (showing that the DRC 
became a state party on Oct. 28, 2005, by accession, making no reservations).  
 203. Report of the Secretariat, Conference of the Parties to the Convention Against 
Transnational Organized Crime, Implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and 
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United 
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime: Consolidated Information 
Received from States for the First Reporting Cycle, Annex, U.N. Doc. 
CTOC/COP/2005/3/Rev.2 (Aug. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Implementation of the Protocol 
2008]; see also Note by the Secretariat, Conference of the Parties to the U.N. Convention 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Information Submitted by States in Their Responses 
to the Checklist/Questionnaire on the Implementation of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress 
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime for the First Reporting 
Cycle, U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2008/CRP.8 (Oct. 6, 2008). 
 204. Implementation of the Protocol 2008, supra note 203, ¶ 6.  
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joint UNODC and U.N. Global Initiative to Fight Trafficking in Persons 
(UNGIFT) Global Report contains a page on trafficking in DRC, there has 
been minimal interaction between the COP, or its trafficking in persons 
working group, and the DRC in furtherance of implementing the Trafficking 
Protocol.205  
Semantic differences could account for varying conceptions of whether 
or not DRC has a law criminalizing human trafficking. In contrast to the 
state report submitted by the DRC, which indicated the existence of a law 
criminalizing human trafficking, the Global Report’s independent research 
through UNGIFT and UNODC asserts that there is no law explicitly 
criminalizing “human trafficking,” although the sexual violence statute 
prohibits pimping, sexual exploitation of minors, and forced prostitution.206 
The Global Report does note, however, that arrests and convictions have 
been made for sexual slavery under the jurisdiction of the ICC.207  
Part of the reason cases have been brought before the ICC, as opposed to 
Congolese courts, is not due to the lack of laws, but rather because of the 
significant barriers to enforcing laws in the DRC.208 While not directly 
referring to the enforcement of the Trafficking Protocol, another UNODC 
report on instability in Central Africa found that the current instability in the 
DRC makes the investigation and prosecution of rape and trafficking 
challenging.209 As that report points out, governmental instability and low 
technical capacity, characterized by rampant impunity for violent crimes, 
inhibits state action in Central Africa and fosters impunity.210  
Combined with concerted efforts to end the conflict in eastern DRC, the 
recent inception of new tools to increase enforcement of the Trafficking 
Protocol could lead to improved protection of victims of sexual slavery in 
the DRC. To help low capacity governments improve their enforcement 
  
 205. U.N. Global Report on Trafficking, supra note 196, at 122.  
 206. Id. 
 207. Id. (“Arrests and convictions related to trafficking in persons were recorded for 
‘unlawful recruitment of child soldiers’ and for war crimes and crimes against humanity in 
connection with the recruitment of child soldiers and sexual slavery. In the latter case, these 
episodes are under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.”). This statement may 
refer to the arrest and trial of Thomas Lubanga for crimes against humanity and war crimes 
including sexual slavery, conscription of child soldiers, and other crimes.                                                                 
 208. The question of whether the ICC is an appropriate venue for certain cases of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity, such as slavery, is outside the scope of this Note. The 
author intends, rather, to improve the ability of the national government to protect its people. 
 209. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Organized Crime and Instability in Central 
Africa: A Threat Assessment, 9, Oct. 2011, available at http://www.unodc.org/ 
documents/data-and analysis/Studies/Central_Africa_Report_2011_web.pdf (“The remaining 
instability and violence, which predominantly affect the Eastern DRC, seem to be 
increasingly the result of criminal acts in a context of persistent lawlessness and weak state 
institutions, rather than the product of war. This context makes it difficult to provide the 
criminal justice response that crimes such as murder, rape and trafficking in children 
require.”). 
 210. Id. 
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ability, the UNODC has recently elaborated the International Framework 
for Action to Implement the Trafficking in Persons Protocol.211 The DRC 
would likely be included in the vast number of states with limited “capacity 
. . . to fully implement existing or future measures in the areas under 
discussion,” which led to this effort to help “States to develop effective and 
multidisciplinary anti-trafficking strategies and build dedicated and 
sustainable resources to implement such strategies.”212 While compliance 
with the Trafficking Protocol has thus far been limited by ongoing 
instability and low capacity in the DRC, the Framework for Action and the 
COP’s trafficking in person working group will enable increasing 
monitoring of compliance within the DRC.  
In the same way that international human rights law has influenced 
national laws in the DRC, the Trafficking Protocol has the potential to 
positively influence the drafting of new laws. In addition, it is the author’s 
opinion that the criminal provisions and obligations imposed on the DRC by 
its membership in the Trafficking Protocol provide the most comprehensive 
potential remedies for victims of GBV forms of human trafficking, as well 
as all other forms of human trafficking in the DRC.213  
In addition to the international Trafficking Protocol, a second law 
supplements its advances by tightly monitoring human trafficking in every 
nation. The United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act, a U.S. law 
that established global support for efforts to combat trafficking in persons, 
unilaterally monitors and provides for enforcement of the same model as the 
Trafficking Protocol: Prevention, Prosecution, and Protection.214  
2. The United States Trafficking Victims Protection Act  
Due to high political will to combat modern-day slavery, the United 
States was instrumental in the development of the international Trafficking 
Protocol.215 Furthermore, in the United States, the Trafficking Victims 
  
 211. U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, International Framework for Action to 
Implement the Trafficking in Persons Protocol, 3 (2009) (“The Framework for Action is a 
technical assistance tool that assists United Nations Member States in the effective 
implementation of the Protocol . . . [by] identifying gaps and putting in place additional 
measures they may need, in conformity with international standards.”).  
 212. Id. at 4 (citing U.N. Doc. CTOC/COP/2006/6/Rev.1). 
 213. This opinion is based on the more comprehensive scope of coverage of the 
Trafficking Protocol (including all ages and genders, and all exploitation of both sexual and 
labor services), as well as the holistic criminal and rights-based protections for victims.  
 214. Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000, 22 U.S.C. § 7101 (2000) [hereinafter 
TVPA 2000]. 
 215. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 78: “A 
general awareness was also developing among an influential group of States of the need for a 
holistic approach where the crime control aspects of trafficking were addressed along with 
traditional human rights concerns.” In 1998, upon commending CEDAW to the Senate for 
ratification, President Bill Clinton declared the importance of passing a law criminalizing 
human trafficking and protecting victims internationally. See Administration of William J. 
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Protection Act (TVPA) was passed on October 28, 2000, and aimed to be a 
comprehensive approach to human trafficking domestically and 
internationally by preventing human trafficking, prosecuting perpetrators, 
and protecting victims.216 On the international level, the law begins by 
stating findings on the international scope and particularities of human 
trafficking.217 These findings contributed to the swelling knowledge of the 
scope of human trafficking internationally.218                                                                             
The TVPA also identified the multitude of factors that make individuals 
vulnerable to becoming victims of human trafficking, such as armed 
conflict. The Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005 
(“TVPRA 2005”) amended the TVPA to include subsection (h): 
“PREVENTION OF TRAFFICKING IN CONJUNCTION WITH POST-CONFLICT AND 
HUMANITARIAN EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE,” which required a joint study of 
vulnerabilities to trafficking caused by conflict within 180 days.219 
However, the study has yet to be published. More importantly, the 
amendment required the U.S. Agency for International Development, 
Department of State, and Department of Defense to “incorporate anti-
trafficking and protection measures for vulnerable populations, particularly 
women and children, into their post-conflict and humanitarian emergency 
assistance and program activities.”220 Significantly, the amendment added to 
the findings sections (7) and (8), which explain the high risk of vulnerability 
to trafficking in conflict zones.221 
The TVPA222 has done more than define and clarify the particular nature 
and vulnerabilities to human trafficking. The TVPA authorized the annual 
Trafficking in Persons Report (TIP Report) to provide global monitoring of 
  
Clinton, Memorandum from President W.J. Clinton on Steps to Combat Violence Against 
Women and Trafficking in Women and Girls, U.S. GOV. PRINTING OFFICE, Mar. 11, 1998, 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-1998-03-16/pdf/WCPD-1998-03-16-
Pg412.pdf. 
 216. TVPA 2000, supra note 214, § 7101 (stating that the purposes of the act are to 
“combat trafficking in persons, a contemporary manifestation of slavery whose victims are 
predominantly women and children, to ensure just and effective punishment of traffickers, 
and to protect their victims.”). 
 217. Id. § 7101(b). See Appendix IV for a reproduction of the relevant congressional 
findings on global trafficking in persons. 
 218. See id. § 7101(b)(1) (for an example of the concrete contribution of knowledge 
about the scope of human trafficking, see finding (1): “As the 21st century begins, the 
degrading institution of slavery continues throughout the world. Trafficking in persons is a 
modern form of slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today. At least 700,000 
persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within or across international 
borders.”).  
 219. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
164, § 101(a) (2006) (amending 22 U.S.C. § 7104(h)) [hereinafter Trafficking Victims 
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005]. 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id.  
 222. The author also includes within the term “TVPA” all of the subsequent 
reauthorizations: 2003, 2005, 2008, 2011.  
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the implementation of the prevention, prosecution, and protection model.223 
In 2010, the current head of the congressionally-mandated Office to 
Monitor Combat Global Trafficking in Persons stated:  
The annual trafficking report remains the United States’ principal 
diplomatic tool to engage foreign governments on the issue of modern 
slavery, and we feel that it is the world’s most comprehensive resource on 
anti-trafficking efforts by governments. It has prompted legislation, 
national action plans, and the implementation of policies and programs. 224 
To accomplish these important diplomatic purposes, the TIP Report 
provides a comprehensive summary of human trafficking in every country 
during the preceding year. The Report unilaterally assigns rankings from 
Tier 1 to Tier 3 to each country based on their compliance with indicia 
dictated by the TVPA to measure governmental efforts to prevent, 
prosecute, and protect. The tiers reflect compliance with the minimum 
standards for the prevention, prosecution, and protection for victims of 
human trafficking, as required by international law. Tier 3 is the worst 
ranking and is reserved for “[c]ountries whose governments do not fully 
comply with the minimum standards and are not making significant efforts 
to do so.”225 According to the leading expert on international human 
trafficking, “there can be no doubt that the TIP reports have radically altered 
the terms of any discussion on compliance with the international law of 
human trafficking.”226 
  
 223. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, supra note 219, § 
2151(n); Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, 
§104(a)-(b) (authorizing annual reports and rankings based on human trafficking within all 
countries receiving foreign aid from the United States). It must be noted that international 
and American scholars differ as to their opinions on the United States State Department’s 
unilateral global monitoring. See, e.g., Janie Chuang, The United States as Global Sheriff: 
Using Unilateral Sanctions to Combat Human Trafficking, 27 MICH. J. OF INT’L L. 437, 449 
(2006) (asserting that the U.S. approach in the TVPA is comparable with many other 
unilateral sanctions that the U.S. has utilized in order to “reinvent and unilaterally define a 
set of anti-trafficking standards with international purchase.”). Chuang bases her argument 
largely on differences between the U.S. norms and the international norms set by the 
Trafficking Protocol. Id. at 466-70. 
 224. Out of the Shadows: The Global Fight Against Human Trafficking Hearing 
Before the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Cong.,10-11 (2010) (statement of Luis 
CdeBaca, Ambassador-At-Large, Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, U.S. 
Department of State). 
 225. Trafficking in Persons Report 2011 Tiers: Placement, Guide, and Penalties for 
Tier 3 Countries, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164221.htm (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2012) (stating that tier 3 ranking may result in economic sanctions for the 
country, which may be waived by Presidential declaration only). 
 226. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING, supra note 66, at 486. 
Gallagher also acknowledges that the “U.S. mechanism explicitly recognizes that 
governments bear a responsibility to prevent trafficking, to prosecute traffickers, and to 
protect victims.” Id.                                                                                                                                                        
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Indicating its failure to comply with the minimum standards to prevent 
trafficking, prosecute traffickers, and protect victims within its borders, the 
DRC has been ranked as Tier 3 in the 2010, 2011, and 2012 TIP reports.227 
In 2010, President Obama waived the sanctions for the DRC, both for its 
Tier 3 ranking and for its use of child soldiers.228 After three years ranked as 
Tier 3, there may be sanctions for the DRC in 2012. In 2010, the United 
States funded programs in the DRC to fight trafficking by increasing the 
rule of law in eastern DRC, including through projects that identify and 
reintegrate women and child survivors of sex trafficking and abduction.229 
The U.S. Agency for International Development asserted that “impunity for 
gender-based violence crimes is still pervasive,” but also reported that the 
U.S. government has sought to decrease it by providing funding for a rule of 
law anti-trafficking initiative through the International Organization for 
Migration.230 All of these efforts have evolved from the passage of the 
TVPA.  
The TVPA has resulted in positive change in the DRC by increasing the 
awareness, public will, and professional involvement in preventing, 
prosecuting, and protecting global victims. Due in part to the awareness 
raised by the TVPA, the American Bar Association’s (ABA) Rule of Law 
Initiative, in 2008, began programs to prevent trafficking and to end 
impunity for GBV crimes in the DRC through criminal law reform, training 
within the legal community, and other mechanisms to decrease impunity 
and increase access to justice for victims of sexual violence.231 In particular, 
the Mobile Courts Program has led to convictions of four Congolese Army 
officers for raping fifty women and girls and abducting several into sexual 
slavery in 2010.232 These convictions occurred through collaboration with 
the national and local governments in the DRC, as well as through 
  
 227. See TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15, at 129-33.  
 228. ALISON SISKIN & LIANA SUN WYLER, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS: U.S. POLICY AND 
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 14-15 (2010), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/misc/RL34317.pdf. 
 229. The Democratic Republic of the Congo: Securing Peace in the Midst of Tragedy: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights of the H. Comm. 
on Foreign Affairs, 112th Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Rajakumari Jandhyala, U.S. Agency 
for International Development Deputy Assistant Administrator for Africa). 
 230. Id. at 3-4. 
 231. Michael Maya, Reflections on ABA ROLI’s Efforts to Combat the Rape Crisis in 
War-Torn Eastern Congo, AMERICANBAR.ORG (June 2011), http://www.americanbar. 
org/advocacy/rule_of_law/where_we_work/africa/democratic_republic_congo/news/news_dr
c_reflections_aba_roli_efforts_to_combat_the_rape_crisis_0611.html. 
 232. Id. (“[F]our high level officers, including Lt. Colonel Kibibi Mutware, were 
among those convicted. They received 20 year sentences, while soldiers who reported to 
them received 10–15 year sentences.”). The convictions of Congolese national army officers 
were not carried out under the sexual violence law, but rather under military law and through 
mobile military tribunals. Id.                                                                                                                                       
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international support and assistance.233 Based on these advances in 
combating impunity, and counting on the continued dedication of Congo 
Special Representative to the U.N. and the U.S. government, the American 
Bar Association boldly asserts, there is reason to be hopeful that the tide is 
turning with regard to impunity for rape in eastern Congo.234 The work of 
the ABA Rule of Law Initiative demonstrates the vast impact of public 
awareness and will to stop trafficking in persons.  
In summary, because the international laws against human trafficking 
encompass criminal sanctions and victim vulnerabilities, like conflict and 
gender, these laws may be most appropriate to impose comprehensive 
obligations on states. Specifically, the TVPA monitors the global 
enforcement of the prevention, prosecution, protection model, and 
contributes to the creation of public awareness, political will, and resources 
to combat human trafficking.                                                                                                       
CONCLUSION: EFFECTIVELY COMBATTING SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THE DRC 
Because the sexual slavery perpetrated in the DRC is both a form of 
human trafficking and GBV, it is prohibited by international and national 
laws that address either crime. By labeling these offenses as both human 
trafficking and GBV, the number of available protections and remedies for 
victims increases.                                                                                                                          
International human trafficking law is a more appropriate tool than 
human rights law to encourage the protection of women and girls from 
sexual slavery in the DRC because the advantages of the three-pronged 
approach found in the international human trafficking laws.235 Specifically, 
the international human trafficking law, the Trafficking Protocol, includes 
criminal sanctions and responds to the offenses as part of a broader scheme 
of criminal violations and infringement of rights.236                            
The Trafficking Protocol is more appropriate because it applies to all 
victims of trafficking regardless of age or gender, and, with the monitoring 
  
 233. See Tessa Khan & Jim Wormington, Mobile Courts in the DRC: Lessons From 
Development for International Criminal Justice 2-3 (Oxford Transitional Justice Research 
Working Papers Series) available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/OTJR-
KhanandWormington-MOBILECOURTSINTHEDRC-LESSONSFROMDEVELOPMENT 
FORINTERNATIONALCRIMINALJU.pdf (last accessed Dec. 28, 2012) (cited as a 
working paper with permission from the authors). 
 234. Id. (noting that funding for these initiatives was provided in part by the U.S. 
Agency for International Development and the U.S. Department of State). 
 235. See Trafficking Protocol, supra note 9 (discussing the three-fold purpose of the 
Protocol).  
 236. Id. arts. 6, 9(1). 
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through the TVPA, can be applied to all nations regardless of membership 
in international treaties.237                                                                                                            
Indeed, the DRC’s Constitution and recent laws have been positively 
influenced by international human rights-based laws and by human rights 
monitoring. International human trafficking laws and their enforcement 
mechanisms238 should use these positive gains as a model to influence laws 
and increase monitoring. Moreover, collaborative progress toward 
protecting victims is possible because the DRC has recognized its obligation 
to respond to GBV crimes like sexual slavery, particularly in conflict zones 
where the rule of law is relatively weak.239  
It is the opinion of the author that the best way to “stand by the victims” 
of GBV in the DRC is to help the government implement its obligations 
under international human trafficking law.240 There are three principal 
means for the DRC to fulfill its obligations to prevent, prosecute, and 
protect under international human trafficking law: (1) improve enforcement 
of the existing law, (2) draft new laws that fully comply with international 
human trafficking standards, and (3) provide for greater training and 
capacity to enact and support programs that provide protection for victims 
and prevent vulnerable populations from being trafficked. International 
pressure, improved monitoring,241 and increased technical assistance and 
support will allow the DRC accomplish these goals.  
First, by improving the enforcement of existing national laws that 
criminalize GBV and human trafficking, the DRC government will take a 
major step toward fulfilling its international obligations with integrity. As 
explained above, Law 06/018 defines various forms of GBV in a way that 
meets the international definition of human trafficking. This law, thus, can 
be used to implement human trafficking criminal obligations on states.  
The DRC could accomplish the second means by introducing new 
provisions in the national penal code with the help of international pressure 
  
 237. TIP Report 2012, supra note 16, at 33-36 (describing the scope of victims and 
types of trafficking covered by “trafficking in persons,” as defined by the Palermo Protocol 
and the TVPA). The Trafficking Protocol is also known as the Palermo Protocol. See id. at 7. 
 238. See TIP REPORT 2011, supra note 15. 
 239. The Constitution of the DCR states: “public authorities are responsible for the 
elimination of sexual violence used as an instrument in the destabilization and displacement 
of families. International treaties and agreements notwithstanding, any sexual violence 
committed against any person with the intention to destabilize or to displace a family and to 
make a whole people disappear is established as a crime against humanity punishable by 
law.” CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO, supra note 72, art. 15 
(emphasis added). 
 240. Pillay, supra note 116, at 459 (suggesting that as a global community we must 
stand by the victims of sexual violence in conflict by incorporating all existing forms of 
international law to protect them). 
 241. In particular, monitoring of compliance with the Trafficking Protocol’s 
obligations on states to prevent, prosecute, and protect. While the TIP Report has increased 
monitoring, global accountability, recommendations, and consequences must be brought to 
bear upon the DRC. 
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and assistance.242 Law 06/018 is a suitable starting point to draft national 
laws that also provide for prevention and protection services for victims, as 
well as increased law enforcement and judicial personnel.                                                           
The third principal means for the DRC to implement international human 
trafficking law is to increase the institutional capacity and support for 
protection of victims and prevention of trafficking. In 2010, there was a 
governmental police division in charge of violence against women; 
however, this Special Victims Unit in South Kivu province has but one 
officer, Major Honorine Munyole.243 A soldier, who had raped more women 
in South Kivu than he could count, admitted in an interview that even if 
there were a law to put him in jail for raping the women, it would not stop 
him. In his words, there are “no police here, so the law does not matter.”244 
The international community has recognized the dire need for improved law 
enforcement and control of national armed forces in conflict zones. The 
U.N. Security Council in 2010 urged security sector reform, admonishing 
parties to armed conflict to make and implement specific and time-bound 
commitments to combat sexual violence, which should include, inter alia, 
issuance of clear orders through chains of command prohibiting sexual 
violence and the prohibition of sexual violence in Codes of Conduct, 
military field manuals, or equivalent; and further calls upon those parties 
to make and implement specific commitments on timely investigation of 
alleged abuses in order to hold perpetrators accountable.245 
In conclusion, without a determined national effort to implement the 
existing laws, create new laws, and provide greater support to victims, the 
international recommendations will perform only a pedagogical function in 
the doctrine of international human rights law. The fulfillment of all three 
means mentioned above is primarily the responsibility of the government of 
the DRC; yet, the international community has a role to play. Protecting 
victims will require continued international involvement through financial 
support, technical assistance, monitoring, and international pressure. 
International human trafficking-based approaches come with high global 
political will and financial resources, which must be channeled to increase 
national and local commitments to end human trafficking in eastern DRC. 
Notwithstanding its current crisis, in order to fulfill its international 
obligations, the DRC must stand by the victims of sexual slavery within its 
borders.  
 
  
 242. Regional bodies and laws also have a substantial role to play in exerting pressure 
on the DRC to improve its laws and enforcement mechanisms. 
 243. Lisa F. Jackson, The Greatest Silence: Rape in the Congo (Women Who Make 
Movies, 2007), available at http://thegreatestsilence.org/about. 
 244. Id. (translated in the source from the original Kiswahili). 
 245. S.C. Res. 1960, supra note 12, ¶ 5.  
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APPENDIX I: Terminology 
 
DRC: Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire)  
 
UNHDI: United Nations Human Development Index 
 
MONUC: French acronym for the United Nations Mission in the  
Democratic Republic of Congo 
 
MONUSCO: new name of MONUC, effective August 2010; French  
acronym meaning United Nations Mission for Organization Stabilization  
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
TIP Report: Trafficking in Persons report of the U.S. State Department 
 
GBV: Gender-based Violence 
 
LRA: Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda) 
 
FDLR: Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda 
 
Interhamwe: Rwandan militia that carried out the 1994 genocide and  
currently control regions of the DRC 
 
FARDC: Congolese Army 
 
ICC: International Criminal Court 
 
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
ICESCR: International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural  
Rights 
 
CEDAW: Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination  
Against Women 
 
CRC: Convention on the Rights of the Child  
 
COTC: Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 
 
COP: Conference of Parties (to the COTC) 
 
UNODC: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
 
UNGIFT: United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Trafficking 
 
TVPA: United States law- Trafficking Victims Protection Act (with  
reauthorizations called TVPRA’s)   
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APPENDIX II: Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
 
Image by Wars in the World, (last visited Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.warsintheworld.com/index.php/2012/07/12/democratic-republic-of-
congo-un-and-government-troops-have-shelled-m23-rebel-positions/. 
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APPENDIX III: “Make Rape a War Crime” 
With her heart beating three times 
faster than normal 
Tears dripping but this time from 
the inside 
She bleeds from the inside as well 
Before she is even touched 
 
Poor woman is pushing kids up in 
the roof 
Before the door can get broke 
As it’s being kicked hard by men 
in camouflage 
 
Her mind has gone blank 
Her body is fighting to get free 
From the man that’s on top of her 
 
She gets so weak 
It’s the third time this week 
That she’s been raped 
 
Her body’s abused 
her mind’s misused 
The first time she got raped 
Her husband called her a 
disgrace 
Abandoned her with four kids 
 
She screamed in agony 
But not as loud as the screech of 
her neighbor 
That’s undergoing the same abuse 
With her daughters next to her 
Her husband bleeding in the 
corner 
Shot in the head eyes open 
 
No reason to fight 
No one to help 
No place to hide 
No other choice 
But concede 
 
After ten men had wounded and 
raped her 
As her kids com[e] down from 
hiding 
Trying their best to console her 
 
Tears in her eyes 
Shame covering her face 
No room for love 
Beside that of her kids 
 
She asks:  
“Why, Why, Why” to God 
But even God cannot justify her 
pain 
She feels like she lives in sin city 
Congo has turned into a ghost 
town 
 
Since rape is not recognized as a 
war crime 
Poor mother has no other dream 
Than her daughters to stay at large 
from  
these 
villains 
Until God restores this part of the 
world 
 
As she regains consciousness 
Looking with shame in the eyes of 
her kids 
And then looking up in the sky 
And says a prayer: 
 
“Thank you God for what has just 
happened 
You have protected my kids once 
again 
Let me die a victim of rape 
As long as my daughters do not go 
through it after 
I am gone for” 
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Poor mother went unconscious  
 
The world has forsaken us 
By not condemning rape as a 
crime of war.246 
 
 
  
  
 246. FIDEL NSHOMBO, ROUTE TO PEACE 2 A LIFE FOR LIVES 47-49 (2011). The author 
grew up in the eastern DRC and witnessed his mother raped by the armed forces for years 
until he and his siblings were sent away to a refugee camp in a neighboring country. Id. at 
Preface. 
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APPENDIX IV: TVPA Relevant Congressional Findings on Trafficking 
in Persons 
 
*** Current through PL 112-60, approved 11/23/11 *** 
 
22 USCS § 7101 
§ 7101. Purposes and findings  
 
(b) Findings. Congress finds that: 
 
(1) As the 21st century begins, the degrading institution of slavery 
continues throughout the world. Trafficking in persons is a modern form of 
slavery, and it is the largest manifestation of slavery today. At least 700,000 
persons annually, primarily women and children, are trafficked within or 
across international borders. Approximately 50,000 women and children are 
trafficked into the United States each year. 
 
(2) Many of these persons are trafficked into the international sex trade, 
often by force, fraud, or coercion. The sex industry has rapidly expanded 
over the past several decades. It involves sexual exploitation of persons, 
predominantly women and girls, involving activities related to prostitution, 
pornography, sex tourism, and other commercial sexual services. The low 
status of women in many parts of the world has contributed to a burgeoning 
of the trafficking industry. 
 
(3) Trafficking in persons is not limited to the sex industry. This growing 
transnational crime also includes forced labor and involves significant 
violations of labor, public health, and human rights standards worldwide. 
 
(4) Traffickers primarily target women and girls, who are 
disproportionately affected by poverty, the lack of access to education, 
chronic unemployment, discrimination, and the lack of economic 
opportunities in countries of origin. Traffickers lure women and girls into 
their networks through false promises of decent working conditions at 
relatively good pay as nannies, maids, dancers, factory workers, restaurant 
workers, sales clerks, or models. Traffickers also buy children from poor 
families and sell them into prostitution or into various types of forced or 
bonded labor. 
 
(5) Traffickers often transport victims from their home communities to 
unfamiliar destinations, including foreign countries away from family and 
friends, religious institutions, and other sources of protection and support, 
leaving the victims defenseless and vulnerable. 
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(6) Victims are often forced through physical violence to engage in sex 
acts or perform slavery-like labor. Such force includes rape and other forms 
of sexual abuse, torture, starvation, imprisonment, threats, psychological 
abuse, and coercion. 
 
(7) Traffickers often make representations to their victims that physical 
harm may occur to them or others should the victim escape or attempt to 
escape. Such representations can have the same coercive effects on victims 
as direct threats to inflict such harm. 
 
(8) Trafficking in persons is increasingly perpetrated by organized, 
sophisticated criminal enterprises. Such trafficking is the fastest growing 
source of profits for organized criminal enterprises worldwide. Profits from 
the trafficking industry contribute to the expansion of organized crime in the 
United States and worldwide. Trafficking in persons is often aided by 
official corruption in countries of origin, transit, and destination, thereby 
threatening the rule of law. 
 
(9) Trafficking includes all the elements of the crime of forcible rape 
when it involves the involuntary participation of another person in sex acts 
by means of fraud, force, or coercion. 
 
(10) Trafficking also involves violations of other laws, including labor 
and immigration codes and laws against kidnapping, slavery, false 
imprisonment, assault, battery, pandering, fraud, and extortion. 
 
(11) Trafficking exposes victims to serious health risks. Women and 
children trafficked in the sex industry are exposed to deadly diseases, 
including HIV and AIDS. Trafficking victims are sometimes worked or 
physically brutalized to death. 
 
(12) Trafficking in persons substantially affects interstate and foreign 
commerce. Trafficking for such purposes as involuntary servitude, peonage, 
and other forms of forced labor has an impact on the nationwide 
employment network and labor market. Within the context of slavery, 
servitude, and labor or services which are obtained or maintained through 
coercive conduct that amounts to a condition of servitude, victims are 
subjected to a range of violations. 
 
… 
 
(14) Existing legislation and law enforcement in the United States and 
other countries are inadequate to deter trafficking and bring traffickers to 
justice, failing to reflect the gravity of the offenses involved. No 
comprehensive law exists in the United States that penalizes the range of 
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offenses involved in the trafficking scheme. Instead, even the most brutal 
instances of trafficking in the sex industry are often punished under laws 
that also apply to lesser offenses, so that traffickers typically escape 
deserved punishment. 
 
… 
 
(16) In some countries, enforcement against traffickers is also hindered 
by official indifference, by corruption, and sometimes even by official 
participation in trafficking. 
 
(17) Existing laws often fail to protect victims of trafficking, and because 
victims are often illegal immigrants in the destination country, they are 
repeatedly punished more harshly than the traffickers themselves. 
 
… 
 
(19) Victims of severe forms of trafficking should not be inappropriately 
incarcerated, fined, or otherwise penalized solely for unlawful acts 
committed as a direct result of being trafficked, such as using false 
documents, entering the country without documentation, or working without 
documentation. 
 
(20) Because victims of trafficking are frequently unfamiliar with the 
laws, cultures, and languages of the countries into which they have been 
trafficked, because they are often subjected to coercion and intimidation 
including physical detention and debt bondage, and because they often fear 
retribution and forcible removal to countries in which they will face 
retribution or other hardship, these victims often find it difficult or 
impossible to report the crimes committed against them or to assist in the 
investigation and prosecution of such crimes. 
 
(21) Trafficking in persons is an evil requiring concerted and vigorous 
action by countries of origin, transit or destination, and by international 
organizations. 
 
(22) One of the founding documents of the United States, the Declaration 
of Independence, recognizes the inherent dignity and worth of all people. It 
states that all men are created equal and that they are endowed by their 
Creator with certain unalienable rights. The right to be free from slavery and 
involuntary servitude is among those unalienable rights. Acknowledging 
this fact, the United States outlawed slavery and involuntary servitude in 
1865, recognizing them as evil institutions that must be abolished. Current 
practices of sexual slavery and trafficking of women and children are 
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similarly abhorrent to the principles upon which the United States was 
founded. 
 
(23) The United States and the international community agree that 
trafficking in persons involves grave violations of human rights and is a 
matter of pressing international concern. The international community has 
repeatedly condemned slavery and involuntary servitude, violence against 
women, and other elements of trafficking, through declarations, treaties, and 
United Nations resolutions and reports, including the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights; the 1956 Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of 
Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery; 
the 1948 American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man; the 1957 
Abolition of Forced Labor Convention; the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; United Nations General 
Assembly Resolutions 50/167, 51/66, and 52/98; the Final Report of the 
World Congress against Sexual Exploitation of Children (Stockholm, 1996); 
the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995); and the 1991 
Moscow Document of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. 
 
(24) Trafficking in persons is a transnational crime with national 
implications. To deter international trafficking and bring its perpetrators to 
justice, nations including the United States must recognize that trafficking is 
a serious offense. This is done by prescribing appropriate punishment, 
giving priority to the prosecution of trafficking offenses, and protecting 
rather than punishing the victims of such offenses. The United States must 
work bilaterally and multilaterally to abolish the trafficking industry by 
taking steps to promote cooperation among countries linked together by 
international trafficking routes. The United States must also urge the 
international community to take strong action in multilateral fora to engage 
recalcitrant countries in serious and sustained efforts to eliminate trafficking 
and protect trafficking victims.247  
 
 
  
 247. Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2005, supra note 219, § 
7101(b) (emphasis added) (findings irrelevant to international scope omitted). 
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 “Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe 
free.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
To respond to the need for communicating with civilians during the Iraq 
War, the United States military hired Iraqis to work as interpreters for 
troops on the ground.2 These interpreters not only risked their own lives 
  
 1. EMMA LAZARUS, The New Colossus, in SELECTED POEMS 58 (John Hollander, ed., 
2005). 
 2. See Maiken Scott, Iraqi Interpreter’s Story Sheds Light on Plight of Those Left 
Behind, NEWSWORKS (Sept. 16, 2011), http://www.newsworks.org/index.php/health-
science/item/26662-iraqi-interpreters-story-sheds-light-on-plight-of-those-left-behind (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
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performing this task, but also the lives of their family members, because 
taking on this role was seen by many Iraqi extremists as collaborating with 
the enemy.3 To reward the sacrifices made by interpreters, Congress took 
action to authorize a significant number of Special Immigrant Visas 
(“SIVs”) to interpreters so that they could live comfortably in the U.S.4 
Unfortunately, the effects of these actions have been minimal. Many former 
interpreters currently face the decision to either remain in the U.S. with little 
opportunity to support themselves and their families or to return to Iraq 
where they risk being murdered for their assistance to U.S. forces.5  
To provide assistance to veterans of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts, 
Congress passed the Vow to Hire Heroes Act (“VHHA”) on November 10, 
2011.6 The VHHA provides incentives to private businesses that hire 
veterans, issues grants to non-profit organizations that provide training and 
placement to veterans, and extends rehabilitation and vocational benefits to 
veterans with severe injuries or illnesses.7 Despite Congressional knowledge 
of the difficulties facing the former interpreters who were fortunate enough 
to obtain SIVs, the VHHA, however, provides no incentives to businesses 
that hire interpreters who served alongside U.S. troops during the conflicts 
in the Middle East. There is very limited data indicating intentional 
discrimination against the former interpreters. However, Congress’ actions 
show otherwise. 
Because it is well-known that interpreters struggle to survive 
economically in the U.S., the VHHA is a violation of former interpreters’ 
equal protection and civil rights.8 Part I of this Note will explain the 
extreme sacrifices made by interpreters in the Middle East and Congress’ 
response to interpreters’ work for U.S. troops.9 Part II will discuss the 
history and Congressional intent behind the VHHA.10 Part III will explore 
  
 3. Id.  
 4. See National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. §§ 
1241- 49 (1st Sess. 2008); Relocation Empowerment and Placement Assistance for Iraqi 
Refugees Act of 2007, H.R. 3824, 110th Cong. §§ 3, 7 (2007); Deborah Amos, Lawmakers 
Lobby to Bring Iraqi Translators to U.S., NPR (Nov. 27, 2007), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=16650437. 
 5. See Anna King, Former Iraqi Interpreter Tries to Make It in a Down Economy, 
OPB NEWS (Jan. 5, 2009, 10:09 PM), http://news.opb.org/article/former-iraqi-interpreter-
tries-make-it-down-economy. 
 6. See Press Release, Senator Patty Murray, Veterans: Senator Murray’s Landmark 
Veterans Employment Bill Passes Senate (Nov. 10, 2011), available at 
http://www.murray.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/newsreleases?ContentRecord_id=74ff2a37-
d6a1-4387-87e2-81ad6016c766 [hereinafter Murray]; Repeal of Imposition of 3 Percent 
Withholding on Certain Payments Made to Vendors by Government Entities, H.R. Con. Res. 
674, 112th Cong. (2011) (enacted) (pointing specifically to Title Two, “VOW to Hire Heroes 
Act of 2011”). 
 7. See H.R. Con. Res. 674 at §§ 225, 232, 234. 
 8. See infra pp. 10-22. 
 9. See infra pp. 2-5. 
 10. See infra pp. 5-9. 
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the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and describe 
how it applies to former interpreters.11 Part III also discusses how the strict 
discriminatory purpose requirement to the Equal Protection Clause can be 
met to prove a violation of interpreters’ rights. Finally, Part IV will discuss 
a potential civil rights claim that former interpreters could make against the 
government under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.12 
I. THE SACRIFICES OF MILITARY INTERPRETERS AND THEIR “REWARD”  
“[It’s] like you live in heaven but you cannot touch anything in it, so 
what is the use of it?”13 
 
In order to rebuild Iraq and take on an insurgency, the U.S. military 
employed thousands of Iraqi interpreters to accompany U.S. troops on 
missions abroad.14 Iraqi interpreters operated alongside U.S. troops on every 
mission conducted outside American outposts.15 Without Iraqi interpreters, 
U.S. troops would have been “essentially blind to what [was] happening 
around them.”16 Insurgents targeted interpreters, both men and women, 
because insurgents knew the American military would need Iraqi 
interpreters to build significant relationships among the populace if they 
wanted to win the hearts and minds of the Iraqi population.17 Because the 
U.S. needed interpreters on “forward” missions,18 they were exposed to 
more risk than many American servicemen and women who rarely left the 
comfort of American bases while serving in Iraq or Afghanistan.19 
Furthermore, while military units rotate home after a tour of duty, 
  
 11. See infra pp. 9-21. 
 12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2012); infra pp. 21-25. 
 13. King, supra note 5. 
 14. See T. Christian Miller, U.S. Insurance Firm Neglects Survivors of Iraqi 
Translators, May Face Criminal Charges, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2011, 9:19 AM), 
http://www.propublica.org/article/us-insurance-firm-neglects-survivors-of-iraqi-translators-
may-face-criminal/single. 
 15. Scott, supra note 2. 
 16. Thomas X. Hammes, Lost in Translation, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2005), 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=950DE4DB1E3EF936A1575BC0A9639C8B
63&ref=interpreters#. 
 17. Paul Thompson, Current Development: Development in International Area: Iraqi 
Translators Face Difficulties Gaining Asylum in the United States, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 141, 
142 (2007). 
 18. See John Koopman, The Rough and the Smooth, SFGATE (Mar. 20, 2006, 7:09 
PM), http://blog.sfgate.com/iraqjkcg/page/3/ (indicating that many troops serving in Iraq 
were removed from actual combat and were based in areas “with more security per square 
inch than the lobby of San Francisco’s Hall of Justice.”); Michael Doyle, Courts Struggle to 
Decide Whether Civilians can be Court-martialed, STARS AND STRIPES (Apr. 7, 2012), 
http://www.stripes.com/news/us/courts-struggle-to-decide-whether-civilians-can-be-court-
martialed-1.173815 (addressing the fact that interpreters work alongside troops located in 
areas where intense combat took place). 
 19. See John Koopman, supra note 18. 
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interpreters stay behind and provide assistance to the U.S. troops replacing 
the previous unit.20 As a result, the interpreters’ death toll was greater than 
any assisting country’s military during the American-led coalition in Iraq.21 
The role of the interpreter was crucial to U.S. success because as Michael 
Breen, a former infantry Captain in the U.S. Army stated, “a trusted 
interpreter [could have been] the difference between a successful patrol and 
body bag.”22 
Though the U.S. considered interpreters to be contractors, they were 
under the supervision of military personnel while performing front-line 
military duties.23 Furthermore, military commanders had final oversight 
over their actions just as military commanders have over American patrols 
on the ground in Iraq or Afghanistan.24 The military even supplied 
interpreters with the necessary equipment and training to accompany 
soldiers on missions.25 Thus, interpreters were essentially soldiers because 
they were subject to military regulations and endured the same risks as most 
service men and women.  
A. The U.S. Response to Interpreter Benefits 
After proposals by Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy and New York 
Congressman Steve Israel, Congress began to realize the importance of 
interpreters to U.S. troops overseas.26 Senator Kennedy introduced the 
Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act in 2007, which President George W. Bush signed 
into law in 2008.27 The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act was included in the 
  
 20. See Conrad Mulcahy, Officers Battle Visa Hurdles for Iraq Aides,  
N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/14/world/middleeast/14interpreters.html?_r=1&ref=interpr
eters (last visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 21. See Miller, supra note 14. 
  22.  Michael Breen, The Debt We Owe Iraqi Interpreters, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE 
MONITOR (Dec. 9, 2008), http://www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2008/1209/ 
p09s02-coop.html (last visited May 12, 2012). 
 23. See Id.; see also Scott, supra note 2. 
 24. Kristin L. Richer, Note, The Functional Political Question Doctrine and the 
Justiciability of Employee Tort Suits Against Military Service Contractors, 85 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1694, 1720 (2010) (citing U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, CONTRACTING SUPPORT ON THE 
BATTLEFIELD 2-10 (1999)). “The Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA), generally the head 
of command in the particular theater of combat, has ultimate authority over all decisions 
made regarding the contracting firm.” Id. at 1720 n.132. Furthermore, “the commander bears 
complete responsibility for all actions of contractors taken under his command.” Id. 
 25. Id. at 1721 n. 135. “Contractors should be assured that the government will 
provide equipment and training . . . .” Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of the Army, Army Regulation 
700-137, Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (1985)). 
 26. See Amos, supra note 4; INT’L RESCUE COMM., FIVE YEARS LATER, A HIDDEN 
CRISIS 10 (2008), available at http://www.rescue.org/sites/default/files/migrated/ 
resources/2008/iraq_report.pdf.  
 27. Ruthie Epstein, U.S. Withdraws Troops from Iraq, But Must Not Abandon Its 
Refugees, Human Rights First (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/ 
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National Defense Authorization Act for the 2008 fiscal year.28 This act 
allowed up to 5,000 Iraqis, employed by the U.S. government in Iraq, to 
obtain SIVs annually for five years.29 In 2007, Representative Israel 
introduced the Relocation Empowerment and Placement Assistance for 
Iraqi Refugees Act (REPAIR).30 This would have required “instruction in 
English as a second language, vocational training, computer training, 
employment services, and certain counseling services” to improve job 
opportunities for former interpreters entering the U.S.31  
Unfortunately for Senator Kennedy and Representative Israel, neither of 
these proposals came to fruition. The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act has not 
lived up to expectations. The process required for interpreters to apply for 
SIVs, which the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act acknowledged, was difficult, 
confusing, and lined in red tape.32 Furthermore, former military officers 
have complained of roadblocks, such as requiring a General’s signature for 
the application to be complete.33 This requirement is “like a junior associate 
at a Fortune 500 company asking the chief executive for a letter of 
recommendation.”34 Due to these massive hurdles, only 3,415 former Iraqi 
interpreters received an SIV by the end of 2011.35 This number is nearly 
2,000 less than the amount authorized per year from 2008 to 2012, 
according to the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act.36  
Even with Representative Israel’s strong support for providing former 
interpreters with SIVs opportunities in the U.S., the REPAIR Act failed to 
pass in the House of Representatives.37 Representative Israel has expressed 
his disappointment with Congress’ inaction and failure to support his 
proposal: “Now there’s no agency to help find a job or a place to live. Once 
Iraqi translators arrive in the U.S., they’re on their own.”38 Those fortunate 
enough to make it to the U.S. live lives fit for paupers. Most struggle to 
make ends meet and must even consider returning to Iraq.39 Back in Iraq, 
  
2011/12/09/u-s-withdraws-troops-from-iraq-but-must-not-abandon-its-refugees/; see also 
H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. §§ 1241- 49 (1st Sess. 2008). 
 28. H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. §§ 1241- 49 (1st Sess. 2008).  
 29. H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. § 1244(c)(2) (1st Sess. 2008). 
 30. Relocation Empowerment and Placement Assistance for Iraqi Refugees Act of 
2007, H.R. 3824, 110th Cong. § 7 (2007). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Mulcahy, supra note 20. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Kevin Spak, US Hangs Iraqi Translators Out to Dry, NEWSER (Dec. 27, 2011 
2:12 PM CST), http://www.newser.com/story/136234/us-hangs-iraqi-translators-out-to-
dry.html. 
 36. H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. § 1244(c)(1) (1st Sess. 2008).  
 37. Relocation Empowerment and Placement Assistance for Iraqi Refugees Act of 
2007, GOVTRACK.US, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr3824 (last visited May 13, 
2012) (for an overview of House Bill 3824).  
 38. Amos, supra note 4. 
 39. See King, supra note 5; see also Mulcahy, supra note 20. 
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extremists will inevitably target interpreters and their families, now labeled 
as traitors, for their previous collaboration with the U.S.40 Around the same 
time that Congress refused to provide assistance to these former interpreters 
living in the U.S., who were an integral part of the war effort, it enacted the 
VHHA, which ensures plentiful job opportunities for the 2.38 million 
Americans who served in Iraq and Afghanistan.41 Both houses of Congress 
passed the VHHA last fall.42 
II. THE VOW TO HIRE HEROES ACT 
The VHHA was designed to combat the unemployment problem among 
American veterans by providing job training assistance.43 Several of the 
benefits provided to veterans in the VHHA are strikingly similar to some of 
the potential benefits that would have been provided to former interpreters 
in the REPAIR Act. The VHHA provides a retraining program for veterans 
that will offer civilian training for veterans in their military profession.44 In 
addition, the VHHA provides incentives to non-profit organizations that 
provide training and mentoring for unemployed veterans and rehabilitation 
and vocational benefits to veterans with injuries or illnesses.45 Similarly, the 
REPAIR Act also called for employment training and mentoring for former 
interpreters in their search for employment in the U.S.46  
Representative Israel should be furious about the rejection of the 
REPAIR Act, considering the same benefits he wanted to extend to nearly 
3,500 legal aliens in the U.S. were extended to over two million American 
citizens. Extending the same benefits to 3,500 former interpreters who 
risked just as much as the U.S. soldiers they worked alongside would only 
marginally diminish the entitlements to the 2.38 million veterans under the 
VHHA.  
A. Interpreters as veterans under the Vow to Hire Heroes Act 
The U.S. has defined a veteran of the current conflicts in the Middle East 
as an individual who  
  
 40. Id. 
 41. VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) 
(enacted); Associated Press, Obama Salutes Iraq War Vets at White House Dinner, 
LONGISLANDPRESS.COM (Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.longislandpress.com/2012/02/ 
29/obama-salutes-iraq-war-vets-at-white-house-dinner [hereinafter LONGISLANDPRESS]. 
 42. H.R. 674; LONGISLANDPRESS, supra note 41. 
 43. See generally H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011); see also Murray, supra 
note 6. 
 44. H.R. 674, 112th Cong. § 211 (1st Sess. 2011). 
 45. H.R. 674, 112th Cong. §§ 225, 232, 234 (1st Sess. 2011).  
 46. Relocation Empowerment and Placement Assistance for Iraqi Refugees Act of 
2007, H.R. 3824, 110th Cong. §§ 3, 7 (2007). 
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[s]erved on active duty at any time for a period of more than 180 
consecutive days any part of which occurred during the period beginning 
on September 11, 2001, and ending on the date prescribed by Presidential 
proclamation or by law as the last date of Operation Iraqi Freedom. . . .47  
Moreover, the individual must have been “discharged or released from 
active duty in the armed forces under honorable conditions.”48  
The interpreters who enlisted their services to aid active duty service 
men and women in accomplishing military missions should fall within both 
of these definitions. First, interpreters fell under the command of military 
leaders.49 Secondly the U.S. military provided them training and equipment 
to successfully assist the U.S. military in its operations in the Middle East.50 
The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act required that interpreters work for the 
government for at least one year and receive a positive recommendation 
from a senior supervisor to obtain a SIV.51 This is evident because a military 
General was required to sign off on a letter for the interpreters in order to 
move to the U.S.52 The General’s signature was required to establish 
“faithful and valuable service to the U.S. government” just as an honorable 
discharge or release from the U.S. military is also intended to indicate 
faithful service to the government.53  
Another reason why these interpreters should be considered veterans 
under the VHHA is their importance in the war effort.  In Personnel 
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the 
Supreme Court conceded that veterans benefits have been extended under 
broad statutory definitions and that they do not show preference for men 
over women.54 The statute referenced in Feeney also allowed any person 
with specified campaign awards to be considered a veteran.55    
For example, these interpreters’ presence in front line patrols in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were imperative to the success of American ground troop 
operations.56 In some instances, their service was so exemplary that the 
military awarded them military honors.57 When interpreters were killed in 
combat, many military units performed memorial ceremonies that replicated 
  
 47. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(D) (2012). 
 48. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(d) (2012).  
 49. Richer, supra note 24, at 1720 n.132. 
 50. Id. at 1721 n.135. 
 51. National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. § 1244 (1st 
Sess. 2008). 
 52. Mulcahy, supra note 20.  
 53. H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. § 1244 (1st Sess. 2008). 
 54. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-80 (1979). 
 55. Id. at 262 n.8. 
 56. See Breen, supra note 22. 
 57. Miller, supra note 14. 
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ceremonies for slain soldiers.58 The Army has even tried interpreters in 
military court for violating the laws of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice.59 The justification is that interpreters, like soldiers, were “deeply 
embedded with the armed forces in an area of actual fighting” and “wore the 
same uniform, ate the same food, slept in the same tents, and faced the same 
constant dangers from the enemy.”60 In sum, if the government treats 
interpreters like soldiers while at war, the government should treat 
interpreters as veterans once the conflict is over. 
Veterans’ preference systems have traditionally been tailored “to reward 
veterans for the sacrifice of military service, to ease the transition from 
military to civilian life, [and] to encourage patriotic service.”61 The general 
objective of most veterans’ preference statutes is to reward former service 
members for the risks they endured.62 These preferences are problematic 
because they are offered at the expense of non-veterans.63 However, 
excluding the former interpreters from the benefits of the VHHA is not 
simply an exclusion of non-veterans; it is an exclusion of individuals who 
fall within the definition of “veteran” according to Congress’ own 
definition.64 Not only did the majority of these interpreters serve alongside 
U.S. forces for over 180 consecutive days following September 11, 2001—
in accordance with the VHHA—they did so in the most hostile and 
dangerous zones of the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.65 Furthermore, 
providing similar benefits to interpreters and U.S. troops would send a 
message to future interpreters that their risks in assisting the American war 
effort will not go unrewarded.  
Additionally, including interpreters in the veterans’ preference system 
would allow former interpreters to make a more seamless transition from 
the Middle East to the U.S, just as veterans’ preferences provide for a 
smooth transition from soldier to civilian life.66 This is extremely significant 
considering that many former interpreters battle many of the same post-war 
effects as American soldiers. Some of these effects include physical injuries 
and psychological issues like post traumatic stress disorder.67   
The U.S. should take this opportunity to allow former interpreters to 
stand side by side with veterans in order to send a message to the rest of the 
  
 58. The Associated Press, Translators Dying by the Dozens in Iraq, USA TODAY 
(May 21, 2005, 3:58 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2005-05-21-translator-
deaths_x.htm. 
 59. See Doyle, supra note 18. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. 
 62. See Melissa E. Murray, Whatever Happened to G.I. Jane?: Citizenship, Gender, 
and Social Policy in the Postwar Era, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 91, 93 (2002). 
 63. Id. 
 64. See 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(D) (2012). 
 65. Scott, supra note 2. 
 66. Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 265 (1979). 
 67. Miller, supra note 14. 
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world. Former interpreters are facing difficulties with employment 
opportunities in other well-developed nations. For example, former 
interpreters in the United Kingdom complain of being treated as illegal 
immigrants when it comes to finding work.68 Furthermore, as of June 2011, 
only nine of 223 former Iraqi interpreters living in Australia were employed 
full time.69 However, Denmark, a country that only committed 480 troops to 
the war in Iraq, granted asylum to 228 interpreters and their families in 
2008, and even provided employment training and language schooling for 
up to three years.70 Denmark’s treatment of former interpreters is 
remarkable when considering it was the U.S. that spearheaded the attack in 
Iraq.71 In light of Denmark’s commitment to respecting the service of 
former interpreters, the U.S. should also honor their service by extending 
the VHHA benefits. 
The reality is that the U.S. does not see these former interpreters as 
veterans under the VHHA, despite Congressional knowledge of their 
sacrifices with the failure of the REPAIR and Refugee Crisis in Iraq Acts. 
The overcome this Congressional neglect, former can take legal action to 
receive the government assistance they deserve is to take legal action 
against the U.S. government. Of the legal remedies available, an Equal 
Protection claim would be the most plausible.  
III. EQUAL PROTECTION 
A. The Principles of an Equal Protection Violation 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits 
states from denying persons the equal protection of laws.72 “The Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment contains an equal protection 
component prohibiting the United States from discriminating against 
individuals or groups.”73 A claim under the equal protection component of 
the Fifth Amendment could be made on behalf of legal aliens (former 
interpreters of the U.S. military) because Congress was well aware of their 
  
  68. Anushka Asthana, Army’s Iraqi interpreters face hardship after fleeing to UK, 
THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/nov/07/iraqi-interpreter-
refugees-jobless-britain. 
 69. Ingrid Piller, Patriots and traitors, LANGUAGE ON THE MOVE (June 6, 2011), 
http://www.languageonthemove.com/language-migration-social-justice/patriots-and-traitors. 
 70. Walter Pincus, Asylum Program Falls Short for Iraqis Aiding U.S. Forces, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/ 
article/2008/01/21/AR2008012102170.html. 
 71. Ryan Chilcote, John King, & Barbara Starr, U.S. Launches Cruise Missiles at 
Saddam, CNN.COM (Mar 20, 2003, 1:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2003/ 
WORLD/meast/03/19/sprj.irq.main.  
 72. U.S. Const. amend. XIV § 1.  
 73. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 
U.S. 497 (1954)).  
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hardships at the time the VHHA was passed and still disregarded former 
interpreters. 
1. Prima Facie Case 
Regardless of whether or not a challenged statute is facially neutral or 
facially discriminatory toward a suspect class, such as race, legal alienage, 
and national origin,74 or a “quasi suspect class, such as women or 
illegitimate children,”75 a plaintiff must make a prima facie case of 
discrimination.76 The presumption of constitutional validity disappears if a 
statute is facially discriminatory towards a suspect class or a quasi suspect 
class.77 Once a statute is deemed discriminatory on its face, it is then 
presumed that there is a prima facie case of discriminatory purpose behind 
the statute.78  
2. Discriminatory Impact 
In addition to a discriminatory purpose, the plaintiff must also prove the 
existence of a discriminatory impact.79 If a plaintiff is able to successfully 
establish both a discriminatory purpose and a discriminatory impact, a 
prima facie case of discrimination against either the suspect class or the 
quasi suspect class has been made.80 The burden of proof then shifts to the 
government to prove either there was no such discriminatory intent and 
impact,81 or there was a compelling government interest behind the statute.82 
If the government fails to overcome this burden, a court will subject the 
statute to strict judicial scrutiny.83 If the plaintiff fails to make a prima facie 
case of discrimination or the government rebuts a case of discrimination, the 
government simply has to show a rational relationship (rational basis test) 
  
 74. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985); Nancy 
G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United States 
Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 141, 159 (2001). 
 75. Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976); Jessica Knouse, Civil 
Marriage: Threat to Democracy, 18 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 361, 392 n.147 (2012). 
 76. Davis, 426 U.S. at 241. 
 77. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971). 
 80. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. 
 81. Id. at 241. 
 82. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371, 376 (1971); Daniel Eduardo Guzman, 
Note, There Be No Shelter Here: Anti-Immigrant Housing Ordinances and Comprehensive 
Reform, 20 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 399, 426 (2010). 
 83. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376; For a more detailed analysis of the strict scrutiny test 
see infra pp. 20-21. 
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between the disparate treatment and legitimate government purpose behind 
the statute.84 
Federal courts also consider a specific group’s political powerlessness in 
the political process when determining how much protection a particular 
class will receive.85 Courts may allow such groups to obtain special 
protection because they are being denied the use of the political arena to 
fight legislation that is adversely affecting them. 86 The Supreme Court has 
held that “[a] desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 
a legitimate government interest.”87  
However, there are exceptions to alienage classifications. Strict scrutiny 
will not apply to classifications against lawful aliens where the restriction is 
to serve the process of self-government.88 In Cabell, the Supreme Court 
held that restricting legal aliens from working as probation officers received 
the rational basis test because probation officers have the power to arrest 
and such coercive force should be limited to citizens.89 
B. The Vow to Hire Heroes Act as a Facially Discriminatory Statute 
The VHHA is a federal act passed by Congress.90 Because potential 
plaintiffs would have to make a claim against the U.S. to fight the 
unconstitutionality of the VHHA, the equal protection component of the 
Fifth Amendment could be used to make the interpreters’ claim. 
A plaintiff could argue the VHHA is facially discriminatory because it 
continuously uses terms such as “veterans” and “members of the armed 
forces” to describe the beneficiaries of the statute.91 A “veteran” of the 
recent “Operation Iraqi Freedom” is defined as any individual who served 
on active duty for 180 consecutive days after September 11, 2001 and was 
honorably released from active duty.92 Most interpreters fought alongside of 
American armed forces for years in hostile zones, far exceeding the 180 day 
requirement.93 Further, the military granted SIVs to interpreters who 
  
 84. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993); Kevin Lapp, Pressing Public Necessity: 
The Unconstitutionality of the Absconder Apprehension Initiative, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 573, 589 (2005). 
  85. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
  86. Jennifer E. Watson, Note, When No Place Is Home: Why the Homeless Deserve 
Suspect Classification, 88 IOWA L. REV. 501, 509 (2003). 
 87. Dept. of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973). 
 88. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982). 
 89. Id. at 446, 457. 
 90. See VOW to Hire Heroes Act of 2011, H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011) 
(enacted). 
 91. See generally H.R. 674, 112th Cong. (1st Sess. 2011). 
 92. 5 U.S.C. § 2108(1)(D) (2012).  
 93. Scott, supra note 2. 
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assisted the armed forces in their missions with distinction.94 Thus, these 
interpreters have achieved “veteran” status. 
Unfortunately, the federal government has refused to extend veteran 
benefits to interpreters. The government has come nowhere close to the 
5,000 annual visa maximum for former interpreters as per the Refugee 
Crisis in Iraq Act.95 Further, the Department of Labor has neglected to 
enforce the Defense Base Act.96 This act required certain insurance 
companies to provide treatment payments to former interpreters battling 
physical or psychological injuries that resulted from fighting alongside 
American service men and women.97 Although scarce data and recorded 
statements exist from lawmakers, indicating a refusal to consider former 
interpreters as veterans, the actions of the federal government show 
otherwise.  
If this statute were found facially discriminatory against this class of 
legal aliens, then a prima facie case of discriminatory intent would be 
present.98 A discriminatory impact could be proven with statistical analysis 
indicating the current economic suffering of former wartime interpreters. 
Even though such studies producing concrete numbers have not yet been 
conducted, unemployment statistics for current Iraqi refugees living in the 
U.S. reached 60 percent in 2009.99 Moreover, many former interpreters are 
in such dire need of economic assistance that they are contemplating 
returning to their native countries where they face extreme danger.100 A 
discriminatory purpose and impact would result in a court reviewing the 
VHHA with strict judicial scrutiny. Under a strict scrutiny review, the 
government would have to prove a compelling government interest existed 
  
 94. Mulcahy, supra note 20. 
 95. See National Defense Authorization Act of 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. § 
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 98. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980). 
 99. See Migration Policy Institute Releases Refugee Report, IRAQI REFUGEE 
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articles/2008/12/22/for-iraqi-refugees-in-america-the-recession-makes-it-even-harder-to-
find-jobs (quoting the vice president of the International Rescue Committee’s resettlement 
and migration policy as seeing a 50% drop in job placements from 2007 to 2008); Refugee 
Crisis in America: Iraqis and Their Resettlement Experience, GEO. U. L. CTR., HUM. RTS 
INST 20 (2009), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/releases/ 
documents/RefugeeCrisisinAmerica_000.pdf (explaining that the employment rate for Iraqi 
refugees in San Diego in 2008 was around 25%) [hereinafter GEO. U. L. CTR].  
 100. King, supra note 5. 
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when Congress decided to exclude this class of legal aliens from the 
VHHA.101  
C. The Vow to Hire Heroes Act as a Facially Neutral Discriminatory  
Statute 
Facially neutral classifications make an inferential discrimination against 
suspect classes.102 Such legislation may not have had the direct intent to 
discriminate when they were passed.103 By excluding former interpreters, 
the VHHA, at the very least, makes a facially neutral classification against 
legal aliens.104 The interpreters fall within this suspect class because they 
are lawfully living in the U.S. on government issued SIVs.105  
Furthermore, the VHHA is not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
government’s interests. As previously established, the men and women who 
served as interpreters for the U.S. military in the Middle East shared many 
of the same hardships and benefits of American soldiers they worked 
alongside.106 Therefore, if the VHHA does not include former interpreters, it 
is simply not a preference for veterans over nonveterans like the preference 
at issue in Feeney.107 Instead, it is a preference for American citizens over 
legal aliens.  
Additionally, the VHHA does not meet the exception to avoid strict 
scrutiny by meeting the exception set forth in Feeney. The VHHA does not 
mention providing benefits to veterans that would allow easier access to law 
enforcement positions or other occupations that would serve the process of 
self-government.108 The VHHA simply calls for tax incentives to businesses 
that hire veterans, increased job training to veterans, and educational 
benefits to veterans.109 
Further, the VHHA creates a discriminatory impact against former 
interpreters. Already faced with dismal job opportunities, the VHHA will 
ensure that former American soldiers will receive more opportunities than 
former interpreters. This diminishes the already low probability of former 
interpreters finding gainful employment in the U.S. The VHHA makes it far 
more difficult for former interpreters to receive aid from the government 
than the American citizens they served beside. 
  
 101. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371 (1971); Guzman, supra note 82 at 426.  
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In addition to the legislation’s discriminatory impact, interpreters would 
also be required to prove a discriminatory purpose.110 The standard has 
proven difficult to meet and has, often times, resulted in an absolute bar to 
specific equal protection claims concerning race neutral statutes.111 
D. Proving a Discriminatory Purpose 
A plaintiff must show evidence of a discriminatory purpose independent 
of discriminatory impact to prove that a facially neutral law is in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.112 However, a plaintiff can use other 
circumstantial evidence to show the totality of relevant facts, which 
produces an inference of a discriminatory purpose.113 Patterns of 
discriminatory conduct will also give rise to an inference of discriminatory 
purpose.114 In addition, courts can use statistics in certain cases to determine 
if they can infer a discriminatory purpose from the relevant facts.115 
1. Circumstantial Evidence of Government Intent to 
Discriminate 
Even though the VHHA may not discriminate against legal aliens 
(former wartime interpreters for the U.S. military) on its face, other 
circumstantial evidence may suffice to convince a court that a 
discriminatory purpose could be inferred.116 Other evidence of the 
government’s intent to discriminate against this class of legal aliens has 
been evident in recent years. Studies have shown that Arabs have faced 
more discrimination in the U.S. than any class of individuals, other than 
homosexuals, since September 11, 2001.117 The 2009 Fort Hood killings by 
Nidal Malik Hasan and the 2009 attempted suicide bombing by Umar 
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 111. Chris Weaver & Will Purcell, The Prison Industrial Complex: A Modern 
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September 11, 18 AM. U. J. GEN. SOC. POL’Y & L. 411, 412 (2010) (citing PEW FORUM ON 
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Farouk Abdulmutallab on a Northwest Airlines flight have further fueled 
this intolerance.118 President Obama has even called for increased security 
measures, such as profiling individuals with “Muslim sounding names.” 119 
Also, two Congressmen, P. David Gaubatz and Paul Sperry, expressed their 
desire for a “professional and legal backlash against Muslims” while 
promoting their book on alleged Islamic conspiracies in the U.S.120  
An inference can also be made that Congress excluded former 
interpreters from the VHHA due to the actions of two Iraqi refugees last 
year. Federal officials arrested the refugees for attempting to provide 
weapons to al Qaeda from Kentucky.121 Following this incident, the 
Department of Homeland Security acknowledged that flaws exist in the 
standards it uses to screen refugees before entering the country.122 Though 
the two refugees were not former interpreters who risked their lives for an 
American cause, the government has slowly begun to lose interest in 
providing services to Iraqi refugees, regardless of whether they provided 
vital support to the military mission in the Middle East.123 
For example, the Defense Base Act requires certain insurance companies 
to compensate contractors, such as interpreters of the U.S. military, for 
injuries sustained in combat.124 However, a number of allegations surfaced 
last year that the Department of Labor “has seldom [taken] any action to 
enforce [this] law” when dealing with former interpreters now living in the 
U.S.125 Therefore, numerous former interpreters endure physical and 
psychological injuries resulting from their work as wartime interpreters 
without the proper reparations from the U.S. government.126  
Additionally, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2009 
encouraged the Department of Defense and the Department of State to hire 
former interpreters as translators, interpreters, and cultural awareness 
instructors, even though many government agencies are restricted from 
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 120. Id. (addressing the two Congressman’s anti-Islamic views and book entitled 
MUSLIM MAFIA: INSIDE THE SECRET UNDERWORLD THAT’S CONSPIRING TO ISLAMIZE 
AMERICA.(2009). 
 121. Terry Frieden, 2 Iraqis arrested in Kentucky, charged with aiding al Qaeda in 
Iraq, CNN JUSTICE (Mar. 31, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-
31/justice/kentucky.iraqis.arrested_1_qaeda-iraqi-authorities-weapons?_s=PM:CRIME. 
 122. Peter Smith & Andrew Wolfson, Kentucky Terrorist Arrests Shouldn’t 
Jeopardize Refugee Program, Advocates Say, COURIER-JOURNAL, Jun. 1, 2011, 
http://www.courier-journal.com/article/20110601/NEWS01/306010147 /Kentucky-terrorist-
arrests-shouldn-t-jeopardize-refugee-program-advocates-say. 
 123. See Tim Arango, Visa Delays Put Iraqis Who Aided U.S. in Fear, N.Y. TIMES, 
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hiring noncitizens. 127 This authorization was part of the Refugee Crisis in 
Iraq Act.128 However, neither agency has used the National Defense 
Authorization Act to hire former interpreters.129 A committee report from 
2010 indicated that former interpreters’ “fluency in Arabic and knowledge 
of Iraq could be useful to the U.S. government.”130 The report even 
indicated the risk and sacrifices made by interpreters while serving with 
American service members.131 Even so, officials at the Departments of 
Defense and State have indicated they have no plan to establish such a 
program to employ former interpreters.132  
By and large, the government has failed to provide benefits to former 
interpreters, despite acknowledging the sacrifices made to assist the military 
mission in the Middle East.133 Such exclusions would create an inference to 
any reasonable trier of fact that the government also purposely neglected 
former interpreters when devising the VHHA. 
2. Statistical Evidence 
Plaintiffs cannot rely on statistics alone to prove intentional 
governmental discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.134 If a court 
accepts statistics, there must be a link between the statistics and the alleged 
discrimination.135 There is no shortage of statistical facts to link the 
government to discrimination with regard to the VHHA.  
When examining the history of these legal aliens from the start of the 
Iraq war until the present day, there is a strong pattern of statistical 
discrimination. In 2005, two years into the Iraq war, the U.S. government 
paid interpreters working with U.S. troops $400 a month ($4,800 per 
year).136 The U.S. government paid oil and security contractors around 
$80,000 to $100,000 per year, without requiring them to accompany 
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frontline troops on combat patrols.137 Such a variance in earnings between 
security contractors and interpreters provides strong enough statistical 
evidence to infer a discriminatory purpose. While interpreters’ yearly wages 
were increased from $4,800 to $12,000 in 2009, a $12,000 yearly salary 
would still put an interpreter in a desperate economic situation in the U.S.138 
In comparison, a brand new Army Private earns around $18,000 a year.139 
This does not include extra pay, such as a basic housing allowance and 
hazardous duty pay if deployed overseas.140 These numbers indicate that the 
U.S. saw interpreters merely as pieces of equipment soldiers were required 
to carry into combat.  
Although no one has conducted an accurate study to determine the 
current employment rate of former interpreters, studies have been done to 
determine employment rates among Iraqi refugees. These studies have 
shown dangerously low numbers. For example, in 2008, the employment 
rate for Iraqi refugees in San Diego was around 25 percent.141 In 2009, 
another report showed employment rates for Iraqi refugees throughout the 
U.S. to be around 40 percent.142 Another telling figure is a United States 
Government Accountability Office Report where former interpreters were 
interviewed.143 The interpreters disclosed they had interviewed for more 
than 30 low-skill cleaning jobs before finally receiving work from a former 
supervisor in Iraq.144 These are just a few examples of the hardships facing 
former interpreters when it comes to finding gainful employment in the U.S.  
Despite these alarming statistics, the federal government has failed to 
act. Congress has allowed the Departments of Defense and State to hire 
former interpreters to work as translators, interpreters, and instructors.145 
Although the federal government possesses knowledge of the current 
economic suffering of these legal aliens, its departments have failed to 
create programs that would allow former interpreters to take advantage of 
such jobs.146  
Thus, the government has had ample opportunity to extend benefits and 
rewards to this class of legal aliens, but has continued to exclude them. The 
VHHA was another wasted opportunity for the government to include the 
former interpreters in the benefits being allocated to American veterans who 
risked their lives to take on the U.S. military’s mission in the Middle East. 
  
 137. Fast Facts: Contractors in Iraq, FOX NEWS.COM, July 6, 2005, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,161208,00.html.; Hammes, supra note 16. 
 138. Miller, supra note 14. 
 139. 2012 Military Pay Scale Salary Chart, MILTARY FACTORY, http://www. 
militaryfactory.com/military_pay_scale.asp (last visited May 14, 2012). 
 140. Id.  
 141. GEO. U. L. CNT., supra note 99, at 20-21. 
       142.     IRAQI REFUGEE ASSISTANCE PROJECT, supra note 99. 
 143. REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, supra note 127, at 12. 
 144. Id.  
 145. Id. at 19. 
 146. Id. at 11, 19. 
222 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:1  
E. Strict Scrutiny 
Whether the VHHA is seen as facially discriminatory or facially neutral, 
potential plaintiffs could find a discriminatory intent to exclude former 
military interpreters, legal aliens, who worked side by side with U.S. armed 
forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. Under the strict scrutiny standard, the 
burden will shift to the government to prove there was not a discriminatory 
purpose or impact. 147 Courts will not defer to a suspect classification in 
government legislation unless that classification is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest.148 In addition, this legislation must be 
narrowly tailored to meet this compelling interest, which means the suspect 
groups that are excluded from the legislation must fit tightly with this 
interest.149 To be narrowly tailored, the legislation must not be grossly 
underinclusive or overinclusive.150 Underinclusive classifications fail to 
include all similarly situated people with regards to the legislation’s 
purpose.151 In other words, some similarly situated individuals are included, 
whereas others are not.152 Overinclusiveness occurs when legislation 
extends beyond its purpose and affects people that lie outside of the 
statute’s objective.153 
The VHHA may serve a compelling government interest because the 
goal of most veterans’ preference programs is to reward the risk of military 
service.154 The President signed the VHHA into law with hope that the 
country would fulfill an obligation to servicemen and servicewomen.155 
Even if the VHHA is found to be a compelling government interest, it fails 
the narrowly tailored test. Congress and the President had other options to 
provide job benefits to those who served the military during the recent 
conflicts in the Middle East, without discriminating against the legal alien 
interpreters who served with American troops. Because the government’s 
objective was to reward those who served the U.S. overseas, it would have 
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made sense to reward the interpreters who accompanied frontline troops on 
every patrol and mission.156  
As a result, the VHHA is underinclusive. The VHHA protects a group of 
individuals (U.S. citizen soldiers) who greatly assisted in the U.S. 
government’s military mission in the Middle East, but not a separate group 
of individuals (legal alien interpreters) who assisted equally in support of 
that mission.157 There is no explanation as to how the government can send 
interpreters on the same dangerous assignments,158 provide them with the 
same equipment as service members,159 award them with military honors for 
heroism,160 and even punish them in the same manner as service members161 
without providing them the same benefits after their service.  
In addition to being underinclusiveness, the VHHA possesses a desire to 
discriminate against a politically powerless group of legal aliens that has 
been consistently unpopular with the federal government. Therefore, the 
VHHA does not serve a compelling government interest.162 The Department 
of Labor has refused to enforce the Defense Base Act which would require 
specified insurance companies to provide financing for injuries suffered 
while serving as interpreters in the Middle East.163 The Departments of 
Defense and State have refused to open up jobs for former interpreters even 
though these departments have had the opportunity to do so.164 The VHHA 
is another example of a government decision to neglect legal alien 
interpreters who put their lives at risk to support the U.S. government’s 
military mission in the Middle East.  
IV. CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATION 
If interpreters fail to achieve the strict burden of discriminatory purpose 
in an equal protection claim, a civil rights claim can also be made against 
the government under Title VI section 2000d of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Title VI section 2000d states that “[n]o person in the United States 
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”165 
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This prohibits the government from awarding federal funding to programs 
that discriminate.166  
A. Requirements for a Claim Under Title VI 
Title VI claims can be made for claims against racial classifications that 
would violate either the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment.167 
A plaintiff does not have to prove a discriminatory intent to make a claim 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.168 In cases where injunctive 
relief is sought, a showing of unintentional discrimination or discriminatory 
impact will suffice for a valid Title VI claim.169  
A plaintiff must prove by “a preponderance of the evidence that a 
facially neutral practice has a disproportionate adverse effect on a group 
protected by Title VI.”170 Once this burden is met, a prima facie showing of 
discriminatory impact is established and the burden then shifts to the 
government to show that the impact does not exist.171 The government can 
rebut this by proving that a “substantial legitimate justification” is present as 
a result of its practice.172 However, a plaintiff will still prevail if he or she 
can reveal that “a comparably effective alternative practice which would 
result in less disproportionality” is present.173  
To prove a discriminatory impact, a plaintiff must prove three elements: 
first, a facially neutral policy has an effect on a protected class of 
individuals; second, the effect must be adverse; and finally, the effect must 
be disproportionate.174 Statistics can be used to establish this discriminatory 
impact.175 Thus, the burden of proof under a Title VI claim is much lower 
than a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.  
Federal courts have held that plaintiffs met the burden of proving a 
discriminatory impact in numerous circumstances. For example, in 
Sandoval, the Eleventh Circuit found Alabama’s policy of administering its 
driver’s license exam only in English was a facially neutral classification 
that resulted in an adverse discriminatory impact on applicants of foreign 
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descent.176 In Guardians Association, applicants were appointed to entry-
level positions with the New York City Police Department according to 
their score on several written police examinations.177 As a result, African 
and Hispanic Americans were appointed after white applicants who had 
received higher test scores.178 Also, African and Hispanic American officers 
were laid off before similarly-situated white employees because the 
Department had a “last-hired, first-fired” policy.179 The Court held this 
examination procedure was not job related and resulted in a discriminatory 
impact.180 
A potential remedy for the government’s failure to comply with section 
2000d-1 of Title VI is the refusal to grant continued financial assistance to 
businesses that hire veterans under VHHA.181 Unless there is clear 
congressional intent to discriminate against a class protected by Title VI, the 
relief in private actions is solely limited to declaratory or injunctive relief 
ordering subsequent compliance with the statutory obligations at issue.182 
Other forms of relief, such as compensatory or punitive damages will not be 
awarded in a case where only a discriminatory impact is present.183 
Intentional discrimination must be shown.184 
B. Title VI Applied to the Vow to Hire Heroes Act 
Former military interpreters working beside the U.S. military in the 
Middle East have a valid claim under Title VI under the Civil Rights Act of 
1964. Former interpreters are being denied the benefits of the VHHA, which 
provides federal financial assistance to employers who hire American born 
veterans and job training to these veterans.185 The former interpreters who 
are the collateral victims of the VHHA are part of a suspect classification 
(legal aliens) under the Equal Protection Clause and the Fifth 
Amendment.186  
Additionally, interpreters can show they are suffering from a 
discriminatory impact resulting from the VHHA: the American service men 
and women they worked beside in the Middle East receive government 
benefits for contributing to the military mission while the interpreters do 
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not.187 Although an accurate study has not been conducted on the current 
employment rates of these former interpreters, an adverse, disproportionate 
effect is inferred when looking at the current employment rates among Iraqi 
refugees currently living in the U.S. and the U.S. Government 
Accountability Office’s finding that former interpreters currently struggle to 
find relevant work.188 Even if the government can prove there is a 
reasonable justification for the VHHA, interpreters can simply demonstrate 
that opening the benefits of the VHHA to former interpreters would 
eliminate the disproportionality. Moreover, providing the same benefits to 
interpreters would have little to no impact on American veterans because 
there are only approximately 3,500 former interpreters currently living in 
the U.S., compared with the 2.38 million American veterans living in the 
U.S.189 
Therefore, former interpreters would have a valid claim under Title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Although money damages could not be 
awarded unless plaintiffs can prove a discriminatory purpose, interpreters 
would be entitled to declaratory relief. As a result, the government would be 
forced to comply with Title VI, and Congress would have to extend the 
VHHA benefits to former interpreters. If Congress failed to do so, the 
VHHA would be stuck down as unconstitutional.  
CONCLUSION 
Congress has ignored the sacrifices made by interpreters overseas. This 
is evident when considering the government’s reluctance to fully comply 
with the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 and its failure to pass the 
REPAIR Act, which would have provided the former interpreters similar 
benefits to the VHHA. Further, governmental branches, such as the 
departments of State and Defense failed to enact programs in accordance 
with the Defense Authorization Act of 2009. This act would have allowed 
the State and Defense departments to hire former interpreters to provide 
essential services.190 As a result, former interpreters who share the same 
risks as American soldiers receive little in return for their service and 
sacrifice.  
Based on Congress’ decision to remain apathetic to the current suffering 
of the former interpreters in the U.S., intentional discrimination can be 
inferred from the VHHA, which fails to provide assistance to former 
interpreters. Therefore, a valid equal protection claim can be brought 
against the government for passing the VHHA. If a discriminatory purpose 
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cannot be shown, a valid claim under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 could provide the former interpreters with declaratory relief against 
the government. 
The former military interpreters are poor, tired, and hungry from years of 
fighting for the success of the U.S. military operations in the Middle East. 
They arrive in the U.S. and find the employment prospects and government 
support more closely resemble hell than heaven. Inaction by U.S. 
lawmakers in not extending VHHA benefits to former interpreters has left 
them with a troublesome decision: either continue life as paupers in the U.S. 
or return home where murderous extremists anxiously await. 
 
 



